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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a systematic theological response to the
environmentalist critique of Christian attitudes to the
natural world. Various occasional responses and a number of
historical studies have already demonstrated that this
critique is inaccurate in its portrayal of Christianity as
uniformly hostile to the environment. However, they also
show that those Christian traditions most closely associated
with the development of western science and technology
exhibit a deep-seated ambivalence towards matter and the
natural world.
In the thesis I relate this ambivalence to the western
post-Nicene development of the doctrine of the Trinity and
its impact on the doctrines of creation and providence.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 trace the relationship between these
doctrines and their effect on attitudes to the nonhuman
creation in the writings of Augustine, Bonaventure, Calvin,
Tillich, and Barth.
Chapter 5 re-examines several biblical texts which have
been of central importance in the development of the
Christian doctrine of creation. I reject Lynn White's
thesis that hostility to nature is an integral part of these
texts.	 I also question the thesis that creation faith is
always subordinate to soteriology. The chapter emphasises a
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number of ways in which the biblical texts offer a positive
view of the nonhuman creation.
In the final chapter I begin to develop a positive
theology of nature within the Reformed dogmatic locus of
providence. The resources I use include some of the
positive elements discerned in the preceding historical
study, a re-examination of certain key biblical texts, and a
modern interpretation of the eastern doctrine of the
Trinity. I conclude that the nonhuman creation has a proper
and lasting place within the divine economy. This is not to
deny the centrality of humankind but to argue that this
centrality must be interpreted in terms of priesthood,
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THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
1	 THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND WESTERN ATTITUDES TO
NATURE
The past thirty years have seen a dramatic awakening of
human consciousness to the rapid deterioration of our
environment as a result of human activities. The major
immediate causal factors appear to be exploitative or
inappropriate agricultural and forestry practices, resulting
in an accelerating loss of natural habitats and the
desertification of marginal agricultural land.	 Further
destruction of ecosystems is occurring as a result of
urbanisation and industrial pollutlon l . These immediate
causes have, in turn, been traced back to the exponential
growth in human population and the nature of current global
economic structures2.
However, environmentalists have not been content to
restrict their search for causes of the environmental crisis
to the above factors. They pursue their search for its
roots beyond the immediately visible aspects of human
behaviour into the realms of human belief systems and
intellectual constructions. 	 William Blackstone summarises
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the attitudes and values held to be responsible for the
crisis as follows:
the basic underlying causes ... are mistaken values and
attitudes--the attitudes that we can exploit the
environment without restrictions, that the production
of goods is more important than the people who use
them, that nature will provide unlimited resources,
that we have no obligation to future generations to
conserve resources, that continued increase in human
population is desirable and that the right to have as
many children as one wants is an inviolable right, that
the answer to the problems of technology is more
technology, and that gross differences and inequities
in the distribution of goods and services are quite
acceptable. (Blackstone 1974, 16)
In general, three widely held beliefs are regarded as
significant causal factors underlying the present situation:
the right to exploit nature (whether to benefit humankind as
a whole, a particular nation, or social class, or corporate
grouping, or individual); the acceptance (or positive
approval) of population growth; and, belief in the progress
of human society towards a specific (but variously defined)
goal. To this list is sometimes added a concern for
posterity (e.g., Black 1970, 21-22, 109-24).
In the light of recent developments in philosophy, it
is noteworthy that Blackstorie and the vast majority of
environmentalists simply assume that thought is prior to
behaviour: that specific beliefs and intellectual positions
may be regarded as causing specific types of behaviour.
Only a small minority is prepared to argue that the search
for intellectual or spiritual roots of the crisis is
fundamentally misguided. For Marxist environmentalists
(e.g., Leiss 1972) human activity is both logically and
temporally prior to reflection on that activity. Thus the
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Biblical injunction to be fruitful and multiply is no more
than a rationalisation of what is, in fact, the case given a
particular set of social and economic structures.
This divergence over the relationship between thought
and action is, of course, a dynamic analogue of the
longstanding philosophical debate about the relationship
between mind and body. The dominant view recalls the
Cartesian dualism (and other forms of idealism) which have
dominated western thought in recent centuries.
	 Its polar
opposite is clearly reminiscent of dialectical materialism
and epiphenomenalism. Since both extremes have been
subjected to severe criticism, I will content myself with
noting a strong correlation between particular patterns of
human behaviour and particular belief systems. Rather than
insisting that one is consistently the cause of the other,
I prefer to treat them as mutually determinative: human
actions are often the expression of mental processes but,
conversely, those same mental processes are continually
open to modification to provide rationalisations of human
actions.	 Thus in the case of the environmental crisis it
is not a mistake to seek intellectual causes (cf. Alves
1985, xxxiii).	 However, we must beware of oversimplified
explanations.
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2.	 CHRISTIANITY AS A ROOT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS?
From the insistence that the crisis has its roots in the
attitudes and values of Western society it is but a short
step to seeing it as a spiritual crisis. Since the Judaeo-
Christian traditions have played a formative role in our
society, it is not surprising to find widespread criticism
of them in environmentalist literature3.
Although not the most carefully nuanced of arguments,
Lynn White's case against the Latin strand of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition is widely accepted as representative of
environmentalist critiques of Christianity. Having laid
the blame for our present environmental problems squarely
at the door of western science and technology, he asks about
the world view that encouraged this development. Given the
widespread belief that science as we know it could not have
evolved without the particular presuppositions of the
Christian doctrine of creation 4 , it is not surprising that
he should look critically at the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures
as interpreted by western Christianity.
In particular he singles out for criticism the concepts
of dominium terrae and imago dei. The former leads to an
understanding of nature as a human utility: its sole
purpose is to minister to our physical needs. "God planned
all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no item
in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's
purposes" (White 1967, 1205). The latter sets man apart
from nature, presenting him as a demigod manipulating
-11-
passive matter:
Man shares, in great measure, God's transcendence of
nature. Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient
paganism and Asia's religions (except, perhaps,
Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism of man
and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that
man exploit nature for his proper ends. 	 (White 1967,
1 205).
In White's view, the combined effect of these concepts,
is to make Christianity "the most anthropocentric religion
the world has seen" (White 1967, 1205). Furthermore, he
suggests that the historical nature of te Judaeo-Christian
revelation, with its linear view of time, has contributed
to the appearance of doctrines of human progress in Western
society.
On this analysis, antipathy to the natural world is
implicit in the very foundations of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition. However, White allows that, "The implications
of Christianity for the conquest of nature would emerge more
easily in the Western atmosphere" (White 1967, 1206).
Furthermore he recognises within the more obviously anti-
ecological Western tradition the presence of a positive
strand of thought with respect to nature, personified by St
Francis of Assisi. He credits St Francis with recognising
that "all things are fellow creatures praising God in their
own ways, as men do in theirs" (White 1968, 100). For this
reason he proposes St Francis as "a patron saint for
ecologists" (White 1967, 1207) while asserting that his
views were strictly "heretical. "
More recently White has moderated his argument. Thus,
"All that can be said .. is that Christianity in its Latin
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form ... provided a set of presuppositions remarkably
favourable to technological thrust" (White 1973, 58).
Not surprisingly his original accusations elicited
considerable response from Christian theologians. Several
defensive responses may be discerned in these writings. Of
these, the most popular has been to question his historical
arguments 6 . For example, it is frequently pointed out that
considerable ecological damage has been done by non-
Christian cultures7 . This approach seeks to undermine his
charges by showing that Christianity does not bear sole
responsibility. Thus Arthur Peacocke asserts that,
to substantiate White's hypothesis ... it would be
necessary to show that men in the 'Judaeo-Christian
tradition' have uniquely generated the eco-disasters of
our planet; that an exploitative view of nature was
actually and generally held in that tradition; and that
this tradition actually does involve such an
exploitative view. (Peacocke 1979, 276)
But to argue in this vein is to miss the real strength
of White's argument. As he says himself, "No sensible
person could maintain that all ecologic damage is, or has
been, rooted in religious attitudes" (White 1973, 57). It
is illuminating to compare his thesis with Max Weber's
correlation of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Cap italism. Like White, Weber is often regarded as having
postulated a causal relationship between a body of
religious beliefs and a particular cluster of socio-
economic behaviours.	 And the arguments against Weber so
understood have been used against White.
	 However, Rubem
Alves has pointed out that
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Weber's analysis does not purport to establish a causal
relationship between the spirit of Protestantism and
the spirit of capitalism. It claims, rather, to
establish the functional relationship of the former to
the latter. In other words, the Protestant spirit is
structurally similar to the spirit of capitalism; hence
it is adapted to the latter and suited to its
expansion.	 (Alves 1985, 15).
Seen in this light, the moderate version of White's
case suggests a corresponding functional relationship
between Christian teaching with regard to nature and the
exploitative practices of significant sections of western
society. Thus it is not enough to offer historical counter-
examples. Western Christianity still stands accused of
being peculiarly adapted to permit the growth of
exploitative technologies and economic structures. An
adequate response to this charge must involve a careful
historical examination of the attitudes to nature adopted by
the western Christian traditions.
Santmire 1985 offers an outline of such an analysis.
In summary, the results of his research suggest that there
is a deep-rooted ambivalence towards nature in the Latin
(and hence also Protestant) theological and spiritual
traditions. He discerns two competing motifs within the
tradition: the spiritual (representing an anti-ecological
flight from creation towards a God conceived of as
transcendent Spirit) and the ecological. The dominant view
of Western Christianity may be regarded as the product of an
attempt to resolve this ambivalence by suppressing the
latter motif. Like White (and the majority of religious
environmentalists), he envisages the development of an
adequate theology of nature as involving the suppression of
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the former motif. Furthermore, his analysis suggests that
certain key figures in the history of western theology and
spirituality have achieved that suppression. Thus he sees
both Augustine and St Francis as paradigms for would-be
theologians of nature (Santmire 1985, 55-73; 106-19). The
apparent triumph of the ecological motif in these cases is
made the more remarkable by the fact that Santmire finds the
opposing spiritual motif even in the pages of the New
Testament (Santmire 1985, 210-15).
3.	 THE NEED FOR A THEOLOGY OF NATURE
(a) Theolo g ical and religious im p lications of
environmental i Sm:
Quite apart from the question of direct or indirect
culpability, the nature of the issues raised by the
ecological crisis suggests that Christian theology could
play a positive role in the associated intellectual debate.
There is wide agreement amongst environmentalists that what
is needed is not a technological response but rather a
transformation in our attitudes towards nature; if you
like, a repentance. Typical is Eugene Odum's comment that,
Science can define reasonable levels and limits of
growth and energy usage that are optimum for the
quality of human existence, but ethics coupled with the
legal and economic expediencies that derive from
ethical behaviour are absolutely necessary if we are to
make the orderly transition to maturity. (Odum 1974,
15)
In the face of such demands for prescriptive answers
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(for an environmental ethic) our technocentric Western
culture is impotent. Its continuing emphasis on
description as the basis for control and manipulation is
dangerously conservative (i.e., it tends to regard the
results of scientific desription as, somehow, normative).
Such canonisation of the status quo makes it difficult for
society to change direction even when it is widely
recognised that such change is necessary. The lack of any
convincing or authoritative guidance is clearly visible in
the lack of agreement over what would constitute an
acceptable (or even a viable) environmental ethic8.
The widespread demands for an appropriate environmental
ethic present theologians with an opportunity to re-examine
and further develop their own creation ethics. At the same
time, since an ethical system cannot be developed in a
vacuum, there is a clear need for further work to be done on
an appropriate ontology and philosophical anthropology.
Human capacity (perhaps fatally) to damage our natural
environment also raises several important questions for
theology. For instance John Black says of contemporary
humankind that,
Dominion over his environment has proceeded so far as
to encourage man to arrogate to himself the role of its
creator. If Christianity will be shown in the end to
have failed the world, it will have failed because it
encouraged man to set himself apart from nature, or, at
the very least, because it failed to discourage him
from doing this ... The end result of dissociating
himself from the rest of nature has been to dissociate
himself also from the belief in a divine creator.
(Black 1970, 121).
In what sense has twentieth century man come of age?
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Do the realities of the ecological crisis and the threat of
nuclear war imply that modern man has indeed wrested from
God the capacity to govern and perhaps to destroy his
creation?	 Clearly the present situation calls for a re-
examination of theological anthropology. Equally clear is
the need for an examination of the questions this raises
about divine sovereignty and God's activity of governing
the natural world.
One may also see the ecological crisis as requiring a
revision of our approaches to spirituality and worship in
the light of a revised understanding of the place of the
natural order in the divine will. The connection between
our attitude to nature and our approach to spirituality
appears very clearly in Santmire's analysis. In particular,
the spiritual motif which has formed such an important part
of the Western Christian traditions, and which Santmire
argues has contributed to the present crisis, is seen to be
at the very foundation of Western spirituality 9 . As Donald
Nicholl has commented,
there is an intimate connection between the picture
which human beings hold of their position in the cosmos
and the sort of wholeness or holiness which they regard
as feasible for human beings. If there is no such
harmonious connection between a person's image of his
own position and his image of the cosmos in which he
lives but, on the contrary, a jarring discord between
them, then all his efforts- to achieve wholeness and
holiness will be frustrated from the beginning.
(Nicholl 1981, 15).
If so, the jarring discord between a creation which God has
declared to be very good in its own right and the apparent
acquiescence of Christian theology in the face of its wanton
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destruction by humankind must be a cause for concern.
As regards the relationship between our attitude to
nature and worship, Hardy and Ford point out that,
Most praise is of God in interaction with the world.
He is praised for his creation, his acts, his words,
his loving presence and involvement. If the credibility
of this interaction is weakened then the very nerve of
praise is numbed. (Hardy & Ford 1984, 60)
This is precisely what happens when Christianity is silent
in the face of the exploitation of nature. In granting
humanity absolute power over creation, it denies the
sovereignty of God and undermines the credibility of his
interaction with his creation. Alternatively, one may say
that one's understanding of God's interaction with the
world critically affects one's views about what constitutes
an appropriate form of praise. It is significant that those
Christian traditions which have maintained a positive
attitude to the material creation in their theologies have
done so also in their forms of worship.
(b) The dogmatic necessity
It is arguable that without the stimulus of the
environmental crisis Christian teaching with respect to the
natural world would have remained largely unexamined.
However, once given that external stimulus, several
theological factors come into play which necessitate closer
attention to nature.
(1) Silence with res pect to nature:	 The single most
important such pressure is simply the consciousness of an
embarrassing silence regarding nature. 	 Pressure for
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revision of Christian attitudes to the natural world has
made theologians aware that the various Christian
theological traditions have remarkably little to say about
the nonhuman dimensions of creation.
Contrary to the opinion of some recent schools of
theology, there is a longstanding tradition that the
concerns of theology are not confined solely to the
relationship between God and man.
	 On the contrary, even
Albrecht Ritschl could write that lhree points are
necessary to determine the circle by which a religion is
completely represented--God, man and the world" (Ritschl
1902, 29). He even went on to complain about the neglect of
the third point by German theology after Schleiermacher
(Ritschl 1902, 587) 10 .	 More recently 1. F. Torrance has
insisted that
since theology has to do not simply with God/man
relations but with God/man/world or God/world/man
relations, an understanding of the world inevitably
enters into the coefficients of theological concepts
and statements. (Torrance 1980, 75)
Environmentalism has pointed out that, in spite of this
tradition of including the world within the circle of
theological concerns, theologians of all traditions have
been singularly poor at doing so. In recent years, the
inability of theologians to find a positive place for the
nonhuman creation has been commented on from a variety of
perspectives.	 Two of these comments are worth noting at
this point.
From the perspective of divine action in the world,
Langdon Gilkey has pointed out the inability of contemporary
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theology to accommodate a doctrine of providence (Gilkey
1963; Gilkey 1976, 188-238). Since this doctrine treats
God's continuing relation to the world, its marginalisation
must render problematic any effort to expound a theology of
nature in terms of any of the theologies criticised by
Gilkey11
A similar observation is made by Hendrikus Berkhof from
the perspective of the relationship of Christian faith and
hope to this world. He questions the tendency of Christlian
theology to detach faith and hope from its context in our
biophysical existence, and asserts that "Christian
conceptions of creation, of renewal, and of consummation
are bound to remain abstract, unless the world is included
in the consideration" where world is understood as the
totality of the contexts and structures within which human
existence takes place" (Berkhof 1979, 499). However,
Berkhof is himself by no means entirely free from the
tendency to undervalue the nonhuman context of human
existence. This is clearly illustrated by the serious
consideration he gives to the possibility of using society
or culture as synonyms for world (and the reasons he gives
for rejecting them). (Berkhof 1979, 499-501).
As has been pointed out by Karl Barth, the existence of
such silences in systematic theology clearly indicates the
need for theologians to attend to unspoken presuppositions
and to ensure that they are, in fact, in accordance with
Scripture. In his own words,
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In theology we must always be suspicious when questions
are left open and problems evaded, for in practice it
means that they are linked with certain necessary
answers which because they are casual and unregulated
may well be completely false. It is in those
situations where we can proceed only by surreptitiously
leaving questions unanswered that we easily find
ourselves in deep water in our theological thinking and
utterance. (CD 111/3, 140)
But this internal pressure to avoid silences within
theology is not merely negative. Pannenberg puts it in a
positive light by considering the nature of the God of the
Christian revelation. Since God is the creator of all
things, "the task of theology goes beyond its special theme
and includes all truth whatever" (Pannenberg 1970, 1)12. It
follows that,
A theology that remains conscious of the intellectual
obligation that goes along with the use of the word
"God" will try in every possible way to relate all
truth, and therefore not least of all the knowledge of
the extra-theological sciences, to the God of the
Bible, and to attain a new understanding of everything
by viewing it in the light of this God. That task
might seem presumptuous, but it is the non-transferable
burden laid upon any responsible speech about God.
(Pannenberg 1970, 2)
(-ii) Nature and communion: Another factor which
demands that we re-examine the theological significance of
the nonhuman creation is the personalism of many
contemporary theologians.
This is closely associated with the recent dramatic
revival of interest in the doctrine of the Trinity.
Recognition of its fundamental place in Christian doctrine
has led to the creation of dynamic trinitarian ontologies.
In the context of such ontologies, created being is seen in
terms of participation, communion, or relatedness. Such an
approach lends itself to a the-anthropocentric neglect of
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the nonhuman unless it takes pains to work out the meaning
of an ontology of communion for non-personal being. By
their very nature, such theologies take up the challenge of
Martin Buber's insistence that I-Thou relationships extend
to the nonhuman (e.g., Buber 1970, 57-58).
The theology which most clearly demonstrates the
dangers of failing to do so is that of Karl Barth. In
spite of having written more than two thousand words on the
subject, he is often accused of failing to take creation
seriously.	 Of course, his clearly stated reluctance to
tackle this doctrine (CD 111/1, ix) was partly responsible
for attracting such criticism. However, as we shall see
later, there is in his doctrine of creation such a strong
emphasis on man as the paradigmatic creature and on Jesus
Christ as the paradigmatic man as to raise serious
suspicions in the minds of those whose concern is to
articulate a theology of nature13.
(iii) The lin guistic necessit y : In addition to the
above, a third theological factor may be mentioned.
Theological language, indeed all language, is shot through
with metaphors drawn from the world of nature. The free
use of such metaphors by the biblical authors is sometimes
dismissed as merely metaphorical: the implication being that
such language is nothing more than poetic embellishment.
However, an approach to theological language that takes
metaphor seriously cannot ignore the fact that human
communications are embedded in the nonhuman. It is simply
incongruous for theology to be so dependent on something it
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neglects or affects to despise.
(c) The polemical necessity
Environmentalism,	 particularly in its more aggressive
religiously	 motivated	 forms,	 has	 suggested	 that
Christianity is incorrigibly out of step with some of the
most deeply held beliefs of contemporary culture.
	 One of
the tasks of theology is the defensive one of responding to
such criticisms. Since the self-understanding of the
Christian community is expressed in terms it shares with
its cultural context, the theologian cannot take for
granted that the conventional wisdom of the church is an
accurate interpretation of the Christian revelation.
Secular criticisms may highlight either the points at which
the Gospel scandalises the world or points at which the
church has accommodated the Gospel to a now obsolete secular
world view.
Hendrikus Berkhof points out three important challenges
to the aforementioned theological silence with respect to
the world (Berkhof 1979, 505-07). As he points out, they
have already had a major influence on the way in which the
social world of man has been integrated into contemporary
theology.
The first was the appearance of a secularism which
accuses Christianity of regarding this world as irrelevant
to, or, at best, merely instrumental in the achievement of
God's purposes.	 Closely related to this is the second
challenge: the dialectical materialism of Marxism. 	 Its
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effect has been to recall our attention to "how much of an
alienating effect the structures of our world can have with
respect to the quality of human life as desired by God"
(Berkhof 1979, 505). Thus, in a negative sense, it
stresses the embeddedness of human life in the structures
of this world. The third of Berkhof's perceived challenges
is that of evolutionary thought and the dynamic view of the
natural world which has accompanied it. In the light of
this new dynamism, the static understanding of the world
favoured by the older orthodoxy becomes highly suspect.
Berkhof suggests that -it "involves a challenge to
theologians to broaden the belief in man's changeability
(sanctification) so that it includes the sanctification of
the world as well" (Berkhof 1979, 506).
In addition to these pressures on us not to maintain
our silence with respect to the natural world, it is
important to be aware of further pressures exerted by our
contemporary scientific understanding of the world. The
twentieth century has seen a radical transformation in the
way we understand the world both in the physical sciences
and the biological sciences. For example, the combined
effect of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity and the
more recent development of Quantum Mechanics has been to
undermine the older view of the physical world as a
deterministic mechanism14 . Quite apart from the awareness
of the interconnectedness of things created by developments
in ecology, such changes in scientific outlook demand a re-
examination of Christian traditions with respect to the
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natural world.
4.	 FACTORS WORKING AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
THEOLOGY OF NATURE
However, in spite of the pressures cited above, there are a
number of emphases in recent theology which actively hinder
the development of a theology of nature. Within twentieth
century protestant theology four, in particular, stand
outl5. Because of its association with the tradition of
doing natural theology, theological attention to nature is
widely regarded as a threat to the Christian revelation.
Even if the difference between natural theology and
theology of nature is recognised, it is still suggested
that the concept of nature carries with it alien
philosophical connotations which constitute a threat to any
theology which engages with the concept. A particularly
influential form of this objection is to be found in
twentieth century existential approaches to theology.
Theologians such as Bultmann call into question the
objectification they see in such attempts to grapple with
the nonhuman dimensions of the world. Finally, even
theologians who would not be averse to theologies of nature
on other grounds counsel caution because of the mystery of
nature revealed by modern science. 	 Some go so far as to
commend the view that theology should remain agnostic with
regard to the world of science.	 In brief, it has been
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suggested by a wide variety of theologians that such
attention to the nonhuman is either inappropriate or
impossible within theology.
(a) Natural theology:
In western Christianity, the traditional loci of
theological attention to the natural world were natural
theology and the hexaemeral literature (exegetical or
dogmatic accounts of the divine creative activity).
	 Since
the Enlightenment, both loci have been lost. The former
has been subjected to a variety of philosophical and (more
recently) theological criticisms while the latter has been
dismembered by a combination of biblical criticism and
modern scientific cosmogonies. Not surprisingly, the
assault on natural theology has been seen as a key factor
in inhibiting the development of a theology of nature
(Macquarrie 1975, 69). Those who question the legitimacy
of natural theology are widely seen as wishing to eliminate
nature from the sphere of theology16.
Thus an examination of the criticisms of natural
theology and the counter-claims of contemporary natural
theologians will help us to define more clearly the
boundaries of a legitimate theology of nature.
(i) What is natural theolo gy? Natural theology has
been defined in a variety of ways (Avis 1984) with the
result there is considerable disagreement over precisely
what it was trying to achieve. There is less disagreement
over its content: it embraced all natural knowledge of God,
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the human soul and natural law (Macquarrie 1977, 45).
Since it is the Barthian approach which is seen to create
difficulties for would-be theologians of nature we would do
well to examine just what Barth was objecting to. In the
first of his 1937 Gifford Lectures, he defined it thus:
a science of God, of the relations in which the world
stands to Him and of the human ethics and morality
resulting from the knowledge of Him. This science is
to be constructed independently of all historical
religions and religious bodies as a strict natural
science like chemistry and astronomy "without reference
to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or
so-called miraculous revelation." (Barth 1938, 3)
It is clear from this definition that what Barth has in
mind is not so much a particular content (e.g., the theistic
arguments for the existence of God) as a method. Natural
theology is seen as offering a rational and empirical
foundation for revealed theology.	 Its contemporary
advocates see this as an essential link between reason and
faith (Macquarrie 1977, 44). Without it, so it is argued,
there can be no point of contact between secular and
theological discourse. Thus apologetics becomes impossible
and theology unintelligible.
(ii) Objections to natural theolo gy : The Enlightenment
and post-Enlightenment philosophical critiques of natural
theology have been enormously influential. Hume, Kant, and,
more recently, Nietzsche and Camus have changed the face of
natural theology and the philosophy of religion. However,
if their intention was to debunk natural theology their
efforts have been strikingly unsuccessful. Even Darwin's
remarkable inversion of Paley's natural theology has failed
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to dissuade those who are convinced of its value.
Perhaps this lack of success can be explained by the
fact that these critiques were directed at the content of
natural theology rather than the method. By highlighting
glaring inconsistencies in the classical natural theological
tradition, they actually enabled natural theology to
complete its absorption of revealed theology. The theistic
arguments claimed too much because they remained connected
to ideas of God derived from classical philosophy and the
Christian revelation. What Kant, in particular, offered was
a way of purging the older natural theology of those
inconsistencies. The very title of one of his works sums up
precisely what the natural theological programme was about:
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. It was the
victory of this Kantian purge of natural theology which
allowed it the dominant but covert place in German
Protestantism to which Barth and his contemporaries
objected.
This critique had little effect on Anglo-Saxon liberal
theology. The tradition which was most wedded to the
classical approach to natural theology (typified by the
physico-theologians and William Paley) for the most part
ignored the newer natural theology of Kant. The failure of
these philosophical critiques to convince those who were
committed to the older natural theological (or physico-
theological) programme becomes easier to understand when
its ideological utility is considered.
	
Physico-theology
was promoted by the scientific establishment of the
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of
	 its
apologetic value for science: it presented scientific
research	 as	 a quasi-religious enterprise and
	 thus
established the moral worth of science education. As the
lowest common denominator for theist and deist alike it
offered them common ground from which to attack atheism as
irrational as well as morally reprehensible. Related to
its polemical value against atheism was its political
utility: by presenting the natural order as divine it
allowed 'natural' forms of government such as constitutional
monarchy to be seen as divinely inspired. Thus the
advocates of natural theology were able to take even
Darwinism in their stride.
Turning to the theological objections to natural
theology, the successors of Barth focus their attention on
its theological function. Natural theology first
established itself in a theological tradition which was
seeking a stable synthesis of a Neoplatonism mediated
through the theology of St Augustine and a Platonised
Aristotelianism advocated by St Thomas Aquinas. 	 The most
important of its antecedents was the natural theology of
Hellenistic culture.
	 Thus its intellectual context was
strongly dualistic.	 The accepted epistemology involved a
sharp dualism between natural and supernatural knowledge:
between reason and faith. Corresponding to this was an
equally sharp cosmological dualism between God and creation:
divine action was limited, in semi-deistic fashion, to
evoking creaturely activity already latent in creation. In
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this situation, natural theology provided a vital logical
bridge between the world and God (Torrance 1980, 80).
Macquarrie's contention that without natural theology
there can be no link between faith and reason suggests that
it performs the same function today. Taken together with
natural theology's continuing association with a dualism of
God's Being and Act and a deistic gulf between God and
creation, this suggests that natural theology is incapable,
of itself of sustaining an orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity 17 .	 The relevance of Barth's relocation of this
doctrine thus becomes clear.
However, the central Barthian objection to natural
theology as defined above is that it makes human reason the
decisive factor in the knowledge of God. For Barth, there
can be as little question of a co-operation of reason in
the knowledge of the true God, as of co-operation of the
human will in the fulfilment of the divine commandments"
(Barth 1946, 97). In other words, the paradox of grace
extends also to the knowledge of God.
In contrast to this, natural theology is founded upon
the presupposition that rational inquiry into the structures
of this world can provide us with (limited) public knowledge
of God: or at least with evidence of his existence. At the
very starting point of theology this research programme
divorces the knowledge of God from the grace of God. For
Barth this approach is objectionable for a number of
reasons.
Perhaps the most important objection for a Reformed
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theologian is that it fails to take full account of the
radical nature of human sinfulness. Natural knowledge of
God is possible in principle but not in fact because of the
distortion imposed by sin upon all human activities (Barth
1946, 107).
	 A related objection is that knowledge of a
created order which is divorced from grace merely
exacerbates the problem of evil. For Barth, what Brunner
refers to as preserving grace "might just as well be our
condemnation to a kind of antechamber of hell!" (Barth
1946, 84).
In one form or another natural theology plays a key
role in the religious quest of humankind. 	 It forms the
basis of all generalised philosophical or religious
concepts of God (in which the divine character is
established either by extrapolation from or negation of the
characteristics perceived in the structures of this world).
Far from providing the bridge by which one can move from
such skeletal knowledge of God to the much fuller knowledge
of God possible through divine revelation, it allows the
latter to be reduced to an element in man's religious
quest. The western bias in favour of the rational has
meant that, in practice, wherever natural theology has
started as the handmaiden of revelation she has sooner or
later become the mistress. This bias is amply demonstrated
by the covert adoption of the Averroist doctrine of the two
verities which, not content with setting faith and reason
in opposition, suggested that the truths of reason were of
a higher order than those of faith.
	
The same bias is
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visible in the deists' advocacy of natural religion, and
Hegel's treatment of religion and philosophy.
Such an approach is impossible to reconcile with a
theology which starts from the self-revelation of God to
humankind.	 It is false, not because its statements are
false, but because man is false.
	
Barth is opposed to it
because of its motivation. As Torrance puts it,
natural theology as such arises out of man's natural
existence and is part of the whole movement in which he
develops his own autonomy and seeks a naturalistic
explanation for himself within the universe. (Torrance
1984, 290)
This may be illustrated with an analogy from the
natural sciences. All human sciences are characterised by a
tension between an obedient understanding of the object of
study and man's desire to predict and control. Barth
understands natural theology as the religious expression of
that desire to predict and control: to make even God fit
into our self-understanding. 	 This suggests that even when
met on its own ground, natural theology is susceptible to a
particularly damaging criticism: that of Feuerbach. 	 To
continue the analogy with the natural sciences this is the
religious equivalent of recognising that such an
instrumentalist approach ultimately surrenders any claim to
give us knowledge of an objective reality.
It follows from this that, for the natural theologian,
our present understanding of the structures of the world is
normative (Webster 1986, 123). Thus it may impart to the
science of its day a dogmatic status which may impede future
research.	 It may also result in a conservatism which
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favours the social and political status quo (thus rendering
Christianity politically neutral and morally impotent).
Alternatively it may be used, as in some forms of liberation
theology, to dignify the revolutionary inclinations of the
theologian with the status of an ordinance of creation.
Barth asks of all such claims, "Can such a claim be anything
other than the rebellious establishment of some very private
Weltanschauunq
 as a kind of papacy?" (Barth 1946, 86f.).
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the
contemporary developments of natural theology are remarkably
unhelpful when it comes to developing a theology of nature.
This is because, following the insights of Kant, they have
become highly anthropocentric. 	 The science of God's
activity in the world has become the science of human
religious experience. Thus George Hendry cites the
anthropological concentration of modern natural theology as
one of the reasons for the continuing eclipse of the
doctrine of creation (Hendry 1971/72, 417).
(i -u) The limits of a theology of nature:
	 However,
Barth goes further than the Reformers.
	 His radical
alternative to natural theology appears to eliminate the
need for a general revelation. This has resulted in
accusations of a subjectivising tendency in his view of
revelation (e.g., Berkouwer 1955, 330).
Why does Barth proceed in this manner? He stresses
that man can only know God as a result of God's self-
revelation. In his present fallen condition such encounters
entail God's coming to us in grace and reconciliation:
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through his Son Jesus Christ. The existence of a general
revelation creates the possibility of a knowledge of God
which is independent of the knowledge mediated by his
gracious encounter with us in Christ.. As soon as the
dialectic created by the early Reformers' stress on human
sinfulness is lost, this becomes a basis for a theology of
the first article. Such a theology presumes that a
knowledge of God as Creator may be attained from the
structures of the world without reference to His special
revelation in Christ. In so doing it assumes that some
knowledge of God's Being can be attained independently of a
knowledge of his saving activity: it thus opens the door to
a modalistic conception of the Trinity.
Does this indicate that a theology of nature is futile
or misguided? This would be the case only if nature were
regarded as a second book of revelation: a source of
knowledge of God supplementary to that found in Scripture.
Barth's view of revelation does not exclude the possibility
of a theology of nature within the limits of revelation
alone. On the contrary, Torrance argues that Barth's
approach effectively integrates the content of natural
theology into the framework of Christian dogmatics (Torrance
1980, 90-109). Similarly Jungel, in his development of
Barth's theology, speaks of the possibility of a "more
natural theology" which is a theory of the enrichment of man
and his world by the incarnation (Webster 1986, 127): a
doctrine of the worldly implications of the Christian
revelation.
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Creation has been divested of any revelatory content:
the Christian theologian is not at liberty to supplement or
qualify our knowledge of God with information gleaned from
the natural or social sciences. Calvin spoke of a general
revelation in the structures of the world which could be
perceived only through the spectacles of special revelation.
Barth prefers to speak of signs and witnesses: there is in
the way this world is constituted that which reflects the
one revelation of God in Christ. For Barth, the world is
sacramental but not revelatory.
Thus Barth's rejection of natural theology need not be
seen as a barrier to a theology of nature. Indeed, in the
midst of his most strident repudiation of the former he
nevertheless warns that "it would be advisable to be
careful about statements such as that man alone is capable
of receiving the Word of God" (Barth 1946, 88). However,
Barth himself failed to develop the worldly implications of
revelation. That such a development is possible within a
broadly Barthian context is clear from Jungel's 'more
natural theology": an account of the one light which
enlightens, and thereby enriches, the world.
Thus a theology of nature does not seek knowledge of
God from the natural world. Rather it looks at nature in
the light of God. It examines the implications for our
world (and our relationship to it) of this enrichment of the
world by the incarnation.
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(b) The impropriety of nature as a theological concept
The preceding section has gone some way to clarifying the
methodology of a Christian theology of nature by ruling out
as illegitimate the use of the tradition of natural
theology. Thus a theology of nature may not be developed
as a prolegomenon to a revealed theology. On the contrary,
if Christian theology is to attend to nature it must do so
in the light of the Christian revelation. But is this
either possible or desirable?
One possible response to the recent spate of calls for
a theology of nature is to argue that the concept of nature
implies a metapnysical position incommensurable with
Christian theology. This view has been discussed with some
care by Kaufman 1981.
He begins with a note of warning: theologians must
always be self-critical of their use of non-Biblical
concepts. Thus any theology of nature must give careful
consideration to the concept of nature.
The first thing to note about this concept is its
multivalence18 . Because of the extreme complexity of its
usage, Kaufman restricts himself to a consideration of its
use in such phrases as 'the order of nature' and 'the
natural world'. Here he observes an ambiguity which goes
beyond mere linguistic confusion. Nature denotes both the
totality of powers and processes (including man and all his
works) and the polar opposite of culture. Taking the latter
as his starting point, Kaufman defines nature as
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the widest context of human life, and thus our most
fundamental home, viewed as wilderness ("untouched by
human hand") rather than on some analogy or image drawn
from the teleological and meaning-filleii orders of
society and culture. (Kaufman 1981, 218)
A comparison of this definition with Kant's concept of
world leads him to suggest that nature is a more concrete,
more immediate concept. Being an object of our experience
in a way that world cannot be, nature more readily becomes
an object of religious devotion. But it is an idol which is
implicitly metaphysical. It leads us to believe that the
reality we experience has no place for purpose, meaning or
value.
He then contrasts this with the traditional (i.e.,
western) Christian metaphysics which, he believes, asserts
that ultimate reality is moral and personal. Thus it sets
God and man over against nature. At best the nonhuman is of
secondary importance. Thus,
The rest of creation, though always recognized and
sometimes acknowledged and even reflected upon, simply
was not of central theological interest or importance,
and (with the exception of the angels) never became the
subject of any technical theological vocabulary.
(Kaufman 1981, 222)
In spite of the balancing tradition of responsible
stewardship, Kaufman concludes that a theology that takes
nature seriously will entail a radical re-examination of
the Christian concept of God. A corollary of this is the
impossibility of merely equating nature and the Christian
concept of creation. 	 In his view this would be merely a
glossing over of the fundamental issue, namely that
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The very ideas of God and humanity, as they have
gradually been worked out over millenia, are so framed
as to blur or even conceal our embeddedness in the
natural order as we now are increasingly conceiving it.
(Kaufman 1981, 226)
On the other hand the apparent lack of purpose, meaning
and value in nature causes him to doubt the value of a more
naturalistic approach. He fears that the theological use of
this concept may lead us to de-personalise a universe which
Christianity regards as fundamentally personal.
In the end Kaufman leaves us with questions rather than
answers.	 He fails to offer us a middle path between a
personalistic	 but anti-ecological 	 theism and a de-
personalising naturalism. But is the dilemma as stark as he
suggests? We must not forget that the understanding of
nature which he has examined was itself the product of a
scientific culture steeped in the Christian traditions.
It is worth noting that his definition of nature places
too much weight on the purposelessness of nature.
Purposeful activity is not the exclusive prerogative of the
human species as any ethologist would be quick to point
out.	 It is true that strict philosophical naturalism
demands the elimination of teleological explanation. The
success of the antiteleological programme in the sciences is
well illustrated by the following poignant observation: "The
more the universe seems comprehensible the more it also
seems pointless" (Weinberg 1977, 154).
	
However, as this
comment suggests, we must distinguish between purposes and
(ultimate) purpose.
	 If Kaufman means that purposes are
absent from nature, then he is simply wrong.
	 If he means
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that it lacks an ultimate purpose then he is covertly
assuming that human culture (in contrast to nature)
possesses an ultimate purpose.
For the forerunners of the Newtonian world view
teleology was not excluded from nature. On the contrary,
scientists such as Robert Boyle and John Ray omitted
teleology from their scientific accounts of the world
precisely because they accepted its reality and recognised
that it was not susceptible to the same mode of
investigation as were efficient causes. This tradition of
regarding nature as teleologically neutral rather than anti-
teleological is probably still typical of the sciences.
Indeed there remain many scientists and non-scientists
whose concept of nature still
	 contains an implicit
assumption that the natural world is purposeful.
But even if lack of purpose were implicit in the
concept of nature this would not, as Kaufman seems to
suggest, preclude its use in Christian theology. Two quite
different lines of theological reasoning can be adduced in
support of this contention.
First, purpose is by no means as central to Christian
theology as Kaufman suggests. Tillich, for example, has
put on record his doubts about the propriety of using this
concept in Christian theology (Tillich 1953, 263-64).
	
From
a completely different theological perspective, Moltmann
has made very similar observations. In his case, he
questions the tendency to connect purpose and meaning. For
him one of the meanings of the Gospel is precisely the
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proclamation of liberation from bondage to a purpose,
enabling all creation to participate in the eschatological
celebration (Moltmann 1973, 56).
Second, theologians must always be on their guard when
they make use of concepts from the culture in which they
live. As Barth rightly insisted, the meaning of terms used
in Christian theology must always be governed by the
Christian revelation and not by their secular etymology.
Insofar as Kaufman has reminded us that nature may bear
connotations which must be stripped away before the term may
be used theologically he has done all would-be theologians
of nature an important service 19 . However, to deny
theologians the right to use, and in using to modify, the
concept at all would be to undermine our attempts to respond
to a major problem of our times.
If we are not deterred from a theology of nature by
doubts about the theological propriety of concepts such as
nature we must, nevertheless, take seriously Kaufman's
point about the Christian concepts of God and humankind.
The difficulty of speaking theologically about the nonhuman
will not be alleviated without a major revision of the
concepts and metaphors which have dominated western
theology in recent centuries. This is the avenue adopted
in this thesis, and it is my contention that just such a
revision has been underway for some years. One weakness of
Santmire's examination of western Christian attitudes to
nature is its failure to relate those attitudes to our
understanding of God. A major task of this thesis will be
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make up for that deficiency.
(c) The influence of existentialism
At this point it is appropriate to examine a significant
strand of contemporary theology which, deterred by its
understanding of nature, has opted for an exclusive
concentration on humankind in relation to God. I refer, of
course, to Christian existentialism.
Existentialists insist that a statement, in order to be
meaningful, must address one's own present existence: it
must be personally involving. Thus Christian
existentja1sts outlaw from their theology all merely
general statements about God and the world: theological
statements must say something about God's relationship to
me.	 Furthermore the personal existence so involved is
defined in historical rather than natural terms.
	 In other
words, self is defined by historical events and personal
decisions rather than by some essential nature. Thus
personal existence is at root dynamic and open to the
future in contrast to some classical understandings of
human nature which appear static and determined by the
past.
The implications of this tendency for a Christian
theology of nature may be seen by examining the place given
to nature by one of the most influential Christian
existentialists, Rudolf Bultmann.
Both of the above points bear directly on the Christian
understanding of nature, and both may be illustrated from
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Bultmann's own work.
	 The former appears in Bultmann's
concern to find the most appropriate way of putting the
questions of theology.	 For Bultmann, all theological
questions are questions about human existence. It follows
from this presupposition that God and nature are only
treated insofar as they are relevant to such questions.
From the outset the questions he poses are so couched as to
threaten the nonhuman with relegation to a secondary place
in theology.
The second point pervades Bultmann's theology in the
form of a sharp contrast between nature and history. This
contrast is well illustrated by the introduction to one of
his early works, Jesus and the Word:
a fundamental presupposition of this book is that the
essence of history cannot be grasped by "viewing" it,
as we view our natural environment in order to orient
ourselves in it. Our relationship to history is wholly
different from our relationship to nature. Man, if he
rightly understands himself, differentiates himself
from nature. When he observes nature, he perceives
there something objective which is not himself. When
he turns his attention to history, however, he must
admit himself to be a part of history; he is
considering a living complex of events in which he is
essentially involved. He cannot observe this complex
objectively as he can observe natural phenomena; for in
every word which he says about history he is saying at
the same time something about himself. Hence there
cannot be impersonal observation of history in the same
sense that there can be impersonal observation of
nature.	 (Bultmann 1958, 11)
What understanding of nature can we deduce from this
and other statements in Bultmann's writings 20 ? We appear
to be confronted with two contrasting realms: nature and
history. Man observes nature but participates in history.
He is able to differentiate himself from nature since it is
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constituted by events as objectified by human reason
whereas it is impossible for him to disentangle himself from
history in the same way.
In his essay "The Question of Wonder" Bultmann
characterises nature as "the law-governed complex of all
that happens" (Bultmann 1969, 252), and he distinguishes it
from world. He also distinguishes nature from creation in
the following terms,
if one tries to apply the ideas of creation and wonder
to the unending, law-conforming process which we call
nature, the whole idea of wonder becomes meaningless.
If all that happens is wonderful, then there is nothing
further; God and world are equated. (Bultmann 1969,
250f.)
These contrasts are significant and relate to the
primary contrast between nature and history but, for the
moment we will continue to examine what he has to say about
nature.
Nature is governed by law; it is a closed deterministic
causal order comprehensible in terms of rational thought21
(Bultmann 1957, 6fj. It stands in direct opposition to
the concepts of wonder, miracle, and divine action
(Bultmann 1969, 250, 253). By the same token, providence,
which he describes as "the teleological character which can
be discerned in the working of natural law" (Bultmann 1958,
118), is a concept of nature: it thus becomes problematic
for an existential approach to theology.
Most striking of all is his assertion that life is not
a phenomenon of nature. Claiming to follow Pauline usage,
he describes life as "the life a man leads in his concrete
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existence, the intentionality of human existence" (Bultmann
1952, 210).	 Life understood in this sense is not even a
phenomenon of the world.	 On the contrary, "it belongs
solely to God and his Revealer (Bultmann 1969, 172).
Taken together, these points seem to suggest an
extremely Cartesian understanding of nature 22 . However, it
should be noted that Bultmann, having presented nature as a
particular way of interpreting the world, invariably gives
this interpretation a negative evaluation. His negative
view of this understanding of nature is strikingly summed
up in his assertion that nature is a concept of man in the
mode of sinner (Bultmann 1969, 247).
I believe there is an ambiguity running throughout his
treatment of nature. On the one hand there is this use of
nature to denote a mechanistic interpretation of our
physical environment. This would constitute an exclusive
alternative to history understood as a way of looking at the
world which makes humankind an integral part of the world.
However, when challenged about this apparent dualism of
nature and history, he explicitly denied that he worked with
such a dualism. In a reply to Paul Minear's account of his
eschatology, Bultmann insists that nature and history are
inseparable and that the distinction is merely
phenomenological (Bultmann 1966, 267). He does not support
any form of dualism between natural and historical events
themsel yes.
This is confirmed by a strand of more positive
statements about nature running through his writings in
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parallel with the ones noted above. For example, "there is
no need of escaping beyond the present or outside of nature.
Nowhere does Jesus say that nature is evil" (Bultmann 1958,
77). Similarly, in contrast to his view that nature is the
sinner's interpretation of world events, Jesus sees nature
only as "the God-given world in which man receives the gift
of God and must prove himself obedient to God's will"
(Bultmann 1958, 43). Nature in the sense of environment is
not separable from history. It
does not exist for its own sake, for the drama of man's
history is enacted in its midst, and whether it wills
or no, it is drawn into the complex of that drama,
becomes involved in the fate of man, is violated and
despoiled by man. (Bultmann 1960b, 73)
Bultmann reaffirms the traditional doctrine of dominium
terrae but recognises the ambiguity of that lordship.
Elsewhere he qualifies the lordship of humankind with the
comment that it is given to us as creatures (Bultmann 1961,
221): it is conditional upon authentic existence. When we
fail to recognise that we are related to God as creature to
creator we become the slaves and destroyers of the world
(Bultmann 1957, 3).
Giving Bultmann the benefit of the doubt for the
moment, we may say that he opts for a historical
interpretation of all events. However, as the last
paragraph suggests, this is by no means the end of the
story.	 He recognises two mutually exclusive ways of
viewing historical	 existence:	 an	 inauthentic way as
world23 , and an authentic way as creation.
World translates the fallen human kosmos of the New
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Testament. He says that "It is not conceived at all as an
objective phenomenon.	 The 'world'--is primarily mankind"
(Bultmann 1969, 166).
	 It is "the specific reality in which
I live and act,
	 world" (Bultmann 1969, 252).
	
It is a
historical reality which "is never objectified as a natural
order whose eternal
	 laws are open to intellectual
apprehension" (Bultmann 1960a, 17).
Creation, however, takes on a rather different meaning
from the one we are used to.
Statements which speak of God's actions as cosmic
events are illegitimate. The affirmation that God is
creator cannot be a theoretical statement about God as
creator mundi in a general sense. The affirmation can only
be a personal confession that I understand myself to be a
creature which owes its existence to God. It cannot be
made as a neutral statement, but only as a thanksgiving and
surrender (Bultmann 1958, 69).
Thus, faith -in the Creator (Bultmann's preferred way of
expressing references to creation) means a recognition and
acceptance of one's (past, present, and future) dependence
upon God. Since the demise of Cartesian dualism (and
because of the influence of existentialism) few theologians
would deny that this element of self-involvement is a
necessary dimension of faith in creation 24 . However, in
order to defend this element, Bultmann feels it necessary to
deny the possibility that such self-involving statements
have objective implications.
Bultmann's insistence on the exclusively existential
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meaning of theological statements makes it impossible for
him to embark on a theology of nature as such. Natural
events are properly understood only in terms of humankind
(Bultmann 1960b, 73).
	
Furthermore they are irrelevant to
Jesus Christ except as they provide a stage for human
activity (Bultmann 1958, 43, 77). Accordingly, he denies
that the eschaton involves any transformation of nature
(Bultmann 1966, 268). It comes as no surprise to find that
for Bultmann the doctrine of creation implies that God has
placed the earth at the disposal of the human race. Nature
has no relevance in itself but only as our servant.
Similarly human threats to the environment are relevant only
when they are also threats to human existence.
It is instructive to compare this view of nature with
that of his close associate, the philosopher Heidegger. He
classifies the nonhuman into two categories: all natural
occurrences are either vorhanden (merely being to hand) or
zuhanden (present at hand: relevant to humankind because
integrated into our instrumental system)25.
We may conclude that Bultmann, and his fellow
existentialists, while rightly calling into question the
reductionistic tendencies of nineteenth century naturalism,
have maintained and intensified the anthropological
concentration characteristic of much Christian theology.
This is not to imply that existentialists have not been
concerned about the ecological crisis, but simply that
their philosophy does not have the categories to tackle the
issue.
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(d) A gnosticism with re gard to the world of science
A final factor which hinders the development of modern
theologies of nature is the widespread belief that theology
ought to be agnostic with regard to the world of science.
Clearly the rejection of natural theology and the
heightened anthropological concentration encouraged by
existentialism have contributed to this belief. However, it
had already established itself long before the appearance of
either of these factors.
The suggestion that theology should refrain from
commenting on areas which are properly the objects of
natural scientific investigation dates back at least to
Herbert Spencer and was widely adopted in the late
nineteenth century as a way in which theology and science
could coexist. However, as Aubrey Moore pointed out,
Spencer's modus vivendi was, in reality a Trojan Horse
(Moore 1891, 43f.). The natural sciences by their very
nature continually expand into new areas of reality. Thus
areas which were once regarded as the preserve of religion
are now firmly within the sphere of science. The
boundaries proposed by Spencer may have protected science
from theology but they did nothing to prevent incursions in
the opposite direction. It is not surprising that the
warfare metaphor for the relationship between science and
religion developed at the same time as this uneasy truce.
(i) The two realms and com p lementarity: A variety of
similar,	 though more sophisticated, views have been
prevalent in the twentieth century. 	 Perhaps closest to
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Spencer's position are those who see reality as a duality
of realms: natural and supernatural; temporal and eternal;
natural and historical; physical and mental (or spiritual).
We have already seen the impact of this approach in
theology in the discussion of Bultmann's contribution.
Similar comments could have been made about Karl Helm's
proposal that science be restricted to the dimension (or
space) of public objects and theology to the dimension of
selfhood. The effect of both approaches is to evacuate the
concept of divine action of any reference to the
biophysical world.
A third approach which may yield similar results is
that of the application of post-Wittgensteinian linguistic
analysis to theology. Some advocates of this approach see
theology (and religious discourse in general) as a non-
cognitive language game quite distinct from the game of
science26 . Thus religion may be reduced to a way of
interpreting the world in which we live and of commending
particular attitudes to life.
The concept of complementarity is often deployed in an
effort to justify the maintenance of such an approach.
However, the analogy with this physical principle breaks
down when it is recalled that, in physics, the language of
complementarity refers to different objective situations.
Wave and particle descriptions of an electron are
complementary in the sense the former offer more adequate
models of some events while the latter apply to other
events. There is no suggestion (as there so often is when
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linguistic analysis is applied to science and theology)
that one set of events or one description is more real than
the other. Nor does the principle in its original form
propose any veto on the search for a unitary description of
those events (on the contrary, physics has developed the
whole field of quantum mechanics precisely as a unitary
approach).
(ii) The silence of revelation: 	 Finally there are
those who warn us that revelation has little to say about
the natural world. Thus they argue that we should think
very carefully before shifting the emphasis from the
relationship between God and the human race to the complex
of relationships between God, humankind and the world.
A typical advocate of this position would be Hendrikus
Berkhof. More than once when referring to nature, he
reminds us that "while we know the mode of God's concern
for man, we do not know the mode of his concern for nature"
(Berkhof 1979, 536). Furthermore, he retains the notion,
widespread in twentieth century theology, that the world
view of the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures sets history apart
from nature. On such a view nature is no more than the
stage upon which the events of history occur. Thus history
is "the only realm where the secret of creation is revealed
and fulfilled" (Berkhof 1968, 51).
Indeed he is prepared to go further still: "Creation
and nature are pre-history, directed towards man" (Berkhof
1968, 52). He spells this out in his systematic theology
when he asserts that "the purpose of the world is the
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Kingdom of God, as the full realization of human existence
through human fellowship with God" (Berkhof 1979, 165). In
his view the goodness of creation referred to in Genesis 1
merely indicates that the natural world is ""suitable for
its purpose," namely communion between God and man" (Berkhof
1979, 171).
In contrast to the anthropocentric tone of these
statements he recognises that "the nonhuman creation
everywhere, and especially in the infinite space of the
interstellar world where there are no humans, has its own
for us inaccessible relatedness to God" (Berkhof 1979, 165).
He regards this as a good reason for humility when speaking
of creation and nature: "As a creation of God which is
different from man, it is largely unfathomable to us and as
such a pointer to the unfathomableness of its creator; and
that is cause for us to be humble" (Berkhof 1979, 423).
However Berkhof's expression of this humility consists
of denying the systematic theologian "direct use of any
biblical statement on creation for the construction of his
doctrine of creation" (Berkhof 1979, 159). In his view,
most of the biblical creation statements are secondary: a
husk of pre-scientific beliefs which may be discarded with
impunity (Berkhof 1968, 46). He praises post-Enlightenment
and historical-critical developments of Reformed theology
for eliminating considerable cosmological content from the
doctrine of creation.
Of course this does not imply the complete absence of
revealed knowledge of the natural world. There is a kernel
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of revelation regarding nature, namely that nature shares
with humankind the status of creature. The revealed de-
divinisation of nature means that "In contrast to the
worship of nature," the Bible "makes room for natural
science and mastery over nature" (Berkhof 1979, 162). In
conjunction with his anthropology, this view leads him into
outright support for human domination of nature:
in the cosmos around man, with which he cannot
primarily have a relationship of love, the other
element of his nature, that of freedom, must
particularly come to stand out. Freedom means that he
lifts himself above the common lot he shares with the
cosmos (partially, but increasingly more) and takes it
into his own hands. With the same freedom with which
he is called to respond to God's love, he must have
dominion over the world, managing and ruling,
cultivating and transforming it with his technology and
culture. (Berkhof 1979, 186)
If we were to accept Berkhof's stated views on the
matter, we would have little choice but to remain silent
with regard to the natural world. However, as we shall see
in Chapter 5, the Bible has much more to say about the non-
human than Berkhof is willing to admit. That the bulk of
this is a dispensable husk is an interpretation built upon
the anti-ecological pole of the Christian ambivalence
towards the material world.
5.	 CONTOURS OF A THEOLOGY OF NATURE
Which Christian doctrines will be most relevant to our
study? Before proceeding to examine western Christian
understandings of nature we should consider in a provisional
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manner which aspects of systematic theology have been most
relevant in the development of these attitudes.
(a) The dogmatic locus for a theolo gy of nature
(i) The necessity for such a locus:
	 Theological attention
to nature may be necessary, but need it find a specific
dogmatic locus? As a result of the environmental crisis
considerable attention has been given to the development of
a Christian ecological ethic and (amongst Roman Catholics)
to a creation-centred spirituality. Given such extensive
and diverse consideration is it necessary to seek to
integrate such reflection into the traditional loci of
dogmatic theology?
Two considerations prompt me to take such a course of
action. The first is the susceptibility of occasional
theologies of nature to criticism from environmentalists.
As long as theological attention to nature remains
occasional it will be possible to dismiss it as merely a
reflection of environmentalism's current fashionability.
Thus theological consideration of nature will
	 remain
vulnerable to changes in secular fashions and attitudes.
The second consideration arises from a particular way
of conceiving theology. While it is true that theology
properly denotes rational attention to divine reality, it
may also have a much broader connotation. It can
justifiably be extended to include rational attention to
every aspect of reality from the perspective of faith in
the divine reality.
	 In this sense, not only God but also
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faith itself and the entire physical, biological, social,
psychological, and spiritual context of human existence
become proper objects of theological attention. Clearly an
overview of the dogmatic loci (even on the scale of Barth's
Church Dogmatics) cannot hope to do justice to every area of
reality but it can, and should, point out the proper
theological context for each of those subjects. Given such
an understanding of the task of systematic theology and in
the light of the environmental debate, failure to locate
theological attention to nature in this way suggests a lack
of seriousness which strengthens the case of Christianity's
environmentalist critics. At the very least it constitutes
an inexcusable (because deliberate) loss of completeness.
(ii) A p rovisional locus: Twentieth century industrial
society tends to look at nature technocentrilcally and,
hence, anthropocentrically. Thus a would-be tIeologian of
nature might seek to relate his theology of nature to
Christian anthropology. By tradition, such theological
anthropologies relate the origin, existence and end of
human beings (individually and corporately) to God the
Creator. It would be a natural extension of this approach
to include a discussion of the created context of humankind.
However, there is an important objection to this
approach. It assumes without further discussion that the
nonhuman is nothing more than the context in which human
existence is carried on. Now it is true that any
theological understanding of nature will put considerable
emphasis on the significance on nature as the created
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context of human existence. Christian theology insists that
the human creature was placed in this world, not thrown. It
is also true that theology may well have to settle for a
reverent agnosticism with respect to much of God's purposes
in the nonhuman creation. Nevertheless, theological
attention to nature must respect contemporary scientific
understandings of the universe, and one of the most basic
presuppositions of modern science is the Copernican
Principle that the human race does not occupy a privileged
position in the universe26
Theological treatments of the created context of human
existence were traditionally located in the context of the
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Specifically, nature was
examined from a theological perspective, and sometimes at
great length, in the patristic and mediaeval hexaemera.
However, since the end of the Middle Ages such an approach
has become rare, with more recent theological accounts of
creation preferring to move straight to anthropology after
treating the broader aspects of the doctrine of creation
relatively briefly.
More importantly, such treatments of the nonhuman
creation	 lend themselves	 to	 an essentially	 static
interpretation. The divine creative activity is readily
seen as one of creating and ordering an unchanging stage
for the drama of human history. This is reflected in the
distinction between nature and history which came to
dominate European thinking on the matter during the
Enlightenment (and which, all too often, still dominates
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our thinking in spite of a century of evolutionary
biology).
Contemporary theological attention to nature must
recognise, in form as well as content, the fact that science
understands the world in essentially dynamic terms. The old
distinction between nature and history has been relativised,
if not entirely abolished 27 . It is now widely accepted that
the events of nature are, in a real sense, historical rather
than merely temporal 28 . Such an approac+, is consonant with
a theology which ultimately refers all events to the
creative activity of God. In chapter 6 I shall propose that
the nonhuman creation be treated under the locus of general
providence rather than creatio ex nihilo in order to
emphasise this dynamic understanding of the natural world.
(b) Influence of the doctrine of God
The environmentalists'	 critique of Christian theology
focusses exclusively on western Christianity. 	 Indeed Lynn
White explicitly excludes the eastern churches from his
critique (White 1967, 1206). It is a striking fact of
history that the Christian East, equipped with similar
resources (intellectual, material, political, and spiritual)
to the West, did not give rise to an exploitative technology
in the same way as its partner in Christendom. 	 Is this a
historical accident? Or can the cause be traced to a
significant difference in the philosophical and theological
presuppositions of West and East?
White argues that Christianity in its western forms is
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peculiarly adapted to encourage the growth of exploitative
attitudes towards the natural world. However, in the east,
a different understanding of the spiritual life hindered
this adaptation: "The Greek saint contemplates; the Western
saint acts. The implications of Christianity would emerge
more easily in the Western atmosphere" (White 1967, 1206)
While this sweeping generalisation is easily falsified, it
does suggest deep theological differences between East and
West which may have a bearing on the observed difference in
attitudes to nature.
Generally speaking, the spiritual and theological
writings of eastern orthodoxy offer a more uniformly
positive view of the material world than is to be found in
most western theology. This may be partially due to the
lasting effects of the condemnation of Origenism. However,
it is too consistent to be merely a reaction.
Gordon Kaufman's point that greater attention to nature
will necessitate a revision of western conceptions of God
(and humankind) suggests that we might look for the source
of this difference in different conceptions of God. More
specifically, the Christian traditions of East and West are
deeply divided over the trinitarian nature of God. The
twentieth century rediscovery of trinitarianism has led to
the realisation that this doctrine has been crucial in
shaping the development of other Christian doctrines. This
influence can be traced in christology, soteriology, and
ecciesiology.	 The apparent east-west divergence in
Christian attitudes to nature encourages us to trace a
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similar influence at this point too.
Preliminary corroboration for this postulate may be
drawn from an exceptional case in the history of western
spirituality, namely the Celtic tradition. In spite of its
geographical location, the Celtic Church maintained its own
distinctive approach to Christianity, largely independent of
Roman Catholicism.	 In theology and liturgical practice it
retained significant links with the eastern churches. The
features of Celtic spirituality which are of particular
relevance to the present study are the combination of an
pervasive trinitarianism with a very positive evaluation of
the material world. One may also note, in passing, St
Francis' insistence on trinitarianism and the goodness of
God's material creation.
(c) General ar guments for a trinitarian approach
Apart from the apparent correlation between an emphasis on
the doctrine of the Trinity and a positive evaluation of the
material creation two general arguments can be put forward
in favour of a trinitarian approach to providence.
Firstly,	 the	 doctrine of
	 the	 Trinity	 is	 the
distinguishing feature of Christian theology. Furthermore,
the form and content of theology is critically dependent on
who God is and has revealed himself to be. As Irenaeus put
it, "One has not to understand God from what he has done,
but the things he has done, from God" (cited by Jungel 1976,
6).	 A theology which claims to be Christian necessarily
refers its readers to the God who has revealed himself in
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the form of a personal history embedded in creation history
(namely, Jesus Christ). Indeed, it has been said of the
Incarnation that, "by thinking through the meaning of this
event in terms of the Trinity one finds in embryo the key to
the solution of God's relation to the world" (O'Donnell
1983, 198). If so, the only adequate basis for a Christian
ontology is the doctrine of the Trinity. John Zizioulas
makes this point when he argues that the basis for the
Patristic attack on the ontological monism of Hellenistic
thought was precisely the trinitarian conception of being as
persons-in-relation (Zizioulas 1985, 35ff.). Without the
doctrine of the Trinity and its attendant participational
ontology it is hard to see how accounts of the relationship
between God and his creation can be anything but sub-
personal.
In contrast to this trinitarianism is the emphatically
monotheistic tone of many classical western Christian
doctrines of providence. They have been developed on the
basis of a general concept of God rather than the Christian
revelation of God as triune.
	 That this is so can be seen
by comparing the Christian doctrine of providence with its
Stoic, Jewish, and Muslim counterparts.
	 Even as biblical a
theologian as Calvin can couch his doctrine of providence
in terms which strongly suggest Stoic influence. The lack
of a distinctively Christian dimension to the doctrine is
underlined by the fact that a recent study of providence
can offer a single account which is claimed to be equally
acceptable to those "who hold to an orthodox variation of
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Christianity or Judaism or Islam" (Langford 1981, 155).
One effect of this loss of any distinctively Christian
character to the doctrine of providence is to turn it into
apparently neutral ground. Because the Christian, Jewish
and Muslim views of providence thus appear to be identical,
the doctrine comes to be regarded as public knowledge
supposedly accessible to all men of good will and sound
reason. As a result, it provides a justification for doing
natural theology. But in this capitulation to the religious
impulse of humankind it creates room within theology for
non-Christian concepts of God and natural analogies for the
relationship between God and his creation. In particular, a
distinctively Christian approach rules out the organismic
and mechanistic analogies for the world. Their recurrence
within Christian theology is evidence of the failure of the
doctrine of providence.
Secondly, the particular character of the doctrine of
providence lends itself to a trinitarian treatment. It is
concerned with the maintenance of creatures in and through
time and their being brought to an eschatological
fulfilment.	 Providence has to do with divine action in
creation history. Thus, "there is a basic correlation
between how one conceives time and one's doctrine of
providence or something very like a doctrine of providence"
(Mason 1982, 6). It follows that an adequate account of the
doctrine of providence is bound up with an adequate
Christian understanding of time. And this brings us back to
the doctrine of the Trinity. This is so because, as I noted
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above, God has revealed himself through a personal history
embedded in creation history. In other words, God has
permitted himself to be identified in temporal terms: he is
the one who raised Jesus from the dead (Jenson 1982b, 21).
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity speaks of a divine
life which is definitive of created temporality.
NOTES
1. Objectively speaking, these have until recently been a
secondary factor because of their restriction to parts
of the ecosphere least susceptible to such damage
(Lovelock 1979, 121).
2. This point, while widely accepted by environmentalists
(e.g., Meadows et al. 1972) is disputed by advocates of
traditional liberal economic policies (e.g., Simon &
Kahn 1984).
3. The seminal article is, without doubt, White 1967.
Similar arguments may be found in Black 1970; Nicholson
1970, 264f.; Passmore 1980. However, Passmore focusses
on the culpability of the Hellenistic tradition which
he presents as a malign influence on an environmentally
innocuous Hebrew tradition.
4. It is widely believed that the methodological and other
presuppositions upon which western science was founded
were the result of distinctively Christian beliefs
about the relationship of the world to God. See e.g.,
Hooykaas 1973, Russell 1985.
5. Given the often strained relations between the early
Franciscans and the institutional church such comments
are hardly surprising. However, it has been argued
that Francis, for all his radicalism, was steeped in
the Augustinian tradition (Santmire 1985, 106-19). As
we shall see later, this was certainly true of the
first great theologian of the Franciscan order.
6. Most of these amount to shifting the blame onto some
other strand of the Christian religion, e.g., Robert
Fancy argues that "at the origin of the contemporary
agressively exploitative attitude toward the world of
nature lies not Christianity as such, but the
Christianity of the protestant reformation" (Fancy
1987, 205; cf. Fancy 1982, 12-16). Gabriel Fackne
draws a similar line between Protestantism and




this strategy is that its success depends on the
(implicit) denial that the target is a legitimate part
of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church!
A similar criticism applies to those who object to
White's exegesis. It must be shown that either his
exegesis is at odds with those of every Christian
exegete or those exegetes who agree with him are
heretical.
Barr 1972 offers a plausible exegetical argument
against White. However, his case depends on denying
the link between western science and presuppositions
drawn from the Christian doctrine of creation.
7. For example, primitive use of fire-drive hunting
methods (Black 1970, 9; Peacocke 1979, 277). It has
also been pointed out that even in the case of
societies which regard the natural world as religiously
important	 environmental	 damage	 has	 still	 been
widespread (Tuan 1970).
8. The breadth of opinion about what constitutes an
appropriate ethical response to the situation detailed
here ranges from Garrett Hardin's lifeboat ethics
(which sanctions the privileged nations to hang on to
their privilege at the expense of the developing
nations in the hope of surviving the impending
catastrophe) to various forms of reverence for life
(which in extreme cases seem to put other species
before humanity).
9. The spiritual motif is characterised by a tendency to
present the Christian life in terms of ascent: the
mediaeval itinerarium mentis. It is to be found in
those seminal works of mediaeval spirituality, The
Twelve Patriarchs and The Mystical Ark by Richard of St
Victor and its influence can be traced to the present
day (e.g. in the early writings of Thomas Merton).
10. The incongruity of this becomes clear when it is
recalled that Ritschl is credited with attacking
theological references to nature in the name of a
Kantian expurgation of natural theology. In the very
work which contains this complaint he asserts the
purely instrumental role of nature thus, "nature is
called into being to serve as a means to God's
essential purpose in creating the world of spirits"
(Ritschl 1902, 279).
11. Gilkey 1976 is highly critical of the understandings of
providence articulated by nineteenth century liberalism
(specifically Schleiermacher and Ritschl); twentieth
century Krisis theology (the young Barth and Bultmann);
and eschatological theology (a pastiche of Pannenberg,
Moltmann, Metz, Alves, Gutierrez, and Braaten!).
12. Such a demand for theological completeness cannot be
dismissed as merely a Hegelianising tendency in his
thought. A similar demand is implicit in the passage
just quoted from Ritschl and is to be found also in the
writings of his evangelical opponent James Denney,
e.g., "the doctrine of God, in the very nature of the
case, is related to everything that enters into our
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knowledge; all our world depends upon Him; and hence it
follows that a systematic presentation of the doctrine
of God involves a general view of the world through
God. It must contain the ideas and the principles
which enable us to look at our life and our world as a
whole, and to take them into our religion, instead of
leaving them outside" (Denney 1895, 1).
13. Criticisms of Barth's doctrine of creation and its
implications for our understanding of nature have been
expressed	 by,	 e.g.,	 Brunner	 1951,	 Deegan	 1961,
Macquarrie	 1971/2,	 Idinopulos	 1972,	 Young	 1976,
Santmire 1985 and Linzey 1986.
14. Only a tiny minority of physicists have attempted to
maintain the older approach by means of the hyper-
deterministic hidden variables theory.
15. I have not cited personalism as one of these factors in
spite of its frequent association with the neglect of
the nonhuman (e.g., Santmire 1985, 145-73). As I have
already noted, that pioneer of personalism, Martin
Buber, did not envisage it as excluding the nonhuman.
And even Karl Barth refuses to deny the nonhuman
creation some sort of receptivity to the Word of God
(Barth 1946, 88).
16. This accusation is most frequently directed at Barth
and the neo-orthodox school of theology (e.g.,
Macquarrie 1975, Santmire 1985, Stewart 1984, Wingren
1984).
17. Another factor which points in this direction is the
advocacy by some natural theologians of a theology of
the first article: a position which, Otto Weber argues,
leads to a modalistic understanding of the Trinity and
its banishment to the appendix of a dogmatic system
(Weber 1981, 206f.).
18. Kaufman refers his readers to the more than fifteen
distinct meanings of nature to be found in the Oxford
English Dictionary. The most comprehensive account
remains that of Lovejoy and Boas 1935, pp. 447-56, who
list some thirty nine literary and philosophical uses
of nature and a further twenty seven ethical,
political, and religious uses derived from them.
19. For example one must beware of its axiological
overtones (both positive and negative).
20. Such a study is complicated by the apparently loose use
of nature, world and creation in the translations of
his works.
21. To anyone influenced by Heidegger the notion that
something can be comprehended rationally is cause to be
suspicious of that thing. For "Thinking only begins at
the point where we have come to know that Reason,
glorified for centuries, is the most obstinate
adversary of thinking" (Heidegger cited by Barrett
1961, 184).
22. Bultmann's view of nature is, in fact, sometimes
treated in this way. For example, Barbour 1966, 431-34
concludes that he accepts without question the
nineteenth century mechanistic view of the material
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universe.
23. In his earlier writings world appears to be prior to
nature and history: the former being the way of
interpreting world that gives rise to inauthentic
existence and the latter being closely associated with
faith in creation as that which gives rise to authentic
existence.
24. For example, Evans 1963 has developed Bultmann's view
to show that creation discourse is self-involving.
From a quite different perspective we find Barth
affirming this position without thereby divesting the
doctrine of creation of its objective content.
25. Macquarrie defends Heidegger by pointing to hints of a
more adequate philosophy of nature in his later work.
According to this approach a non-reductionist view of
nonhuman life is attainable by starting with human
existence and working downwards (Macquarrie 1975, 72-
75). However, the hints hardly add up to a philosophy
of nature and it is not at all clear how this approach
would overcome its highly anthropocentric starting
point.
26. This contradicts the recently fashionable Anthropic
Principle which, in its stronger forms, suggests that
rationality does indeed occupy a (causally) privileged
position in the cosmos.
27. This has happened in a number of ways not all of which
would be acceptable to the Christian theologian. For
example, nature and history may be fused together by a
positivistic reduction of history to nature.
28. According to Collingwood, Benedetto Croce's view of
history reduces the distinction between rature and
history from an objective one of two realms to a





IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST AUGUSTINE
Since the exploitative attitude to the natural world which
so exercises the contemporary conscience evolved within the
context of western Christianity, a natural starting point
for the study of the latter would be the work of St
Augustine. Following the line suggested by Gordon Kaufman
any such study ought to examine his attitude to nature in
relation to his understanding of God.
1.	 AUGUSTINE'S THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
The study of Augustine's contribution to this issue is
greatly complicated by his tortuous spiritual pilgrimage
from paganism to Christianity. In response to his
experiences he wrote a number of relevant writings which
display considerable diversity and development. Thus it is
not possible to present a simple uniform picture of his
theology. However, Santmire 1985 argues that the trajectory
of that development is clearly from the radically world-
denying position of his Manichaean period towards a world-
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affirming position resulting from years of dialogue between
Neoplatonism and catholic Christianity. Ironically such a
development is, at the same time, a movement from a
radically materialistic position to an emphatically
idealistic one (Brown 1967, 56). Thus, we must ask whether
it is accurate to say that Augustine's work represents "the
flowering of the ecological promise of classical Christian
theology" (Santmire 1985, 73).
In theological terms Augustine may be described as
post-Nicene and, specifically, post-Cappadocian. As regards
his relationship to the general culture of ancient Rome he
could be described as post-pagan and, specifically, post-
Plotin Ian.
As a post-Nicene bishop, he consciously represented a
victorious catholic Christianity. This had a twofold effect
on his writings, particularly on his doctrine of the
Trinity. The more striking of these is the non-
controversial character of his De trinitate when compared
with earlier works such as Hilary of Poitiers' work of the
same name. The trinitarian controversy had been settled and
Augustine was free to write with a graciousness which
contrasts with the tone of his anti-Pelagian writings.
Clearly he viewed his task as different from that of earlier
trinitarian theologians. Their task had been defensive and
apologetic; his was explanatory. 	 He could assume his
readers' assent to the trinitarian creed adopted by the
Council of Constantinople in 381. 	 And his purpose was to
extend their understanding of this central mystery of the
-66-
faith.
He was also writing in the light of the Cappadocian
theology which informed that council: he was able to take
over the eastern doctrine as a finished product. Part and
parcel of this doctrine was a sophisticated Greek
trinitarian terminology. Although a technical terminology
for the doctrine had existed in Latin since the time of
Tertullian, Augustine was the first western theologian to do
any serious work on the doctrine. Thus, in addition to the
explanatory task, he was faced with the daunting
hermeneutical task of reconciling the very sophisticated
Greek trinitarian terminology with a rough and ready Latin
terminology.
Turning to the general cultural context, he may be
characterised as post-pagan in the sense that by this time
paganism had virtually collapsed as a serious intellectual
and religious challenge to Christianity. Christianity had
been the state religion for four generations when he began
work on the De trinitate. Thus the essential defensive role
of the doctrine (its capacity to uniquely identify the
Christian God over against the gods of paganism) was
seriously obscured.
It is possible to be more specific about his cultural
background. His pilgrimage from Manichaeism to Christianity
via Neoplatonism is very well documented. But of the
diverse influences on his subsequent theology the most
profound was without doubt Neoplatonism. 	 Thus we may
describe him as post-Plotinian.
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He was closely associated with those Christian
intellectuals based in Milan who were attempting a critical
appropriation of Neoplatonic philosophy and particularly the
work of Plotinus and Porphyry. These Christian Platonists
included not only his young friends of the Cassiciacum
dialogues but also Bishop Ambrose and his spiritual adviser
Simplicianus (a former pupil of Porphyry's Latin
translator).
There can be little doubt that, like these friends,
Augustine regarded Christianity as the key to synthesis of
classical thought which had eluded Plotinus (O'Connell
1978, 10-27). This ensured that in the years of dialogue
that followed his conversion, Christianity remained the
dominant partner (Sorabji 1983, 167, 170f.). As we shall
see, the Plotinian world view exerted such a strong
influence on the young convert that thirty years later it
still	 played a significant part	 in his trinitarian
reflections. For that reason it will be worth summarising
the essential features of Plotinus' philosophy before
proceeding to look at Augustine's work.
Augustine's sympathy for the Neoplatonists is clear
from his repeated approval of Porphyry whom he refers to as
doctissimus and "the most notable pagan philosopher'. In
his De civitate Del, he paints a remarkably sympathetic
picture of the teachings of this man whom he believed to
have been led astray by pride and demons. He presents the
ontology of Porphyry and his master Plotinus as trinitarian.
The philosophy of Neoplatonism was the closest approach of
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pagan philosophy to Christian truth, only stopping short by
failing to identify the second hypostasis of the NeoPlatonic
trinity with the incarnate Son of God. Addressing the pagan
successors of Porphyry directly, he says,
You assert the Father and his Son, whom you call the
Intellect or Mind of the Father; you also speak of a
being who is between the two, and we imagine that you
are referring to the Holy Spirit. And it is your habit
to call them three gods. In spite of your irregular
terminology you Platonists have here some kind of
intuition of the goal to which we must strive, however
dimly seen through the obscurities of a subtle
imagination. And yet you refuse to recognize the
incarnation of the unchanging Son of God, which brings
us salvation, so that we can arrive at those realities
in which we believe, and which we can in some small
measure comprehend. (Civ., 10.29)
The beginning and end of this system which came so
close to apprehending the truth was the Plotinian doctrine
of the One.	 This is the transcendent source and goal of
all diversity. In Dean Inge's words, it was "the source
from which the differentiation of unity and plurality
proceeds; . . .the transcendence of separability rather than
the negation of plurality" (cited by O'Brien 1964, 18).
However, unlike the orthodox account of the Christian God,
the Neoplatonic One was not regarded as essence. Plotinus
remained convinced of the Hellenistic belief that a reality
could not be both determinate and unterminated (a belief
rejected by the Cappadocians). As O'Brien comments, "The
One is not essence nor existence nor intellect nor
intelligible because of all these it is the generative
principle and to be thus generative it must be, in this
precise regard, 'other'" (O'Brien 1964, 20).
	
In line with
this, only negations may be predicated of the One1
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Although the One is prior to the duality of subject and
object, and hence cannot know itself, it is self-aware.
This non-conceptual self-contemplation results in the
begetting of the Intelligence which contains the Ideas, the
archetypes of the multiplicity of beings which make up the
cosmos.	 Plotinus regarded this repository of form as the
highest being. The Intelligence, in turn, gives rise to
the Soul, which is the demiurge and governor of the
material cosmos, and contains the souls of all creatures as
the Intelligence contains the Ideas. These three, then, the
primal hypostases, constitute what is essential in all
reality. In sharp contrast to the radical materialism of
the Manichees, Plotinus regarded all reality as spiritual
(Knowles 1962, 23).
While Plotinus was prepared to recognise the necessity
of the material world, he could not affirm its goodness.
Goodness is a function of proximity to the One. Thus the
human individual is essentially a soul with governorship of
a material body. However, the presence of that soul within
the human body is the result of a fall into individuality.
In their present state human beings are microcosmic in the
sense that they present in their spiritual life an image of
the cosmic dialectic of descent into multiplicity and return
to the One. The negative implications for life in this
world are well summed up in Porphyry's comment that
"Plotinus seemed ashamed of having a body" (cited by O'Brien
1964, 14 n.3).
For Plotinus the good life was defined by the soul's
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return to unity with the One by a process of intellectual
purgation. Augustine's identification of this with the
Christian life led to its adoption by western Christianity
as the method of introspection (or, in Christian mystical
circles, the doctrine of ascent to the divine). In its
Plotinian form it consists of three essential stages. The
first is apophatic: a separation of the soul from the
multiplicity of the material world, a drawing inwards
towards the centre or apex of the soul (Plotinus, pji. 5, 9
[5], 1).	 This is followed by a cataphatic stage of
meditation upon the unity of the Intelligible. The final
stage -is ekstasis: a contemplative self-transcendence of
intellect resulting in communion with the One.
2. THE TRIUNE GOD ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE
We turn now to Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. His
writings on this subject, and particularly his major work
De trinitate, have for centuries been virtually definitive
for the western Christian understanding of the Trinity.
They have also been widely interpreted as strongly monistic
in their tendency.	 This interpretation is well summarised
by Paul Tillich, who insists that Augustine,
is more interested in the unity of God than in the
different h ypostaseis, the three personae, in God. He
expresses this -in terms which make it clear he is one
of those responsible for our present-day inclination to
apply the term persona to God, instead of applying it
individually to the Father, Son, and Spirit. Of
course, Augustine never became heterodox in this
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respect, although he leaned, as did the West generally,
toward a Monarchian view. That he was inclined in this
direction is evident by the analogy he sees between the
trinity and the personal life of man. He says:
"Father, Son, and Spirit are analogous to amans (he who
loves), quod amatur (that which is loved), and amor
(the power to love)." Or: "The trinity is analogous to
memory, intelligence, and will." This means that he
uses the trinity in order to give analogically a
description of God as a person. Since God is a person,
and that means a unity, all acts of God toward the
outside (ad extra) are always acts of the whole
trinity, even the act of the incarnation. 	 (Tillich
1968, 116f.)
Although Tillich clearly regards this as the orthodox
view of God many contemporary theologians have raised
questions about the validity of such a tendency to uni-
personalism within what claims to be a Christian theological
system. It is widely believed that, by suppressing the
personal distinctions within the Godhead, Augustine has
reduced Christianity to another monotheism2.
He is not without advocates to defend him against this
charge3 and would himself have strenuously denied it.
Whatever the apparent tendency of the body of his
trinitarian theology, -it is bracketed by assertions of the
genuineness of the trinitarian distinctions and the full
personality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Thus, for
example he asks,
who would venture to say either that the one God, which
is the Trinity itself, or that the Father, or the Son,
or the Holy Spirit is not living, or is lacking in
perception or understanding; or that in that nature by
which they are proclaimed to be mutually equal, any one
of them is mortal, or corruptible, or changeable, or
corporeal? Or who would deny that any one there is the
most powerful, the most just, the most beautiful, the
best, and the most blessed? (Inn. 15.5.7)
However this raises another difficulty. If the Trinity
itself is personal in the same sense as the persons, it is
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not clear why we speak of a Trinity at all rather than a
quaternity. It is clear from the above that a closer
examination of his understanding of the term Person is
necessary.
Before turning to that examination, however, it is
worth commenting on one line of defence of the Augustinian
position. It is sometimes said that he adopts an
essentially empirical approach in which his trinitarian
reflections are controlled throughout by the content of
Scripture. Thus, it is urged, he rejects the Cappadocians'
social analogies for the Trinity on the basis that
Scripture presents the human individual as imago dei
(Hodgson 1943, 146).
	 However, his individualistic exegesis
of Gen. 1:26 was something of a novelty. Prior to that, the
imago dei was usually treated in more social terms.
	 His
search for the image of God within the individual soul
recalls Plotinus' view of the soul as microcosm. What
appears at first sight to be a purely exegetical decision
may, in fact, owe more to his philosophical context than to
the demands of Scripture.
But, quite apart from this consideration, it is
doubtful whether the case for treating De trinitate as an
empirical study of Scripture can be maintained. Augustine
does not use Scripture as his starting point. On the
contrary, he begins and ends with the credal statements
adopted by the Council of Constantinople. It is an
exposition of orthodox catholic truth, not of Scripture.
The structure of De trinitate makes this quite clear: he
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begins with a statement of orthodox trinitarianism (Book
1); he then expounds that statement with the aid of
Scripture (Books 1-4); this is followed by a metaphysical
reformulation of the doctrine (Books 5-7); then he turns to
the task of clarifying this statement with the aid of
analogies drawn from creation (Books 8-14); and he
concludes by returning to the creed and affirming the
incomprehensibility of the God to whom it bears witness
(Book 15).
(a) The Oneness of God
The starting point of his attempt to explain the meaning of
trinitarian discourse is his assumption of the unity of the
Godhead, that "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
constitute a divine unity of one and the same substance in
an indivisible equality" (Inn. 1.4.7; cf., 5.8.9, 5.9.10,
7.5.10). As we have already noted, he found it easy to
equate the triune God of Christianity with the primal
hypostases of Neoplatonism. Furthermore, the philosophical
categories and even the methodology of De trinitate are
those of Neoplatonism (Burnaby 1955, 21). Thus his
Hellenistic background is partly responsible for the
presupposition that the divine essence is unitary and exerts
a powerful influence on what he feels able to predicate of
God.
However, his understanding of ultimate reality as
essence marks a significant departure from this background.
The Nicene insistence on the homoousios also requires that
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we take the unity of God seriously. And it is surely out
of deference to catholic orthodoxy that he starts from the
one divine essence rather than from a uniity which
transcends all categories. Nevertheless, his acceptance of
Hellenistic categories clearly affects his understanding of
the divine unity. Thus, for Augustine, absoluteness,
immutability, and simplicity are self-evident corollaries
of the concept of divine unity.
As wielded by Augustine, this cluster of concepts
became a formidable weapon against contemporary trinitarian
heresies. The concept of divine simplicity (adopted from
Plotinus) led immediately to the dictum that God is his
attributes (Civ. 11.10). Any relaxation of this insistence
on simplicity would result in modalism (Hodgson 1943, 151),
particularly in a theology which stressed the divine unity
as strongly as did Augustine's.	 At the same time the
concept of absoluteness entails absolute unity of substance
(Trin. 6.3.5). This insistence on the divine unity implied
a radical opposition to any form of subordinationism (Trin.
8.2.1).
Central to his understanding of the divine unity was
the concept of immutability. Two implications of this are
particularly noteworthy. If God is immutable then none of
his attributes may be regarded as accidental (Trin. 5.4.5):
this has important implications for his understanding of the
divine Persons and forms the basis for his preference for
'essence' over 'substance'.	 It also implies that God's
relations with his creatures must be immutable (Trim. 1.1.2,
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15.13.22): as a result we are faced with a severe problem of
how to interpret scriptural witness to divine activity in
creation.
This starting point leads directly to his particular
formulation of the trinitarian question. The unity of God
is not a problem in itself, but it creates a severe problem
for anyone wishing to adhere to the scriptural witness and
the Nicene statement of trinitarian orthodoxy. For
Augustine, the problem was how this One could be spoken of
as Three.
(b) The One as three Persons
Thus the scriptural testimony to and orthodox affirmation
of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constituted a
serious challenge to Augustine (the more so since he had
such a high regard for both Scripture and tradition). A
major task of De trinitate was to answer this challenge.
Disregarding the Cappadocian interpretation of Nicene
orthodoxy (Trim. 5.8.20), Augustine set about tackling the
problem by examining the nature of grammatical predicates5.
Drawing on his experience as a rhetor he classified
predicates into three types: accidental, substantial, and
relative.
Can the personal distinctions or, more generally, the
divine attributes be regarded as accidents? He could
eliminate this possibility because it contradicted the
dictum of divine simplicity.
	 To say that anything
pertaining to the divine is accidental is to assert that in
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some respect God is not his attributes. Since God is
revealed through his attributes this would reintroduce the
possibility of modalism6.
Augustine, like the Arians, had no difficulty in
rejecting the above option. But what about the Arians' own
solution to the problem, namely, that the personal
distinctions and other divine attributes were substantial?
This yields two very different understandings of triunity,
both of which were unacceptable to Augustine.	 In either
case, the divine Persons would have to be understood as
three distinct substances. If this were combined with a
clear ontological distinction between the divine and the
created, the only possible interpretation of triunity would
be as a voluntary association of three gods: tr'itheism7.
Alternatively, and more commonly in the philosophical
milieu of the Fathers, such a clear ontological distinction
might not be made. In this case the persons might be
regarded as members of an ontological hierarchy forming a
continuous chain of being from the unoriginate source of
all being down to the lowest creatures of our world:
subordinationism. This approach to the concept of God was
developed by the Arians from an important strand of the
early patristic tradition, namely, the Christian Hellenism
of the Apologists and Origen. In reality it is a covert
form of pantheism: asserting as it does a continuity of
being between creator and creature.
Augustine, of course, had a very strong sense of the
qualitative difference between creator and creature which
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made it impossible for him to adopt the subordinationist
approach 8 . For him, any suggestion that the personal
distinctions within the Godhead might be substantial could
only lead to tritheism. However, this did not constitute a
blanket ban on substantial predication in relation to God.
He allowed substantial predicates to be used of God
provided that they were applied to the Trinity as a whole.
Dissatisfied with all these options, Augustine made a
counterproposal based on his classification of grammatical
predicates and inspired once again by Plotinus (Enn.
6.1.6ff.). He suggested that the personal' distinctions be
regarded as relative rather than substantial or accidental.
Thus the Persons of the Godhead are constituted by eternal
mutually reciprocal relations within the divine unity.
This counterproposal afforded him a viable basis for
distinguishing between the persons: the nature of the
relations themselves. Four such relations are suggested in
the course of his treatment of the subject: begetting, and
being begotten; giving, and being given. The Father begets
and the Son is begotten: the two Persons are distinguished
by this mutual relationship. The Spirit is introduced into
this perfectly balanced mutuality of generation by means of
the concept of procession (or being given). Thus the
Spirit is constituted by being given to the Son by the
Father and by being returned to the Father by the Son (e.g.,
Inn. 5.14.15).
In order to reduce these four relations to the three
necessary to define a Trinity, giving must be predicated of
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both the Father and the Son. Thus Augustine's understanding
of the Trinity entails the disputed filioque clause.
Drawing on one of his psychological analogies, Augustine
could then describe the Spirit as the bond of love or unity9
between Father and Son. In Augustine's opinion, this need
not threaten the principium of the Father: the Father
remains the ultimate source of the Trinity (Vera relig.
55. 11 2).
The widespread criticisms of Augustine mostly hinge on
this way of distinguishing the Persons. Does he equate the
Persons with their relations? If so, it becomes difficult
to maintain that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are genuinely
personal in the modern sense.
Hodgson 1943 and Burnaby 1955 maintain that he does not
make such an equation. However, whatever Augustine may have
asserted (e.g., Trin. 15.5.7, 15.19.36) the logic of his
approach does appear to require such an equation. The
simplicity dictum (that God is his attributes) applies
indifferently to the Godhead and the Persons. Since the
personal distinctions are the defining attributes of the
Persons it follows that the Father is his Fatherhood (the
act of begetting), the Son is his Sonship (the act of being
begotten), and the Spirit is his Givenness (the act of being
given) (Mackey 1983, 156).
	 Thus he is often credited with
originating the western tendeny to equate the Persons with
their relations (Kelly 1968, 274). The result is clear in
Aquinas' definition of the divine Persons: "'person' in God
signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature" (cited
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by Mackey 1983, 156).
In spite of his orthodox starting point and
conclusions, he seems reluctant to distinguish between the
Persons. He treats trinitanian discourse as an unfortunate
necessity created in order that we "might be able to speak
in some way about that which we cannot fully express in any
way' (Inn. 7.4.7; cf. 5.9.10).
	 Nowhere is this clearer
than in his use of the formula opera ad extra tninitatis
indivisa sunt.
	 The formula was designed to protect the
complete unity of operation, action and will of the Godhead.
However, in keeping with his radical opposition to
subordinationism, he places such an extreme interpretation
on the formula that the 'outward' activities of the persons
of the Trinity become indistinguishable. Thus Mackey can
comment that this formula is now so much in possession that
it makes all detectable means of distinguishing the
'persons' suspect" (Mackey 1983, 158).
Where Scripture is silent the best we may do is to
appropriate specific attributes to a particular person,
i.e., while recognising that it is true of all the persons
we are permitted to say that it is particularly appropriate
to one. Any encounter between the human individual and God
is always with the Trinity as a whole. Thus Augustine can
say,
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, being of one
and the same substance, God the Creator, the omnipotent
Trinity, work together inseparably. But this cannot be
represented inseparably by a creature that is quite
dissimilar, and especially one that is corporeal. Thus
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit cannot be
named by our voices ... except by giving to each one
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its own proper interval of time . . .And just as when I
mention my memory, my understanding, and my will each
name refers indeed to a specific thing, but yet each
one has been produced by all three so ... the whole
Trinity together produced the voice of the Father, the
flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Holy Spirit
although each is referred to one particular person.
(Trin. 4.21.30)
It follows that it is not possible to determine, except
on the basis of what Scripture asserts, whether Father,
Son, or Holy Spirit has become incarnate. There is no
intrinsic relation between the trinitarian structure of
God's activity in the world and the Trinity itself.
	 This
is reflected in Augustine's final candidate for the status
of most perfect created vestige of the Trinity. He opts
for the psychological triad of memory, understanding and
will in the act of contemplating things eternal (the
transcendent being of the triune God) in preference to the
same triad in the act of contemplating the historical
Christ event. There follows an implicit devaluation of the
incarnation in Augustinian theology.
If the creature can only ever encounter the Trinity as
a whole and appropriation is no more than a theological
convention, it is a natural development to treat God as
unipersonal. Augustine's argument clearly points in that
direction though he draws back from the conclusion (Inn.
7.6.11).	 Furthermore, if the Persons are equally and
identically related to the Godhead, they become irrelevant
to the divinity (Jenson 1982b, 118f.). The logical
conclusion is the practical monotheism of which Rahner,
among others, complains (Rahner 1970, 10).
We may conclude that, in order to evade Arian
-81-
accusations of tritheism Augustine has,	 in effect,
suppressed the distinction between persons and relations.
(c) Augustine's use of analogies
The second half of De trinitate, in which Augustine
examines a range of creaturely triads in a search for
analogies for the Holy Trinity, offers important insights
into his understanding of the divine Persons. Since this
search is rooted in the belief that creatures in some sense
participate in the triune God, it is also of particular
relevance to the present study.
It is clear that, whatever use was made of this
approach by subsequent theologians, Augustine himself never
envisaged it as an exercise in natural theology.	 On the
contrary he presents it as a case of faith seeking self-
understanding. The starting point is orthodox belief in the
Trinity combined with Neoplatonic belief in the
participation of every creature in the absolute goodness of
the triune God. In his own words:
the earth is good by the height of its mountains, the
moderate elevation of its hills, and the evenness of
its fields; and good is the farm that is pleasant and
fertile; ... and good are the animals, animate bodies;
and good is the heaven with its own sun, moon, and
stars; ... This is good and that is good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if you can; so you
will see God who is good not by another good, but is
the good of every good. (Trin. 8.3.4)
The point is that something of the character of God may
be discerned by a process of abstraction from concrete
reality.	 The universals which undergird created reality
are closer to the creator than the particulars. 	 In spite
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of his assertions that faith is here seeking understanding
there does seem to be an element of natural theology about
this procedure. This process of abstraction is, in fact,
part of the Neoplatonic method of introspection which
Augustine uses unquestioningly.
The search for explanatory analogies by a method that
directs one inwards (on the assumption that there is a
hierarchical relationship between God, souls, and matter,
cf. Vera Rel. 3.3, Trin. 12.9.14) leads to an ascending
series of psychological triads.
	 It is important to
remember that Augustine does not
	 intend these as
alternative analogies for the divine Trinity. At this
stage he is merely searching for triadic structures within
the human psyche on the assumption that it is the image of
God: that one or more of these triads may provide us with
an appropriate analogy for the trinitarian life of God.
Indeed their real importance for Augustine appears to lie
not so much in their status as approximate models for the
Trinity as in their capacity to describe the way in which
the soul may return to God (O'Donovan 1980, 75). As we
have already noted, the analogy which he finally chooses is
the activity of memory, understanding, and will as they
combine in the contemplation of the essential Trinity.
Augustine concludes his study of the doctrine of the
Trinity with a recognition of the inadequacy of analogies
for God. This recognition is sometimes taken as evidence
that Augustine was unhappy with the unipersonalistic




is some suggestion of this in Augustine's statement that
the Father is His own love, in the same manner as He is
His own understanding and His own memory. Behold these
three, therefore: memory, understanding, love or the
will in that highest and unchangeable essence, which is
God, and these three are not the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone.
And because the Son also is wisdom begotten from
wisdom, as neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit
understands for Him, but He Himself understands for
Himself, so neither does the Father remember for Him,
nor does the Holy Spirit love for Him, but He remembers
for Himself and loves for Himself. ... The Holy
Spirit, too, because He is wisdom proceeding from
wisdom, does not have the Father as His memory, and the
Son as His understanding, and Himself as love; for He
would not be wisdom if the one remembered for Him, and
the other understood for Him, and He Himself only loved
for Himself. (Inn. 15.7.12)
However, this intimation, that the unipersonal nature
of the analogies may be misleading, is isolated.
Augustine's main reservation with these triadic structures
is that they do not offer an exhaustive definition of the
soul; they are only parts of the soul. In contrast to this
God is this Trinity of persons just as he is his
attributes. Thus these structures can never offer an
adequate analogy. His ultimate conclusion is consonant with
his Neoplatonic heritage, namely, that God is essentially
incomprehensible.
The effect of this approach on Christian attitudes to
nature has been largely negative. Although Augustine
assents to the goodness of the created order, both human
and nonhuman, his approval of the method of introspection
as a tool of theological reflection undermines belief in
the goodness of the material creation. His use of it has
elevated the participation of the human soul in the divine
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at the expense the nonhuman creation (and even human
corporeality). Thus, he has encouraged the development of
a narrow understanding of the human as rational soul, and
perpetuated, in Christian theology, a hierarchy of being
which sets the spiritual above, and sometimes even in
opposition to, the material.
(d) Imp lications for divine activity
As was pointed out above, Augustine's interpretation of the
opera ad extra principle was so strong as to render the
activity of the Persons indistinguishable. The resultant
practical unitarianism leads inevitably to a monotheistic
understanding of creation which contrasts sharply with
Greek Patristic efforts to speak of the divine economy in
trinitarian terms. 	 Indeed, Augustine himself recognised
that, to be faithful to the evidence of Scripture, such an
effort was necessary (Vera Rel. 7.13, Civ. 11.24). And he
followed the lead of earlier fathers in recognising
allusions to the Trinity in the Genesis account of creation
(e.g., Gen. ad lit. 1.6.12, 2.6.12). However, one suspects
that he pursued this largely because of the support it
afforded for the Neoplatonic theory of the Word (the
Intelligence) as the repository of created forms (cf. Trin.
4.1 .3).
In any case, the monistic pressure exerted by his
trinitarianism placed severe difficulties in the way of a
serious attempt to develop a trinitarian account of
creation.	 The difficulties are well illustrated by his
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tortuous attempts to speak of the incarnation as the work of
the whole Trinity while maintaining that it was proper for
the Son to become incarnate (e.g., Inn. 15.11.20). Perhaps
the clearest example of the difficulties facing Augustine is
his treatment of the baptism of Jesus where he wants to
maintain, on the one hand that only the Father spoke, only
the Son was incarnate, and only the Spirit descended while,
on the other hand, he insists that the voice of the Father,
the flesh of the Son, and the dove of the Spirit were each
the work of the entire Trinity.
Augustine's way of reconciling these apparently
irreconcilable statements was to opt for a doctrine of
appropriation. Thus activities which are, in fact, the
work of the Trinity (as a single and indivisible agent) are
treated as if they were activities of a specific Person
because their particular character is appropriate to that
Person's place within the Trinity. Or, as Kelly puts it,
"since each of the Persons possesses the divine nature in a
particular manner, it is proper to attribute to each of
Them, in the external operation of the Godhead, the role
which is appropriate to Him in virtue of His origin" (Kelly
1968, 273f.). The result is that any intrinsic relationship
between the essential and the economic Trinities is lost,
and the latter is downgraded in favour of the former.
Finally, the combination of Augustine's practical
unitanianism with his stress on the immutability of God
must create doubts about the reality of active divine
involvement in creation. 	 His way of defining the divine
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essence in terms of absoluteness and impassibility (in line
with Hellenistic presuppositions) certainly seems to
preclude the active involvement of God in creation and
redemption (Pelikan 1971, 296).
	
This appears to be
confirmed by his stress on the equivocity of the concepts of
divine and creaturely activity (Gen. ad lit. 1.18.36). In
order to reconcile this with Scripture, he resorts to using
the hierarchy of being as a hierarchy of agency: God does
not act directly on creatures but acts by means of mediating
spirits (including human souls). Thus,
He diffuses Himself through all things by certain most
orderly movements of the creature, first the spiritual,
then the material, and He uses all according to the
unchangeable pleasure of His own counsel, whether
incorporeal or corporeal things, whether rational or
irrational spirits, whether the good by His grace or
the wicked by their own will.
But as grosser and lower bodies are directed in a
certain order by subtler and stronger bodies, so all
bodies are directed by the spirit of life: the
irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit of
life, the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by
the rational, pious, and just spirit of life, and the
latter by its Creator, from whom, through whom, and in
whom it has also been created and established. Thus
the will of God is the first and the highest cause of
all the forms and movements of the corporeal being.
(Trim. 3.4.9).
3.	 AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF PROVIDENCE
Like his treatment of the Trinity, Augustine's doctrine of
providence has proved to be of seminal importance for the
western catholic tradition. Prior to Augustine, Christian
accounts of divine providence had focussed mainly on God's
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providential ordering of the natural world.	 In line with
the Stoic roots of the concept, interest was concentrated
on static order and harmony (Gilkey 1976, 161). With
Augustine we see a dramatic shift in emphasis to God's
providential oversight of human history: providence comes
to be related much more closely to the divine purpose and,
thus, is determined by the doctrines of divine election and
eschatology. Gilkey argues that his change of emphasis has
determined subsequent understandings of providence in the
following ways,
(1) providence expresses the sovereignty of God over
historical (and natural) events and so a sovereign or
ruling action fulfilling God's final purposes for his
creation. ... (2) God's providential activity includes
sovereignty over the "external" or objective historical
actions and events, individual and social, in which all
human beings live as well as sovereignty in various
ways over the ordinary decisions of human beings.
(3) In his providence God does not "work" in history as
one external cause among other causes ... but always in
and through the various dynamic factors, including
freedom, effective in all historical change. (4)
Providence works through, not against human freedom,
through our voluntary willing, and so even through our
sinful willing.	 ...	 (5) Because of providence, there
is no fate in human historical existence. ... (6)
Providence is active both in the course of an
individual's life and in the course of history
generally--and in both areas of activity what the
divine providence is doing is directly related to the
electing will and the eschatological goal of God's
sovereign rule. (Gilkey 1976, 161-62)
Four features of Augustine's doctrine of providence are
of particular relevance to the present study: the notion of
a hierarchy of agency referred to above, the universal
scope of divine providence, its eschatological
determination, and its pervasive anthropocentricity.
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(a) Hierarchy of agency
The hierarchy of agency described in such passages as Civ.
5.9,	 Trin.	 3.4.9	 and	 3.5.11	 is	 closely	 related	 to
Augustine's understanding of God's creative activity.
	 God
creates by expressing all
	 things simultaneously and
immutably in the divine Word (Trin. 4.1.3). Augustine
interprets the beginning of Gen. 1:1 as the Word of Jn 1:1,
thus transposing the problem of divine origination of the
cosmos from the metaphysics of time to the metaphysics of
causes (Gilson 1961, 197). Contrary to Santmire's opinion,
this lends itself to an interpretation of the cosmos in
primarily static spatial terms.
God's activity in relation to creation is understood
entirely in terms of this primordial expression of the
cosmos.	 God acts via the eternal and immutable reasons
residing in the divine Word. In spite of this very strong
orientation towards the primordial past, Augustine does not
deny the appearance of change and occurrence within the
created order. He reconciles this with the primordial
ordering of all things by means of a doctrine of seminal
reasons (Trin. 3.8.13): causal 'seeds' embedded in the
created order at the beginning, and brought to fruition in
due time by the Holy Sp'irit10.
In addition to the presence of these seminal reasons,
God may be said to act through the secondary agents He has
created. It should be noted, that Augustine cannot
conceive of corporeal agents since cause, for him, entails
volition (and he doubts whether irrational creatures can be
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said to have wills).	 His own summary of the hierarchy of
causation is as follows:
the cause which is cause only, and not effect, is God.
But other causes are also effects, as are all created
spirits and in particular the rational spirits.
Corporeal causes, which are more acted upon than
active, are not to be counted among efficient causes,
since all they can achieve is what is achieved through
them by the wills of spirits. (Civ. 5.9)
His insistence that God's providence is mediated by
finite causes (Markus 1970, 14, 86-92 ) is highly relevant
for a theology of nature. Divine causality is distinguished
from finite creaturely causality by the fact that God acts
in and through the latter (Inn. 3.3; Gilkey 1976, 166).
Thus Augustine sees God as the ultimate ground of both being
and causation (Civ. 5.8, 12.3; Trin. 3.6.8; Sorabji 1983,
302-05). The mediate nature of this activity becomes the
basis for a justification of God in the face of evil
occurrences (Vera Rel. 40.75). It also enables him to
integrate miracles into the natural order (Inn. 3.5.11).
This lack of distinction between God's activity in
nature and the signs and wonders attested to in Scripture
has resulted in two diametrically opposed tendencies in
European thought. For Augustine and his theological
successors it meant that the natural order was at root
miraculous. The effect of Enlightenment secularism has
been to stand this miraculous view of nature on its head:
resulting either in naturalistic explanations of miracles,
or in an understanding of divine activity as continuous
with and completely specified by natural causation.
One important effect of treating divine causality in
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this manner is a tendency to dissociate divine activity
from created reality. God does not act directly upon the
biophysical universe but only through the mediation of
created spirits. As we shall see later, this tendency to
insulate the spiritual from the corporeal extends, in
Augustine, even to the human creature.
Another consequence of this hierarchical view of
causality, when it appears in conjunction with a
fundamentally impersonal, substantialist model of ultimate
reality, is that agency can be understood only as the
exercise of power. Thus, the Creator-creature relationship
is best expressed as a master-slave relationship: "Creator
signifies a relation to the creature, as lord does to
slave" (Trin. 5.13.14).
(b) Universal scope
The universality of divine providence is a corollary of the
universality of God's creative activity. Thus Augustine
affirms that God's providence extends to such ephemeral
creatures as cloud formations (Gen. ad lit. 5.21.42, Trim.
3.5.11).	 Of course his motive	 is to ensure the
absoluteness of God's sovereignty: God is the only ultimate
cause. In spite of this, however, such statements also
affirm God's sustenance of the nonhuman dimensions of
creation (Gilkey 1976, 166; Gen. ad lit. 5.23.45).
God maintains the entire biophysical creation within
primordially ordained limits (Gem. ad lit. 2.6.14, 3.12.18-
19).	 This lex aeterna is the sum of the eternal reasons
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residing in the divine Word: the second Person of the
Trinity lays down the fundamental structure of the cosmos
(Ritschl 1976, 73).
(c) Eschatolo g ical determination
Most important for subsequent attitudes to nature, however,
was Augustine's insistence that God's activity in nature is
expressive of the divine sovereignty and determined by the
divine purpose. In other words, God's activity in nature
is to be understood in terms of his primordial election (in
Augustine's view, of the Church) and his eschatological
goal.
The latter emphasis is particularly important in
Augustine's theology. However, his understanding of the
eschaton is that it is characterised by a supra-historical
participation in the divine eternity. Thus O'Connell can
say, "no thought could claim Augustinian fatherhood unless
it remained in some genuine sense faithful to his other-
worldly stress" (O'Connell 1978, 144). Human history is the
sea which, according to the Book of Revelation, ceases to
exist at the eschatological transformation of the heavens
and the earth (Civ. 20.15-16).
Experience, and the testimony of Scripture, forced
Augustine to admit that God operates through time and
history to bring about the transformation of souls.
However, in line with classical thought, he still defined
time in terms of motion, change and decay (Vera reli g . 4.6,
Util. 17.35).	 Thus he could only contrast it with the
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changeless perfection of the eternal eschaton (Civ. 11.6).
In later years he inclined to view such change in a
more positive light than in his youth. Thus,
these creatures have received their mode of being by
the will of their Creator, whose purpose is that they
should bring to perfection the beauty of the lower
parts of the universe by their alternation and
succession in the passage of the seasons; and this is a
beauty in its own kind, finding its place among the
constituent parts of this world. (Civ. 12.4)
But while he was prepared to admit that change and
decay were in accord with God's will, he could not bring
himself to admit that they were also proper to human
nature. The decay of irrational natures was divinely
ordained but the decay of the latter could only be due to
human disobedience. In the end, he could not recognise
that change, as such, was a good. This reluctance to admit
the goodness of temporality, combined with his supra-
historical understanding of the eschaton, could only result
in him viewing time as an instrument of providence rather
than, in any sense, an end in itself (Civ. 11.4,6, Conf.
11.13-14; Pelikan 1971, 280-84).
It is not surprising that with such an instrumental
view of time, he should also have an instrumental view of
history. Human history may be the stage for the drama of
sin and redemption but the conclusion of the drama is not
set upon that stage. The telos of history lies in eternity
(Civ. 18.49, 20.9, 21.25). Furthermore, its orientation
towards the eschaton means that providence is focussed on
the church and the salvation of individuals rather than on
history as such (Gilkey 1976, 165).
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(d) Anthropocentricjty
Augustine's understanding of the eschaton clearly implies an
anthropocentric orientation. This is quite explicit in his
earlier works. Providence is "what God has done for the
salvation of the human race, renewing and restoring it unto
eternal life" (Vera reli g . 7.13).	 Its primary function is
to recall "to its true and essential nature whatever
manifests defect" (Vera reli q . 17.33; cf. 41.79). However,
he makes no attempt to draw out any implications for
creation as a whole, being content to restrict providence to
the recalling of souls to their true natures. If there is a
development in his doctrine of providence it is not in the
direction of placing more importance on divine care for the
nonhuman but, rather, in the direction of putting more
emphasis on the role of providence in relation to the
Church. And, if history exists in the divine economy only
to enable the trans-historical transformation of souls,
either individually or corporately (Gilkey 1976, 165; Markus
1970, pp. 82ff.), how much more so is this the case for
nature.
4. AUGUSTINE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE MATERIAL CREATION
Augustine the Christian theologian departed radically from
the outright hostility towards the material world which
would have characterised Augustine the 'hearer' of the
Manichees.	 However, this reaction against his heretical
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youth is a far cry from the "triumph of the ecological
motif" which Paul Santmire discerns in his theology
(Santmire 1985, 55-73). A more realistic assessment would
be that of R. A. Markus who argues that the nonhuman
creation as such was never a central issue in Augustine's
thought, and that it appears only under exegetical pressure
(Markus 1967, 395). One might add that polemical pressures
also played an important part in making Augustine attend to
this issue11.
(a) Creatio ex nihilo
At the heart of Augustine's polemic against the Manichees
was his affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. Contrary to
their belief in the corporeality of God, this doctrine
affirmed the existence of an ontological gulf between the
divine and the mutable (Gilson 1961, 189).
Peter Brown comments of Manichaeism that "No religious
system ... had ever treated the visible world so
drastically, and with such literalism, as an externalization
of an inner, spiritual conflict" (Brown 1967, 56). This
treatment of the cosmos as a reification of the eternal
conflict between good and evil, and the consequent denial of
absolute sovereignty to the Good, was also a target for
criticism from the perspective of creatio ex nihilo.
Augustine attacked the Platonic myth of the demiurge (and,
by implication, all forms of cosmic dualism
including Manichaeism) in the following terms, "When they
say that there is something which God omnipotent did not
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create ...	 they so far deny that God is omnipotent" (Fid.
et s ymb. 2.2).
However, in spite of his rejection of Manichaeism,
Augustine tends to to ignore the goodness of the created
order (which is a corollary of the absolute sovereignty of
a good Creator). He admits the biblical insistence on the
goodness of creation but does not permit it to undermine
Neopiatonic doubts about the goodness of matter 12 . At best,
the biblical teaching assured him that even the material
creation played a part in God's good purposes.
In line with this failure to let the Biblical witness
criticise the Neoplatonic view of matter is an apparent
blindness to the tension between the biblical doctrine of
creation and the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. Instead,
he presents creatio ex nihilo as entirely consistent with
the Neoplatonic conception of God as the source of being,
and his use of Neoplatonic categories effectively suppresses
the tension between them (Knowles 1962, 39).
(b) Partici pation in form
For Augustine, creaturely being entails participation in
form (Vera reli g . 11.21-22). Since God is His attributes,
participation clearly distinguishes divine from created
being (Inn. 5.10.11). Indeed participation in form may be
said to be definitive of creaturely existence. Thus chaos
is the absence of form, and the nihil from which God
created all things is no ontological power set over against
Him but, rather, the absence of even the capacity to
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receive form (Vera reli g . 18.36). He confirms this by
insisting on the simultaneous creation of matter and form
(Gen. ad lit. 1.15.29).
This is consistent with his appropriation of Neo-
Platonic emanationism in the theory of creation by the
divine Word (Gen. ad lit. 1.3.8). 	 According to this
theory,	 all	 finite	 possibilities were eternally	 and
immutably expressed in the generation of the second Person
of the Trinity. Contrary to Neoplatonism, the transition
from these eternal reasons to created reality does not take
place by way of a necessary self-diffusion of the Good but
by a free act of the divine will. God has eternally chosen
that the capacity to resemble or participate in these
eternal reasons should exist 'outside' the Godhead.
As we have already noted, Augustine took over the
concept of a great chain of being from classical thought.
Thus he regarded all finite essences as arranged
hierarchically on the basis of the inequality of their
participation in Being (Gilson 1961, 210).
	
Those beings
which participate most fully in Being will clearly resemble
it most closely.	 Since Being itself is immutable, the
degree to which a being is subject to change is a natural
measure of its place in the hierarchy. It follows that
spiritual beings (which are subject only to temporal
change) must be higher than corporeal beings (which are
also subject to spatial change) (Gen. ad lit. 8.20.39).
Augustine	 regarded this hierarchy of being as
equivalent to a hierarchy of agency or power. In the same
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way, he saw it as a hierarchy of goodness: "The highest
form is the highest good, and the lowest form is the lowest
good" (Vera reli g . 18.35). This was because, like the Neo-
platonists, he equated being and goodness: "All things are
to be praised for the reason that they exist; for what
exists is for that reason alone good" (Lib. arb. 3.7.21).
In spite of the apparently world-affirming nature of
the preceding quotation, this doctrine that existence is
goodness has actually had a pernicious effect on western
Christian attitudes to the material creation. Implicit in
it is the doctrine that 'higher' existents are better than
'lower'. Thus spiritual beings are better than corporeal
beings; eternal beings are better than temporal beings.
The material aspects of creation may not be actively evil13
but they are without doubt the least good parts of creation
(Nat. bon. 18-19; Conf. 12.2). This belief that spiritual
realities are better, and therefore more to be desired,
than corporeal realities constitutes a fundamental part of
Augustine's spirituality: the contemptus rnundi.
On the other hand, the equation of existence with
participation in the eternal reasons clearly implies that
they bear some resemblance to that in which they
participate. Thus all things, to the extent that they
participate in the divine Word, do resemble the triune God.
This resemblance enables Augustine to accept the biblical
affirmation of the goodness of all created reality (Civ.
11.24).	 Furthermore, it allows him to recognise the
existence of order and beauty even in the material creation
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(Vera relig. 40.76). This resemblance further suggests
that traces of the divine reality exist within creation:
the vestigia trinitatis. These traces can become the basis
for the contemplation of God 14
 (Trin. 6.10.12).
(c) A deterministic cosmos
Augustine clearly regarded the biophysical universe as
subject to primordial ordering. The patterns of creation,
the orders of creation have been laid down from the
Beginning. Dietrich Ritschl sees in Augustine's treatment
of the divine ordering of creation a Christianisation of
the Stoic concept of fatum (Ritschl 1976, 72). This is, in
essence, a static and deterministic understanding of the
cosmos.
Evidence that the nonhuman is not merely ordered but
determined by God may be adduced from Augustine's
interpretation of "according to their kinds" (Gen. 1:11,12,
21,24,25). He takes this to mean that God has ordained that
the characteristics of the first parents will be transmitted
without defect to all succeeding generations (Gen. ad lit.
3.12.19), and it contrasts with the freedom which God has
bestowed upon the human creature (Gen. ad lit. 3.12.20).
This clearly entails the fixity of nonhuman species'5.
Contrary to this view, Santmire, amongst others, has
attempted to show that Augustine not only saw nature in
historical (and, hence, dynamic) terms but that he had a
rudimentary conception of evolution. Santmire bases his
argument on Augustine's theory of the rationes seminales'6.
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However, quite apart from the fact that Augustine
introduced this theory for exegetical reason& 7 , it entails
that all apparent novelty has, in fact, been implicit in
creation from the beginning (Gen. ad lit. 5.20.41). It,
thus, has more in common with the Hegelian concept of
development than with evolution as commonly understood
today.
Finally, it is worth noting that such a static view of
the cosmos is consistent with a doctrine of God articulated
in terms of divine substance and a doctrine of providence
determined by a supra-historical eschaton. If God is
substance in the Hellenistic sense, the highest good is
immutable: static and lifeless. Similarly, because the
telos of created reality lay beyond history, Augustine was
unable to envisage any real transformation within history or
nature1 8
Cd) The purpose of the nonhuman
What is the purpose of the nonhuman creation? What is its
telos, its fulfilment?
Santmire argues that Augustine believed that the
material creation existed primarily to be beautiful and to
glorify God: "the most fundamental telos of the whole
creation is beauty, and the glorification of the God who
wills such a magnificent community of being, every part of
which has its own divinely validated integrity" (Saritmire
1985, 61). However, this ignores the fact that, for
Augustine, sensual beauty was merely a means to a still
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higher end, namely, the contemplation of the rational.
The hierarchical streak in Augustine's thought means
that the lower exists to serve the higher; the telos of the
lower exists in such service. 	 Thus,	 Since the creature
is either equal or inferior to us, we must use the
inferior for God and enjoy the equal, but in God" (Trin.
9.8.13). He was quite unable to conceive of nature having
order or beauty for its own sake. And, since the human
creature is the highest created being in the material
realm, it follows that the sub-human creation exists only
to serve him.
5. THE HUMAN AND THE NONHUMAN
In this final section we shall examine some implications of
Augustine's anthropology and spirituality for his attitude
to the natural world.
(a) Imago Del
That humankind is, in some sense, the image of God is
fundamental to Christian anthropologies. Augustine's
anthropology is no exception. However, the different ways
in which Christian theologians have answered the question,
"In what sense are human beings images of God?" has led to
a great diversity of anthropologies, and a corresponding
diversity of answers to the question of the relation of the
human to the nonhuman.
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Augustine's answer is straightforward.	 The human
soul' 9 is the image of God:
His image ... is man, in that whereby He is superior to
other animals, namely, in reason and understanding, and
whatever else can be said of the rational or
intellectual soul that pertains to that thing which is
called the mind or animus. (Trin. 15.1.1; cf. Gen. ad
lit. 3.20.30, Trin. 15.8.14)
The spiritual dimension of humankind is that which
participates most fully in, and hence resembles most
closely, the divine reality. 	 Augustine's hierarchical
perspective is quite consistent in picking out the soul as
the image of God.
It follows that the soul must also be regarded as
superior to the material creation (Gen. ad lit. 8.23.44,
Trin. 8.3.4).	 Thus, it is natural that Augustine should
associate the concept of ima qo dei very closely with the
dominium terrae enunciated in the same verse (Gen. 1:26).
By virtue of its possession of reason, the human soul is
rightful lord of the irrational creation (Gen. ad lit.
3.20.30), and the glory of the world (Trin. 15.8.14, Vera
relig. 28.51).
Augustine develops the concept of human dominion over
the created order by analogy with divine sovereignty (Gen.
ad lit. 7.19.25) with potentially serious implications for
the reality of human action in the material world.
However, his motive appears to be to allay doubts about
divine agency. His reply to the question of how we can
conceive of an immutable God as the agent of change is that
we have no difficulty with the similar mystery of how the
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human soul can be conceived of as the agent of physical
movement (Gen. ad lit. 8.21.40).
Of course, Augustine was not content simply to silence
a serious question in this way. Elsewhere he pursues the
mystery of human agency further, suggesting that the soul
does not act directly on the body (Gen. ad lit. 7.19.25).
Instead its wishes are mediated by the highest corporeal
elements, namely, air and fire 20 . The result of these
speculations is that a wedge is driven between soul and
body: his psychological dualism is much more than an
"isolated countervailing theme (Santmire 1985, 68). On
the contrary, it pervades his entire spirituality and
colours his understanding of the relationship between human
and nonhuman.
(b) Embodiment
What, then, of Augustine's attitude to the body?
The young Augustine appears to have retained some
vestiges of the Manichees' hostility to the body 21 . For
example, in his early treatise De quantitatae animae, he
made it clear that he considered bodily existence to be a
state of alienation (O'Connell 1978, 62).
This hostility gave way to a more moderate position
under the impact of biblical teaching on the matter. Two
aspects of the biblical witness appear to have been of
particular importance. One was its insistence on the
reality of the incarnation: Augustine could not evade the
insistence of both Bible and orthodoxy that the Son of God
-103-
condescended to dwell in an ordinary human body. But, even
if that could have been evaded, the Bible's insistence on a
general physical resurrection forced him to concede that
embodiment is part of God's ultimate plan for us.
The position adopted in his mature writings is that
soul and body, though distinct, are intimately related22.
Indeed so close is their relationship that any disorder in
that relationship is translated into illness or sin (Mus.
6.5.13). However, this recognition of a close relationship
between soul and body cannot evade the fact that, since
they are ontologically distinct, one must be superior to
the other. Thus the proper relationship between soul and
body can only be understood in terms of the relationship
between master and slave23:
it is necessary that the soul be ruled by a Superior
and rule the inferior. That Superior is God alone;
that inferior is the body alone ... Therefore, as the
entire soul cannot be without its Lord, so it cannot
excel without its slave. (Mus. 6.5.13)
In the same passage he makes it clear that the soul's
telos is to participate in the eternal (rational) things of
God and that this is completely incompatible with taking
notice of its carnal slave. The resurrection body,
understood by Augustine as the perfect slave, is literally
beneath the notice of its master, the soul:
just as the the spirit is quite appropriately called
carnal when it is the servant of the flesh, the flesh
will with equal propriety be called spiritual, when it
serves the spirit. This is not because the flesh will
be converted into spirit ... but because it will submit
to the spirit with a ready obedience, an obedience so
wonderfully complete that the body will fulfil the will
of the spirit in such a way as to bring perfect
assurance of indissoluble immortality, free from any
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feeling of distress, and relieved of any possibility of
corruption, any trace of reluctance. (Civ. 13.20)
(c) The ascent to God
We have already referred to the telos of the human soul and
the role in it envisaged for matter by Augustine. Before
concluding the chapter it would be worthwhile to look a
little more closely at Augustine's programme for Christian
spirituality and its implications for a theology of nature.
The quest for ultimate fulfilment is not one that the soul
can initiate on its own behalf. Rather, it is initiated by
God's gracious providence (Vera reli g . 17.33). God calls
the soul to the fullest possible participation in Being, in
the divine reality. To Augustine's hierarchical way of
thinking this entails leaving behind the present existence:
an existence characterised by the uncertainty of knowledge
derived from corporeal senses, and the restlessness of
temporal experience. God calls us to eternal rest in the
enduring realm of reason. This is the true import of those
famous, "you made us for yourself and our hearts find no
peace until they rest in you" (Conf. 1.1).
Such a view clearly lends itself to interpretation in
terms of an ascent from this (lower) material realm to a
(higher) spiritual realm (O'Connell 1978, 21). Augustine
describes this ascent in some detail:
In the first stage he is taught by the rich stores of
history which nourish by examples. In the second stage
he forgets human affairs and tends towards divine
things. He is no longer kept in the bosom of human
authority, but step by step by the use of reason he
strives to reach the highest unchangeable law. In the
third stage he confidently marries carnal appetite to
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strong reason, and inwardly rejoices in the sweetness
of the union.	 Soul and mind are joined together in
chaste union. There is as yet no compulsion to do
right, but, even though no one forbids sin, he has no
pleasure in sinning. The fourth stage is similar, only
now he acts much more firmly, and springs forth as the
perfect man, ready to endure and overcome all the
persecutions, tempests and billows of this world.	 In
the fifth stage he has peace and tranquillity on all
sides.	 He lives among the abundant resources of the
unchangeable realm of supreme ineffable wisdom. The
sixth stage is complete transformation into life
eternal, a total forgetfulness of temporal life passing
into the perfect form which is made according to the
image and likeness of God. The seventh is eternal rest
and perpetual beatitude with no distinguishable ages.
(Vera relig. 26.49)
Thus love of this world is inappropriate for anyone
bent on ascending to God.	 Augustine regards love of the
temporal and rational contemplation of the eternal as
mutually exclusive. "Life which delights in material joys
arid neglects God tends to nothingness and is thereby
iniquity" (Vera relig. 11.22; cf. 3.6, 49.97-98, Horn. lJn
2.9-13).
However, we should note that, for Augustine, love of
the temporal was not merely the responsible care for nature
advocated by present-day environmentalists. Love or desire
indicated an ontological orientation. For a soul to love
temporal, corporeal nature meant for Augustine that the
higher was directed towards the lower. Thus it overturned
the divinely ordained hierarchy of being. Such an
orientation meant that the soul, instead of being the free
lord of the material creation, became its slave.
In such a state the soul's relation to matter changes
radically. Animals which before the Fall could not harm
humankind become dangerous beasts, harmless plants become
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noxious weeds, and manual labour becomes back-breaking toil
(Gen. ad lit. 3.15.24-18.28). Similarly fallen humankind
gives up the proper use of the material creation in favour
of its sensual use 24 .	 It is important to remember that
Augustine did not regard matter itself as responsible for
this state. Matter, as such, is morally neutral: "it was
not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful; it was
the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible" (Civ.
14.3).
The opposite state, of rational contemplation of the
eternal, denotes an orientation towards and a desire for
that which is higher, more real. It is the state from
which we have fallen and to which we are recalled by divine
providence. This gracious call to fallen humankind imposes
on us a responsibility: "no one is to receive assistance
from his superiors to know and grasp the grace of God,
unless he is prepared with a pure affection to assist his
inferiors to the same" (Vera reli g . 28.51). But this
obligation does not extend beyond the ontological gap
between the spiritual and material creations. In any case,
such benevolence means, for Augustine, willing assent to
the fulfilment of another's telos (O'Donovan 1980, 32-36).
The telos of the lower creation is to serve humankind and
assist us in our contemplation of the higher.
This is the context in which Augustine's stress on
contemptus mundi is to be understood. Fallen humankind's
inordinate desire for the material world has to be
reversed.	 This slogan serves as a corrective to that
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desire in the preliminary stages of the ascent. Thus he
exhorts his friend Honoratus to, "Think of endurance that
makes light of crosses and flames; of liberality that
distributes its patrimony to the poor; of contempt of this
world not stopping short of a longing for death" (Util.
1 7 . 35).
If contempt for this life is the corrective to our
improper use of creation, what is Augustine's teaching
about the proper use of creation?
We have already seen that Augustine frowned upon the
sensual enjoyment of the material creation and even study
of the created order for its own sake has absolutely no
place in his scheme. The possibility that life might
delight in material joys without, thereby, neglecting God
simply did not occur to him. He insists that,
We should not vainly behold the beauty of the sky, the
order of the stars, the brightness of light, the
alternations of day and night, the monthly courses of
the moon, the fourfold seasons of the year, the meeting
of the four elements, the life-force of seeds begetting
forms and numbers, and all things that keep their
nature and their appropriate measure each in its own
kind. In considering these things there should be no
exercise of vain and perishing curiosity, but a step
should be taken towards immortal things that abide for
ever. (Vera reli g . 29.52)
Here we pick up the positive note in Augustine's
understanding of matter. Since it exists only by
participating in the Being of the Creator, even the
material creation can direct us towards the source of its
being as we contemplate its order and beauty: "the whole
nature of the universe itself, which surrounds us and to
which we also belong, cries aloud that it has the most
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exalted Creator of all" (Trin. 15.4.6; cf. Vera relig.
11.21-22). Thus, there is a right use of matter; not
enjoying it for its own sake, but using it as an instrument
for the contemplation of higher things:
If fleshly pleasure is loved, let it be carefully
considered and vestigial traces of number will be
recognized in it. We must, then, seek the realm where
number exists in complete tranquillity; for there
existence is, above all, unity. 	 (Vera relig. 42.79)
However even this positive note is muted when we recall
that Augustine regarded material reality as inferior to
spiritual reality for such purposes. At best, nature is to
be regarded as a dispensable instrument of contemplation to
be supplanted by the trinitarian structure of the human
soul as soon as one is sufficiently advanced in the
spiritual life. One recalls the ascending series of
psychological trinities in the later books of Ce trinitate
and the suggestion that they were, in fact, part of the
itinerary for the journey towards true knowledge of God.
Such a view of the religious life naturally lends
itself to mere toleration of the physical world while the
soul awaits the time of escape from this realm.
6. CONCLUSIONS: VESTIGES OF A WORLD-AFFIRMING THEOLOGY?
The following implications may be drawn from the preceding
discussion: (1) Augustine's view of nature is essentially
static, a divinely ordered context for human affairs. (2)
The hierarchical structure of being which informs his
theology subordinates matter and irrational
	 life to
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humankind and God.	 The lower orders exist in order to
serve the higher. Thus matter and irrational life achieve
their telos in service to humankind (just as the telos of
humankind is service to God).
However, it would be wrong to dismiss Augustine as
entirely hostile to the nonhuman creation. There are clear
world-affirming elements in his theology. 	 Unfortunately
they are fragmentary and remain largely undeveloped. For
example, his insistence on the value of the material
creation for the contemplation of God could in another
context have become the basis for a more positive Christian
assessment of nature.
Further development of his belief 'in a physical
resurrection would ultimately have led to the discarding of
the Neoplatonic myth of the fall and return of the soul,
and,	 with	 it,	 the rejection of an ascent-oriented
spirituality. Thus it would have necessitated the
transformation of Augustine's anthropology, psychology and
spirituality. O'Connell 1978 argues that it would also have
necessitated a transformation of his aesthetic theory.
Finally these changes would have entailed a corresponding
change in his eschatology.
Santmire does see such a transformation at work in
Augustine's treatment of eschatology in the later books of
De civitate Dei (e.g., Civ. 20.16, 22.29). He argues that
we can see in this work a return to a more literal,
physical view of the eschaton (Santmire 1985, 64f.).	 Now
it is certainly possible to point to passages which lend
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themselves to such an interpretation, but, in the very same
books he denies any continuity between the physical
universe as it now appears and the eschatological
environment. For example,
the qualities of the corruptible elements which were
appropriate for our corruptible bodies will utterly
perish in the burning, and our substance itself will
acquire the qualities which will be suited, by a
miraculous transformation, to our immortal bodies, with
the obvious purpose of furnishing the world, now
renewed for the better, with a fitting population of
human beings, renewed for the better in their flesh.
(Civ. 20.16)
This passage illustrates the difficulty: Augustine is
quite ambiguous in his use of such terms as flesh and body.
If we assume (as Santmire does) that Augustine has
consciously changed his position then we may read it as a
corrective to an earlier spiritualised approach. However,
it is equally possible to read it as continuous with his
earlier theology. This latter approach is more in keeping
with the mature Augustine's own view, as found in his
Retractationes2 .
Amongst the vestiges of a more positive attitude to
nature, we might include his very pictorial, even physical
analogies for providence. Again Santmire cites these as
evidence of a change of heart, and again I believe he has
overstated the case. A more convincing explanation is
surely that which O'Connell uses with reference to the
parallel mismatch between his explicit aesthetic (which is
intellectualist and spiritualising in its implications) and
his rich verbal artistry (which draws freely from the
corporeal world and even from human sexuality). 	 He
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explicitly maintains the continuity of his theological and
philosophical system. However, his faithfulness to
Scripture results in the appearance of rich and moving
passages which seem to point in a different direction.
Looked at in this way, Santmire's very sympathetic
account of Augustine's theology of nature may be regarded
as an authentically Augustinian approach: but one which, in
its development goes far beyond what Augustine himself
envisaged. However, this affirmative approach to the non-
human is embedded in a philosophical system which is
consistently negative. Western Christianity has inherited
both, but it is the latter which has so often been
dominant.
NOTES
1. This widely accepted tenet of Hellenistic theology
penetrated into Christian theology in the form of the
via negativa.
2. Mackey 1983, for example, insists that Augustine
loses sight of genuinely substantial differences within
the Godhead which were dealt with more satisfactorily
by the older subordinationist model.
3. For example, Leonard Hodgson, John Burnaby, and Harry
Wolfson.
4. Augustine's Neoplatonic methodology is not confined to
his adoption of the method of introspection in the
later books of De trinitate. Throughout the work, what
he says about God is said within the restrictions
imposed by the via negativa, e.g.,
let us think of God, if we are able, and insofar
as we are able, in the following way: as good
without quality, as great without quantity, as the
Creator who lacks nothing, who rules but from no
position, and who contains all things without an
external form, as being whole everywhere without
limitation of space, as eternal without time, as
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making mutable things without any change in
Himself, and as a Being without passion. (Trin.
5.1.2).
The logical conclusion of this is his famous
denial of positive content to the doctrine of the
Trinity: the assertion that there are three Persons in
the Godhead is not to be understood as saying something
positive about God but rather as a denial of
singularity (Trin. 7.4.9).
5. Augustine's approach suggests that this was regarded by
him primarily as a problem of trinitarian discourse.
Interestingly, one of Mackey's criticisms of Augustine
is precisely that he reduced the Persons to a set of
logical rules about how we may speak of God (Mackey
1983, 155).
6. The precise nature of this argument is interesting.
The rejection of modalism depends on the assertion
that, since God is faithful, God reveals himself: that
what he is in revelation must correspond to what he is
in himself. It seems that an axiological premise has
been coerced into yielding an ontological conclusion.
As we shall see later, there is some doubt as to
whether Augustine's insistence on the divine simplicity
gives the desired result of an intrinsic relationship
between the economic and the essential. This suggests
the ironical possibility that in order to avoid
modalism it may be necessary to drop the very assertion
that was intended as a safeguard against it.
7. This could be either hierarchical or non-hierarchical.
In the former case, it could easily be confused with
subordinationism proper.
8. It may even have blinded him to the subordinationist
possibilities of the philosophers he most admired,
explaining why he accused the Neoplatonists of
tritheism rather than subordinationism in their
treatment of the primal hypostases.
9. Augustine does not distinguish between love and unity.
Indeed he maintains the Hellenistic tradition of
treating human love as a special case of the cosmic
love which western science has more recently dubbed
gravity (O'Donovan 1980, 19-24; cf. Civ. 11.28, 19.12).
10. Taking his inspiration from Gen. 1:2, Augustine uses
the incongruous metaphor of hatching (Gen. ad lit.
1 . 18.36).
11. For example, his earliest essay in the exegesis of
Genesis, De qenesi contra manichaeos, was inspired by
his reaction against the Manichees.
12. Had he done so, this would have undermined one of the
major motives for the ascent theme in his spirituality.
13. Augustine recognises the essentially spiritual nature
of sin and evil, e.g., "there is no evil except sin and
sin's penalty, that is, a voluntary abandonment of
highest being, and toil among inferior beings which is
not voluntary" (Vera relig. 40.76).
14. Augustine's Pythagorean-Platonic orientation is evident
in the fact that the aspect of the material universe
-113-
which most clearly reveals to him the divine handiwork
is its quantifiability (Gen. ad lit. 4.2.2-7.13).
15. To be fair to Augustine, his purpose in the passage
cited is not to argue for the fixity of species.
Instead, he makes the point that the reliable
transmission of a species' characteristics from one
generation to the next is part of God's providential
care: God ensures the continuance of the species.
However, The static character of the natural order is
also implied by his frequent use of the Stoic aesthetic
(or theodicy) of totality: the cosmos is to be judged,
like a painting, not by localised darkness or ugliness,
but by the overall artistry. Not only is the analogue
of the painting static but a universe in which such an
overall view was possible would on modern physical
understandings of the universe preclude the sort of
dynamism with which we are, in fact, faced.
16. To be specific,	 Santmire	 relies on Augustine's
statements in Trin. 3.8.13 and Gen. ad lit. 9.17.32.
17. The theory seeks to reconcile the instantaneous
creation of Eccius. 18:3 with the seven days' work of
Gen. 1 (Copleston 1950, 76-77).
18. It is arguable that through his psychological theory of
time, Augustine succeeded in psychologising history:
the only genuine history is the history of the soul,
the rest is subject to the deterministic laws of
nature. Thus he may have laid the foundations for the
conflict between nature and history that has plagued
recent western thought.
19. He draws a revealing distinction between the masculine
animus or rational soul (common to humans and
incorporeal spirits), and the feminine anima or
irrational soul (common to humans and lower animals).
The spiritual, rational, celestial and male is superior
to the corporeal, irrational, terrestrial and female
(Gen. ad lit. 8.23.44).
20. His speculations about the role of air within the body
as the medium which translates the souls' wishes into
physical movements seem alien to us. However, they
suggest that Augustine was well-versed in classical
anatomy and hydraulics: an observation that seems
incongruous with his insistence that the material
universe should not be studied for its own sake.
21. He may have been able to retain this aspect of
Manichaean teaching because of parallels in Christian
theology. For example, Origen regarded the body as
divine punishment for sin.
22. This affirmation of the necessity of embodiment has an
important positive effect on his thought with regard to
the telos of the soul. It protects his doctrine of the
ascent of the soul to God from collapsing into Neo-
Platonic monism. Embodiment eternally distinguishes
the rational soul from its divine creator: it ensures
that the end of the ascent is still participation
rather than union.
23. It is sometimes suggested that Augustine moderated his
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position still further, envisaging the relationship as
akin to marriage (e.g., Santmire 1980, 180). However,
this ignores the essentially hierarchical nature of
Augustine's ontology. It also overlooks the fact that,
even though ontologically equal, Augustine regarded the
female as existing in order to serve the male, just as
a human slave serves a human master (Gen. ad lit.
8.23.44).
24. This theme could be developed into an Augustinian
environmentalism: our exploitation of creation being
classified as an improper, sensual use (cf. Saritmire
1985, 69-70).
25. For example, at one point Augustine even corrects a
comment in De vera religione to make it more spiritual
than before. Thus the resurrection body will not only
be immortal but will not require food or drink: it will




IN CLASSICAL WESTERN THEOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the place of the
nonhuman creation in two classical western theological
systems, one scholastic and one from the Reformation. Both
systems are clearly indebted to Augustine. But to what
extent have they adopted and passed on to subsequent
generations his view of the nonhuman creation?
1.	 ST BONAVENTURE
(a) Introduction: The Context of St Bonaventure's Theology
St Bonaventure's theology has long been overshadowed by that
of his contemporary St Thomas Aquinas. However, in the
context of a theological consideration of nature, it well
repays careful consideration.
Until relatively recently it was fashionable to present
Bonaventure and Aquinas as rivals. From this perspective,
he appeared as the traditionalist, ardently defending the
Augustinian tradition of the catholic church against the
Aristotelian novelties of Aquin&s (Knowles 1962, 246;
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Tillich 1968, 141). However this assessment of their
relationship has been challenged by recent studies which
highlight the continuity between their positions rather than
their differences.
In the case of Bonaventure, a convincing case has been
made for his indebtedness to Aristotle 1
 (Quinn 1973). As
for Aquinas, his doctrine of God (in particular, his
understanding of the Trinity) is now seen to be firmly
Augustinian (Pelikan 1978, 277-79), and recent studies of
his philosophy suggest a greater affinity with Neoplatonism
than was formerly thought to be the case (Hankey 1987).
While it would be an exaggeration to see Bonaventure and
Aquinas as representatives of a single school of thought
( pace van Steenberghen) they may be regarded as seeking, in
their	 distinct	 ways,	 to	 achieve	 a	 synthesis	 of
Aristotelianism and Augustinianism. The view that
Bonaventure's system is "an Augustinianism developed through
the centuries and re-thought in relation to Aristotelianism"
(Copleston 1950, 245) appears to be sound.
Nevertheless, it is to Augustine rather than Aristotle,
that we must look for the major source of his theological
thought. Through his teacher, Alexander of Hales, he
imbibed the Augustinian theology and spirituality of St
Anseim and the Victorines (the latter also opening him up to
other influences, notably that of Dionysius the Pseudo-
Areopagite). This indebtedness is clear from the frequent
and very sympathetic citations of Augustine in his writings
(e.g., Brev. 3.5)2.	 Thus he is a natural object of study
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for anyone wishing to examine the historical development of
Augusti n ian ism.
However, there is another connection which makes him
especially valuable for a study of Christian attitudes to
the natural world, namely, his personal and theological
connection with St Francis of Assisi. It is unlikely that
he ever met Francis but, growing up in Italy at the time
when Francis' charismatic influence was at its peak, he
could not help but be influenced by the saint 3 . Having
become minister-general of the Franciscan Order at the early
age of 36, he is rightly regarded as the first great
Franciscan theologian.
Interestingly the influence of St Francis is far less
clear in his theological system than in his personal piety.
The driving force behind his theological synthesis may well
have been the spirituality of St Francis, but in the
interaction with Aristotle and Augustine it has been
transformed almost beyond recognition (Cousins 1978b, 24).
(b) St Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Trinity
It is generally agreed that the key to understanding his
theological system is his doctrine of the Trinity (Hayes
1981, 12; Pelikan 1978, 283). As might be expected in a
commentator upon the Sentences, he follows Peter Lombard in
making the doctrine of the triune God the starting point of
his entire theological system (Brev. 1). However he goes
far beyond Lombard in transforming the doctrine of the
Trinity into the organising principle for his entire world
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view. He discerns trinitarian structures not only within
theology itself but at the very roots of created reality.
As a result, both his ontology and his epistemology are
explicitly trinitarian. In his own words: "this is the sum
total of our metaphysics: concerned with emanation,
exemplarity, and consummation, that is, illumination through
spiritual radiations and return to the Supreme Being" (Hex.
1.17).
(1) The Father as First Princi p le: Bonaventure takes
for granted the Augustinian princnple that all divine
operations ad extra proceed from a single divine principle5.
He consistently argues that the fact of creation entails a
single first principle. Thus the presupposition of a
simple, indivisible divine nature is the basis and a
recurring theme of his treatment of the Trinity (Brev.
1.3.2, 1.4.2, 1.5.2, 1.6.2, 1.7.2, 1.8.4, 1.9.4).
This single divine nature could validly be understood
in terms of being. However, since it is to be equated with
the living God, he prefers to speak in terms of goodness (a
category which he holds to be ontologiically prior to being).
This approach is also fundamental to his positive
understanding of the Trinity, since it enables him to deploy
the Dionysian principle of the self-diffusiveness of the
good5 (Brev. 1.2.3).
This first principle is the sourrce of all things: the
fount of all goodness and being. It is unbegotten.
However, thanks to the principle of self-diffusiveness,
Bonaventure understands unbegottenness positively as a
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correlative of the divine fecundity. Furthermore, by virtue
of its status as first principle, this entity has absolute
power 7
 (thus establishing a positive basis for understanding
God as omnipotent and transcendent).
However, he departs from the Augustinian tradition in
one important respect.
	 He unequivocally identifies this
unbegotten, omnipotent and infinitely fecund first principle
with the person of the Father.
	 The identification is
inevitable once unbegottenness is attributed to the first
principle (Brev. 1.3.7). This characterisation of the
Father as fons et ori go trinitatis is reminiscent of the
Greek Fathers rather than Augustine (Cousins 1978a, 51).
(ii) The innertrinitarian emanations: The necessity of
a triune God follows from the infinite self-diffusiveness of
the Good taken together with the Anselmian logic of
perfection. God as perfect good or love not only exists
necessarily but necessarily requires a perfect expression or
object. This immediately rules out Dionysius' own view that
creation was such an expression. No finite creature (nor
even the sum total of creatures) can perfectly express
infinite fecundity of God. It follows that there must be a
perfect coequal and coeternal expression of the Good. This
can only be the divine Lo gos. Furthermore, we cannot rest
content with binitarianism for it would then be possible to
conceive a yet more perfect Good/Love which did not cling
jealously to the object of its love but shared it with a
third coequal and coeternal entity. It is not necessary to
continue the argument to a quaternity and so ad infinitum
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for that would not lead to any further qualitative increase
in the perfection of the Good (Itin. 6.2).
(iii) The Son. Word, or Ima ge: "Image designates the
Son as the conformed similitude, the Word as the
intellectual similitude, and the Son as the similitude of
the same nature" (Brev. 1.3.8).
As the complete and perfect self-expression of the
Father, the Son is to be regarded as that unitary conception
in which the Father knows himself perfectly 8
 . The Image
completely sums up all the possibilities inherent in the
Father's power and fecundity. Since these possibilities
include the innertrinitarian emanations themselves, it
follows that the Son is the Image not only of the Father but
of the entire Trinity 9 . This is the significance behind one
of his favourite designations of the Son, namely, the
Hierarch (Brev. prol. 3; Hex. 21; Itin. 4.6; Lin. 40). As
Hierarch, the Son is the primordial model for the
trinitarian ordering of all reality (not excluding God
Himself)10.
It also follows that the divine Image contains the
archetypes of creation as a subset of the infinitude of
possibilities which it images 11 .	 This leads directly to a
Christocentric (and,
	
hence,	 trinitarian)	 doctrine of
creation.
As both Image of the Trinity and Archetype (or,
Exemplar) of creation, the Son may be regarded as the centre
of both the Trinity and creation. Thus he is the point of
contact between the triune God and creation or the openness
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of the triune God to the other (Hayes 1978, S90).
Bonaventure arrives at the same point of view by a different
route:
And so, if God is supreme ri ghteousness in Himself as
the Beginning and as the End, it is necessary to posit
within Him an intermediate Person of His own nature, so
that one be only producing, another only produced, and
the intermediary both producing and produced. It is
necessary also to posit a medium between the origin and
the return of things (Reduc. 23)
(iv) The Holy S p irit: "the gift designates Him as a
voluntary gift, the love or nexus as voluntary and especial
gift, and the Holy Ghost designates Him as a voluntary,
especial, and hypostatic gift" (Brev. 1.3.9).
Turning to the Spirit, we find that He appears in
Bonaventure's treatment of the Trinity primarily in the
Augustinian role of bond of love between Father and Son.
Although his use of Anseim's logic of perfection would
suggest that the Spirit is the perfecter of the Trinity,
this role is reserved for the Son.
(v) Vesti ges and analog ies of the Trinity : We shall
discuss Bonaventure's characterisation of creatures as
vestiges of the Trinity later. However, it is appropriate
to say something at this point about his use of Augustine's
psychological analogy.
Contrary to what might be expected (in the light of
certain affinities to the eastern Fathers) he proceeds, in
traditional Augustinian fashion, to use the triadic
structure of the human psyche as a vehicle for the
contemplation of the divine Trinity.
His use of the psychological analogy in Itin. 3 leads
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him into a strikingly monistic expression of the triunity of
God:
From memory, intelligence comes forth as its offspring,
since we understand when a likeness which is in the
memory leaps into the eye of the intellect In the form
of a word.	 From memory and intelligence love is
breathed forth as their mutual bond . . . If, then,
God is a perfect spirit, he has memory, understanding,
and will; and he has the Word generated and Love
breathed forth, which are necessarily distinct since
one is produced by the other--not in the order of
essence, not in the order of accident, therefore in the
order of persons. (Itin. 3.5)
Personal distinctions appear to have been introduced
not in order to say something positive about God but rather
to provide a way of avoiding the obviously heretical
alternatives of accidental or essential distinctions. It is
worth noting that this Book of the Itinerarium also follows
Augustine in equating love with will, or desire.
(c) The trinitarian basis of creation
(i) Extratrinitarian exem p larism: Since both are the direct
result of the divine fecundity, Bonaventure understands the
extratr-jnitarjan activity of creation to be directly
analogous to the innertrinitarian emanations. Indeed, he is
prepared to go so far as to use emanationist metaphors for
the activity of creation. The most striking example of this
is his tendency to liken God to the fountain from which
creation flows like a river (Hex. 13.1-6).
The innertrinitarian emanations thus become the basis
for a trinitarian model for the entire history of creation.
Significantly that model is the Neoplatonic one of descent
and return. The e g ressus of creation is directly analogous
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to the emanation or generation of the eternal Son, while the
reditus is made possible by the mediation of the incarnate
Son. One effect of this trinitarian pattern is that it
imparts to his doctrine of creation the same dynamism that
is apparent in his doctrine of God (Cousins 1978a, 99).
More specifically, it is through the Son that the
intratrinitarian relations become the causal pattern not
only for the procession or emanation of creation (including
humankind) but also for its return to perfect participation
in the divine life. The Son as the perfect expression of
the Father and Image of the Trinity is the eternal
dispositive exemplar of all possible creations. As such,
the divine exemplar so disposes creation that it too is an
expression of deity, albeit a finite and partial expression.
In other words, the Word is the operative principle in
creation through which the Father exercises his causality
(Dourley 1975, 128). By extension every individual creature
is in some sense an expression of the triune God.
The doctrine of exemplarism was, in his view, an
important pillar of orthodox Christian belief. For example,
its denial, by Aristotle, appeared to entail both the denial
of divine knowledge of the world (with its attendant denial
of providence) and an affirmation of the eternity of the
world (in direct opposition to revealed truth).
(ii) The Son as divine art: The close relationship, in
Bonaventure's theology, between the innertrinitarian
processions and the procession of creation from God might
suggest an element of pantheism. We have already noticed
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his preference for emanationist metaphors: a fact which
seems to add weight to this suspicion. However, before
drawing this conclusion it is important to note how he
qualifies the concept of emanation when he uses it in
relation to creation.
He invariably refers to exemplary emanation (or, the
Exemplar) as divine art (e.g., Itin. 1.3). This, he
explains, denotes that it is an act of will. God has freely
chosen to actualise some of the divine possibilities in
time. In thus qualifying exemplary emanation he clearly
intends to distinguish it from the modes of emanation which
are natural to the Godhead, namely generation and spiration.
Only if creation were the complete actualisation of the
infinitude of divine possibilities could it be continuous
with the Godhead. His understanding of creation is rather
that it is a voluntary expression of the (already fully
satisfied) self-diffusiveness of God.
(iii) The partici pation of creation in God: An
important corollary of his exemplarism is the doctrine that
creatures, both individually and as a whole, exist by
participating in the being of God. Like emanation, talk of
participation in deity can have pantheistic overtones.
Bonaventure is aware of this but rather than seeking
alternative terminology he chooses to explain his usage. He
rules out any suggestion of a univocal participation of God
and creation in some common factor (such as being): this
would indeed be a form of pantheism12.
Instead he asks us to understand this participation as
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analogical (Copleston 1950, 267).
	
Creatures exist insofar
as they conform to their divine archetype (Dourley 1975,
177): truth (and, hence, existence) is the perfect
conformity of the creating intellect to the creature itself
(Hex. 3.8). Thus every creature exists in a threefold way:
"in matter, in the mind and in the Eternal Art" (Itin. 1.3).
What follows from this is a hierarchy of being based on
the degree of conformity to the divine archetype. He
clearly believes that some creatures conform more closely to
their archetype than others.	 But the hierarchy also
operates with respect to the threefold existence of each
creature. The material and intellectual (i.e., human
conceptual) expressions of a given creature fail to express
fully and accurately the divine archetype of that creature
(Tavard 1954, 60). As a result the very finitude of these
expressions provides a basis for an ontological evil:
"because it is not perfectly adequated to the reason that
expresses it or represents it, every creature is a lie, as
Augustine says" (Hex. 3.8; cf. Augustine, Vera relig.
36. 66).
The perfect truth (and hence the perfect expression) of
each creature is to be found in its archetype. Thus true
knowledge of the creature (and even of oneself) is to be
found only in Christ: 'I will see myself better in God than
in myself" (fjç. 12.9).
(iv) The resemblance of creatures to God: Since this
participation of created being in God constitutes the
contingent being of every creature and also forms the basis
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for his unending search for vestiges of the Trinity within
creation, it is worth examining in more detail.
As we have already noted, being understood as
participation implies that every creature is an expression
of a divine idea (Hayes 1981, 15). Alternatively, creation
as a whole may be regarded as an external image of God. For
Bonaventure, this means that every creature is "a mirror
through which we may pass over to God, the supreme
Craftsman" (Itin. 1.9). Not only does it reflect the being
of God but, to the extent that it participates in the
transcendentals (unity, truth and goodness), every creature
participates in and reflects the triunity of God. This is
so because he believes that the transcendentals may be
appropriated to the divine Persons: unity corresponding to
the Father, truth to the Son, and goodness to the Spirit
(Brev. 1.6.1). In connection with this particular
appropriation, he also establishes causal links between the
divine Persons and every created event: the
Father is the efficient cause, the Son the exemplary cause
and the Spirit the final cause.
All this might suggest the possibility of developing a
particularly ambitious natural theology: one capable not
only of proving the existence of God but also of showing him
to be triune. However, Bonaventure disavows any such
procedure. Quinn summarises his position thus'3,
There is nothing similar in creatures to the Trinity of
God, nor can human reason, moving to God from
creatures, come to know that there is a plurality of
persons in the unity of the divine essence. The
analogical similarities that we establish between
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creatures and the Trinity depend entirely on our belief
in a plurality of persons in God. (Quinn 1973, 499)
Our discernment of the Trinity in creation rests upon
prior faith in the Trinity and a corresponding knowledge of
the divine Exemplar of creation. But, even if the traces of
the triune God in creation were such as to enable the
unaided human mind to deduce the existence of the Trinity,
this would still be ruled out by the universal fact of human
sinfulness. Our sinfulness has rendered us incapable of
reading the book of creation.
Indeed, for Bonaventure, our contemplation of any
creature must be such as to lead the mind to God. The
ascent to God is the only valid motive for the contemplation
of creation. Any other motive, any desire to contemplate
creation for its own sake is nothing less than an
intellectual expression of sin. For example, "if we stoop
to a knowledge of things acquired by experimenting them,
investigating beyond what is conceded to us, we fall from
true contemplation and taste of the forbidden tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, as did Lucifer" (}3. 1.17)14.
This is the dominant message of his early work, On Retracing
the Arts to Theolo gy , and the same emphasis is visible in
his major work on spirituality, The Soul's Journe y into God.
A corollary of this insistence that contemplation of
creation must be motivated by a desire for God is that the
value of the nonhuman creation lies precisely in its
capacity to act as a sign of God, and nothing more.
Bonaventure remarks that "signs are worthless unless the
things themselves are understood" (Hex. 13.3).
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We have already noted that different degrees of
conformity to the divine archetype give rise to
corresponding degrees of reality: a hierarchy of being. The
more closely a given creature conforms to its divine
archetype the more real it is. It is also more true, more
rational, and morally better. Perfection entails a return
to perfect communion with the triune God. He expresses this
hierarchy in terms of a threefold classification of created
being. All irrational creatures are vestiges (or shadows)
of the Trinity. The next level consists of rational
creatures (including humans) which are images of the
Trinity. The highest level, that of similitude, is reserved
for rational creatures reformed by grace (i.e., the saints).
All creatures are ordered to God but humans, by virtue of
their rationality, are immediately ordered to God while the
irrational creatures are only mediately ordered to God.
The lowest level, that of (irrational) corporeal
creatures, is sometimes subdivided by Bonaventure. The very
lowest corporeal individuals are too lowly to offer the
minds of the faithful the least trace of the triune God.
Their individuality points to the unity of God alone. He
regarded such creatures as mere shadows of God. However,
the majority of corporeal creatures are able to point us to
the divine triunity by virtue of their participation in the
three transcendentals.	 These he referred to as vestiges
(literally 'footprints') of the Trinity.
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(d) The p lace of humankind in creation
(1) The human creature: According to Bonaventure the human
creature is a union of body and soul. The soul is the form
of the body and is characterised as existing, living,
intelligent, and free (Brev. 2.9.1). In this way he
distinguishes it from, and asserts its superiority over, the
other forms found in terrestrial creatures 15 . Unlike its
irrational counterparts, the spiritual nature of the
rational soul ensures its immortality. Hence he insists on
the separability of body and soul (Brev. 2.9.5) and readily
accepts Augustine's view that the soul is the mover of the
body.
However, just as with Augustine, it would be unfair to
dismiss this as crudely dualistic. Soul and body are
represented as needing each other for their mutual
perfection. Matter was created with an appetite for form.
It never exists without form and, when under one kind of
form, its appetite for form, far from being fulfilled,
becomes an appetite for information by a higher form (Quinn
1973, 283). Thus the human creature (matter informed by the
most noble form, the rational soul) is the telos of
corporeal creation 16 . Similarly, "The nature of the
rational and immortal soul requires that, as it has a
perpetual existence, so it should have a body to which it
may forever give life" (Brev. 7.5.5). Thus, like Augustine,
he insists that there must be a physical resurrection if the
human soul is to attain to perfection17.
One would expect Bonaventure to follow Augustine in
-130-
equating the rational soul with the imago del, and this is
indeed the case. For example, he draws on the psychological
analogy for the Trinity to argue that the rational soul •is
capable of holding God in memory, intellect, and will" and
that "this is existence in the image of the Trinity through
the unity of essence and trinity of powers" (Brev. 2.9.5).
Alternatively,
Enter into yourself, then, and see that your soul loves
itself most fervently; that it could not love itself
unless it knew itself, nor know itself unless it
remembered itself, because our intellects grasp only
what is present to our memory . . . Consider,
therefore, the operations and relationships of these
three powers and you will be able to see God through
yourself as through an image. (Itin. 3.1)
However, a more subtle view appears in his early
Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Here the imago
del is presented not as a static possession of the soul but
rather in terms of the proper activities of the soul: power,
intelligence, and love or will. Thus the task of imageing
God entails right use of will by loving the supreme good,
right use of intelligence by thinking truly, and right
exercise of power by governing the world in conformity with
the power of the Creator. His vocabulary at this point even
anticipates that of Calvin's discussion of the image of God
(Hayes 1981, 19_21)18.
(ii) Man as microcosm: He not only regards man as the
image of God, but also, in a certain sense as the image of
creation. Following Genesis (and Aristotle) he trreats man
as the apex of creation: the final adornment of the six
days' work. He is also the centre of creation, the medium
-131-
by which the entire universe is perfected, since he alone
has the capacity to know God both by His wisdom and his
works:
Since there was one creature which had a sense within
for an understanding of the interior book, namely, the
angel, and another which had its whole sense without,
namely, the brute animal, so for the perfection of the
universe there ought to be a creature with the two
senses mentioned above to understand the book written
within and that written without, that is, of the wisdom
of God and His work. (Brev. 2.11.2)
The idea that man is central to creation in this sense,
that man is the mediator between God and the nonhuman
creation, is by no means peculiar to Bonaventure.
	 A very
similar idea can be found in Peter Lombard.
	 One might
expect it to result in an affirmation of solidarity with the
nonhuman creation 19 . However, it is precisely humankind's
otherness from the nonhuman creation that is emphasised at
this point.
Humanity is not to be understood as the image of God in
any merely general sense. On the contrary, the ima go del
implies a specific relationship with the eternal Image of
the Trinity: humankind constitutes an external image of the
internal Image (Hayes 1981, 60)20. As such, of course,
humankind images the eternal Exemplar of all creation. Thus
Bonaventure can speak of humankind as a microcosm or image
of creation. As with the use of 'Image' within the Trinity
such language entails an element of otherness.
It follows from this analogy that, just as the Trinity
is Christocentric, creation is anthropocentric. Similarly
there is a clear analogy between the reditus of creation to
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God via humankind and the ascent of the soul to God via
Christ21.
(iii) The ascent of the soul: Following Richard of St
Victor (and,
	 ultimately, Augustine) he presents the
Christian life as a process of ascent. Specifically it is
the soul (rather than the whole person) which is regarded as
ascending towards God (Brev. 2.12.1).
As usual he presents the process in a trinitarian form.
At its simplest, the process of ascent is modelled upon the
three ways in which the triunity of God is manifested in
creation (by vestige, image, and similitude). He delights
in elaborating this basic triple structure by means of
multiple subdivisions 22 .	 This tendency has obscured the
basic ascent structure. As a result some modern
commentators argue that he thought of them as parallel paths
to the knowledge of God (e.g., Tavard 1954, 229-47; Cousins
1978b, 23-24). However, this interpretation is hard to
reconcile with his frequent use of the metaphor of a ladder
between God and man, e.g., "the universe is a ladder by
which we can ascend into God" (Itin. 1.2).
What is the significance of this ascent for creation as
a whole? In his mature writings, Bonaventure deliberately
creates a correspondence between the six days in which the
macrocosm was created (actually a threefold process of
creation, distinction, and adornment) and the three steps by
which the microcosm returns to God. These steps may be
regarded as increasing levels of insight or internalisation
of the macrocosm (Hayes 1981, 195).
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(iv) The telos of the soul: Its internalisation of the
macrocosm complete, the soul is ready at last to enter into
its telos by transcending not only the world of senses but
also itself (Itin. 7.1). Negatively this self-transcendence
or ekstasis of the soul is characterised by rest from all
intellectual activities (Itin. 7.4). Positively, it is
deiformity or mystical union with God, specifically with the
Father (since even contact with the Father's self-
manifestation in the Son is now transcended). Thus Cousins
comments that the silence of ecstasy, "is not merely a
subjective state of the mystic, but refers to an aspect of
the divinity: to the silence of the Father as the abyss of
the divinity" (Cousins 1978a, 108).
(e) Bonaventure's attitude to the nonhuman creation
What are the implications of all this for his understanding
of the material creation? As we have already noted, all
creatures are ordered to God but only rational creatures are
ordered immediately.	 The nonhuman creation is ordered to
God	 mediately	 by	 being	 ordered	 to	 the	 rational
soul.	 He is quite explicit that creation exists only for
the sake of humanity, e.g.,
all corporeal matter was made for human service so that
by all these things mankind may ascend to loving and
praising the Creator of the universe whose providence
disposes of all. This sensible machine of corporeal
things is finally a certain home built by the supreme
Artificer for man until he comes to the home not made
by hands, but in heaven (Brev. 2.4.5)
As we have seen Bonaventure's view of creation is
ontological ly anthropocentrjc. Given such an understanding
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of the cosmos it is hardly surprising to find a complete
absence of a sense of responsibility for creation in his
statements about the dominium terrae. On the contrary,
responsibility in relation to man's government of creation
can only mean using it so as to promote contemplation of
God23.
Finally, it is hard to avoid the impression that he
regards the nonhuman creation as ultimately dispensable.
The perfected human soul will be so lost in contemplation of
the Holy Trinity that it is no longer conscious of itself
let alone the world of senses. In any case the transient
phenomena of creation are no more than signs pointing the
soul towards God, they will cease to have any significance
in the eschaton: "when the perfect comes, the imperfect will
pass away."
2. JOHN CALVIN
(a) Introduction: Reformation and continuit y in western
Christian attitudes to the natural world
Conventional wisdom has it that the Protestant Reformation
was inspired by a reappropriation of the Bible and of St
Augustine. The indebtedness to Augustine leads us to expect
a continuation of the earlier ambivalence towards the
natural world. Two features which seem to confirm this are
the distinctive ethical emphasis of Protestant spirituality
and the dedivinisation of the world.
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Max Weber's reconstruction of Protestant ethics
presents the Christian life as a process of ascent to God
from this material world of exile. What distinguishes this
from the inward ascent of Augustine and Bonaventure is their
emphasis on the worldly expression of this spirituality.
When Bonaventure wrote of the right use of the material
creation, he meant the contemplation of God; a use of
creation only open to a small elite. For the Reformers,
however, the right use of creation suggested an active
response which was accessible to all. This response has
been described as an 'innerworidly asceticism' whose chief
expressions are cleanliness (in the broadest sense of the
term, embracing not only personal hygiene but also moderate
consumption of resources, and chastity) and hard work, i.e.,
"activity in the world to produce tools and, by means of
them, profit" (Tillich 1968 271).
Contrary to some critics, the Protestant Work Ethic
does not assign a particular historical cause to the rise of
capitalism. However, it does see a functional adaptation of
the one to the other. Thus, "there is something in the
spirit of Calvinist ethics and some related sectarian ethics
which serves the purpose of investment, an important element
in the capitalist economy" (Tillich 1968, 271). This
adaptation to capitalism has made Reformed Christianity a
particular target of the environmentalists.
In addition, environmentalist critiques of Reformation
theology point to its reputed dedivinisation of nature and
support for experimental science.
	 Ammunition for these
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attacks is readily available from the extensive literature
on the historical relationship between Christianity and
early modern science. For example, without explicitly
attributing the change to Reformed teaching, Hooykaas argues
that,
a more fully biblical world view has, since the
sixteenth century, favoured the rise of modern science
and of the world picture connected with it. The model
of the world as an organism was replaced by that of the
world as a mechanism; the whole development from
Copernicus to Newton has rightly been called the
mechanization of the world picture. (Hooykaas 1973, 13)
It is argued that innerworidly asceticism together with
the new emphasis on the mechanistic world model 24
 form the
ideological basis for subsequent western exploitation of
nature. But is there such a clear cut change of opinion
with regard to nature? Were the Reformers, in some respects
at least, not still men of the Middle Ages? In what follows
I shall take John Calvin as representative of the Reformers'
attitudes to the nonhuman creation.
(b) The triune God accordin g to Calvin
(1) Calvin's defensive a pp roach: Calvin staunchly defended
himself against accusations of trinitarian error and yet, by
and large, he ignored the doctrine in his preaching
(Stauffer 1977, 151-76). As a result we are dependent on
his dogmatic works for evidence about his trinitarian
thought.
In these works his defensive and polemical use of the
doctrine is striking.	 In the first edition of
Institutes, he confined his treatment of the Trinity to a
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defence of his orthodoxy against Caroli's accusation of
Arianism. This was expanded and transformed by his response
to changing circumstances until, in the 1559 edition, it was
largely devoted to a defence of Christ's divinity against
the opinions of Servetus (Inst. 1.13.7-13). This polemicism
has raised doubts about whether trinitarianism as such was
of much interest to Calvin (Wendel 1963, 166).
His defence of Nicene orthodoxy results in a treatment
of the Trinity which is conventional in appearance. Thus
anyone who expects to find marks of Augustinian influence in
his theology could do no better than to look at this
doctrine. And, indeed, he does appear to follow Augustine's
lead in the construction of his doctrine of the Trinity. At
the outset he states that God "so proclaims himself the sole
God as to offer himself to be contemplated clearly in three
persons" (Inst. 1.13.2). He immediately follows this with a
defence of western trinitarian terminology against the
charge that it is nonscriptural. The burden of this defence
follows that of the original defenders of Nicene orthodoxy,
namely, that "the novelty of words of this sort .
becomes especially useful when the truth is to be asserted
against false accusers". (Inst. 1.13.4). The content, too,
appears to be faithful to the Augustinian viewpoint, e.g.,
accepting without question the filiociue clause.
Thus Wendel concludes his examination of Calvin's
trinitarianism with the judgement that, "He is closely
following St Augustine and perhaps also remembering the
writings of certain Greek Fathers . . . But although devoid
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of originality, this trinitarian doctrine constitutes an
essential part of the theology of Calvin" (Wendel 1963,
169).
However, Calvin diverges from the Augustinlan consensus
at a number of points which, while individually
insignificant, offer the potential for a radical departure
from Augustine when taken together.
First there is the very form of his doctrine. His
polemical use of the doctrine marks a restoration of one of
its major preAugustinian functions, namely, the correct
identification of the Christian God as against pagan
deities. For Augustine and his followers this was no longer
an issue.	 Instead they were able to concentrate on the
creation of a rational explanation of the triunity of the
divine being. The result was a highly elaborate and
abstract set of logical rules for trinitarian discourse
which, ultimately, severed all connections between the
divine Persons and salvation history.
This abstract trinitarian discourse was of no interest
to Calvin. The new freedom of thought ushered in by the
Renaissance, the Humanist movement, and the Reformation
itself gave rise to a spate of speculation about God. In
the face of this multiplicity of rival doctrines of God,
Calvin restores to the doctrine of the Trinity this original
function of correctly identifying the Christian God. This
was the import of the apparently innocuous remark quoted
above: that trinitarian language while nonscriptural was
helpful in exposing heresy.
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Calvin's faith and theology were firmly rooted in
salvation history. Thus, the correct identification of the
Christian God hinged on the correct identification of Jesus
the Christ with the divine being. As Niesel has pointed
out, "The purpose of Calvin's Trinitarianism is to secure
the Biblical message "God is revealed in the flesh" against
false interpretations" (Nesel 1956, 57). The doctrine of
the Trinity was necessary to maintain the Gospel message
that, in Christ, God has given himself without reserve to
his creatures. In other words, for Calvin, the doctrine of
the Trinity ensured an understanding of God as intimately
present to, and in, creation25.
Another formal difference between his doctrine and that
of the majority of his Augustinian predecessors is the
absence of a treatise on the unity of God prior to his
account of the Trinity. There is virtually no discussion of
the divine attributes prior to the introduction of the
doctrine of the Trinity in Inst. 1.13. Thus he has removed
one factor which might suggest the priority of a common
divine essence over the divine Persons.
Turning to the content of the doctrine, the most
obvious novelty is his thorough avoidance of all analogies
for the Trinity (whether the wild profusion of vestiqia
to be found in scholastic treatises or the
relatively restrained social and psychological analogies of
the Fathers). His stated reason is that, "if anything
should be inopportunely expressed, it may give occasion
either of calumny to the malicious, or of delusion to the
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ignorant" (Inst. 1.13.18).
This reminds us that Calvin was also a pastor and
teacher. His pastoral concerns were never far away even
when he was in the thick of doctrinal controversy. This may
partially explain his reluctance to preach about the Trinity
(Stauffer 1977, 162f; Warfield 1931, 203). However, his
rejection of trinitarian analogies was not simply motivated
by pastoral concerns. As we shall see, there are forces in
his theological system which would render the analogies
(particularly those of Augustine) unpalatable to him, even
without his fears for his readers.
At one level, for instance, we may see the rejection as
an expression of his firm conviction that a major
consequence of the Fall has been the incapacitating of human
reason. Thus human reason alone is unable to arrive at a
true understanding of God. It follows that analogies based
on fallen human nature cannot aid our understanding of God.
All they can do, as Calvin points out, is to provide
occasions for misunderstanding and disagreement amongst
Christians.
(ii) Calvin's understanding of the divine Persons: A
superficial reading of The Institutes would suggest that he
simply accepts the traditional Augustinian understanding of
persona. His own definition of the term is, "a
"subsistence" in God's essence, which, while related to the
others, is distinguished by an incommunicable quality"
(Inst. 1.13.6). His preference for the term 'subsistentia'
arises from the fact that it is a more literal rendering of
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h ypostasis than the more usual persona. 	 Furthermore on
several	 occasions he cites,
	 with obvious approval,
Augustine's reluctance to use the term.
However, his insistence that they are distinguished by
an incommunicable quality betrays the fact that he was not
satisfied with mediaeval Augustinianism, which defined the
personal distinctions solely in terms of opposite relations.
As we have noted, this had the effect of subordinating the
trinity of Persons to the divine unity.
Calvin wants to maintain the status of the Persons
without lapsing into the opposite error of tritheism. To do
so it is not enough simply to hide behind the assertion of
'incommunicable qualities'. Calvin recognises that further
explanation is needed and expands his definition by adding
that the qualities which constitute the permanent
distinction between the subsistences are based on the inter-
relationships of the Persons.
One effect of this modification of Augustinianism is
that the Father is, once again, to be seen as the fount of
the Trinity, "the beginning of activity, and the fountain
and wellspring of all things" (Inst. 1.13.18). Similarly
the Son and the Spirit are distinguished by the trinitarian
roles attributed to them: "to the Son, wisdom, counsel, and
the ordered disposition of all things; but to the Spirit is
assigned the power and efficacy of that activity" (Inst.
1.13.18).
In saying this, he does not intend to call into
question the unity of God.
	
On the contrary, he fully
-142-
accepts the Patristic principle that every act of God is an
act of the entire Trinity operating in concert. However, he
is able on the basis of Scripture to offer a correlation of
the Persons with different aspects of each action. In doing
this he is following the Cappadocians more closely than
Augustine.
While no Augustinian would wish to deny these
appropriations, the whole thrust of the logic of the
Augustinian Trinity is towards a complete dissociation of
the divine Persons from their activity in salvation history.
As we have seen, this creates the problem of why the Son
rather than the Father or the Spirit should become
incarnate. Calvin on the other hand treats the divine
Persons in such a way that his understanding of them cannot
be disentangled from his understanding of salvation history.
(iii) The d ynamic bein g of God: This stress on the
relationship between the divine Persons and the external
activity of God raises another important point about his
doctrine of God. It suggests that he is, in fact, not very
interested in the divine essence. This emphasis on divine
activity is a corollary of the mediaeval voluntarism which
so influenced his belief in divine sovereignty.
In marked contrast to his scholastic predecessors, he
focusses the attention of his theology not on the divine
essence, but rather on the divine will and, hence, the
divine activity. Thus it is not unreasonable to say that,
"Calvin elaborated a theology of God's work, not His being"
(Klaaren 1977, 40).	 This need not be interpreted as a
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Palamite division of God into ousia and energeia (contra
Mackey 1983, 191f.). A more satisfactory explanation would
be that Calvin believed that God had revealed his
incomprehensible essence in his activity. Thus for Calvin
the unity of God was not to be looked for in a static
Being26 prior to divine activity but in the very unity of
the pluriform activity of creation, 	 redemption,	 and
consummation.
(c) God's creative activity
(i) The triune God and creation: In The Institutes, Calvin
locates the doctrine of creation immediately after his
treatment of the Trinity. He spells out their relationship
by reminding the reader that Genesis 1, "not only speaks of
the bare essence of God, but also sets forth for us His
eternal Wisdom and Spirit" (Inst. 1.14.2). Accordingly, in
his Commentary on Genesis, he points to the divine
consultation27 prior to the creation of man as evidence that
God, "finds within himself something distinct; as, in truth,
his eternal wisdom and power reside within him" (C.Gn.
1:26).
As we have noted above, Calvin (unlike Augustine) feels
free to comment on the distinctive roles of Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit in creation. To the Father is assigned the role
of originating cause; to the Son, the role of ordering all
things; and, to the Holy Spirit, the roles of sustaining and
bringing to fulfilment.
The distinctive role of the Word in creation is
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expounded at some length in his defence of the divinity of
Christ. He argues that both Old and New Testaments bear
witness to the fact
that the world was made through the Son, and that he
upholds all things by his powerful word. For here we
see the Word understood as the order or mandate of the
Son, who is himself the eternal and essential Word of
the Father. (Inst. 1.13.8)
The ordering of creation is also ascribed to the Son
(or Wisdom of God) in his treatise On the Eternal
Predestination of God where he comments that "the world was
beautifully ordained by the admirable wisdom of God" (Praed.
10.1).	 Again, commenting on Jn. 1:4, he attributes to the
Son the role of sustaining creation:
the Speech of God was not only the source of life to
all the creatures, so that those which were not began
to be, but . . . his life-giving power causes them to
remain in their condition; for were it not that his
continued inspiration gives vigour to the world, every
thing that lives would immediately decay, or be reduced
to nothing. (C.Jn. 1:4)
As with the Son, Calvin is quite specific about the
roles of the Holy Spirit in creation, and again uses
biblical testimony to these roles as evidence for the
divinity of the Spirit. Thus,
it is the Spirit who, everywhere diffused, sustains all
things, causes them to grow, and quickens them in
heaven and in earth. Because he is circumscribed by no
limits, he is excepted from the category of creatures;
but in transfusing into all things his energy, and
breathing into them essence, life, and movement, he is
indeed plainly divine. (Inst. 1.13.14)
Gn. 1:2 provides him with evidence of the role of the
Holy Spirit in sustaining creation.
	 And elsewhere he
asserts that the world "is unable to persist in being unless
it be sustained by His virtue" (Praed. 10.1)28.
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Calvin does not comment on the considerable overlap in
the roles assigned to Son and Spirit. In the passages cited
both are given the task of sustaining creation. However,
there is a significant difference of emphasis: the Son
orders and sustains while the Spirit empowers and
sustains29.
Finally it is worth noting that his self-restraint in
using trinitarian discourse and his total rejection of
vesti g ia trinitatis have resulted in the ejection from the
doctrine of creation of the complex hierarchical readings of
Genesis 1 beloved of the scholastics. This is perhaps the
most striking difference between his Commentar y on Genesis
and the mediaeval hexaemeral literature. The effect of that
literature was to distance God from the material creation by
postulating a chain of inferior causes (the hierarchy of
being). Its removal implies that God is intimately related
to even the lowliest creature and most insignificant event.
(ii) Providence: creation continued: Calvin's emphasis
on God's will and activity rather than his being combines
with his rejection of the hierarchy of being and causation
to demand a new emphasis in the doctrine of creation. It is
no longer sufficient to concentrate solely on the divine
origination of all things for that path leads inexorably to
deism. Calvin sees quite clearly that a doctrine of
creation is incomplete without an account of divine
providence:
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to make God a momentary Creator, who once for all
finished his work, would be cold and barren, and we
must differ from profane men especially in that we see
the presence of the divine power shining as much in the
continuing state of the universe as in its inception
• . . For unless we pass on to his providence--however
we may seem both to comprehend with the mind and to
confess with the tongue--we do not yet properly grasp
what it means to say: "God is Creator." (Inst. 1.16.1)
Once again, his approach contrasts with that of
scholasticism. There providence was regarded as a divine
attribute expressed in creaturely activity (on the analogy
of a monarch whose words of command are carried out by his
servants). As we have already had cause to note, Calvin's
God is altogether more intimately involved in his creation:
"governing heaven and earth by his providence, he so
regulates all things that nothing takes place without his
deliberation" (Inst. 1.16.3).	 He is suspicious of the
earlier approach, rejecting out of hand any suggestion of a
reduction of providence to natural law (Inst. 1.16.4). He
allows that scholastic teaching concerning universal
providence was formally correct, but his insistence on the
priority of special providence renders the former doctrine
irrelevant. As he says, "the universe is ruled by God, not
only because he watches over the order of nature set by
himself, but because he exercises especial care over each of
his works" (Inst. 1.16.4).
Calvin does not explicitly develop his doctrine of
providence in trinitarian terms. At best he merely alludes
to such a possibility, e.g., the Creator "is he only who
with wisdom, goodness and power rules the whole course and
order of nature" (Cat.Gen., q.27). However, his insistence
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that, in Christian theology, unqualified references to God
must always be understood as referring to the Holy Trinity
(Inst. 1.13.20) suggests that such a development would be
permissible.
It is perhaps significant that his account of the
triune God's continuing care for creation is itself
threefold: he understands God as manifesting his care in
three ways (Niesel 1956, 70). God sustains creatures in
being, individually and as a whole: "he sustains, nourishes,
and cares for, everything he has made, even to the least
sparrow" (Inst. 1.16.1); He bestows upon every individual
creature its effective reality (Inst. 1.16.2); and, he
guides all things to their appointed end (Inst. 1.16.4). We
see here the roots of the later Reformed doctrine of
providence, with its threefold division into preservation,
concurrence, and government.
Calvin draws a clear distinction between creation and
sustenance. While God's providential care is a continuation
of his work of creation, there is no sense in which it may
be interpreted as continuous creation. In his exegesis of
Gn. 2:2, he affirms that God is constantly at work upholding
what he has created. However, he has clearly ceased from
creation as such: "he desisted from the creation of new
kinds of things" (C.Gn. 2:2). He admits the possibility of
novelty in creation while maintaining belief in the fixity
of species. On the contrary, "many things which are now
seen in the world are rather corruptions of it than any part
of its proper furniture" (C.Gn. 2:2): in other words, the
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rebellion of man has resulted in the progressive defection
of creation from a state of primordial perfection.
We have already commented upon his belief that God is
immediately present to every creature. This transforms the
idea of divine sustenance. It ceases to be an abstract
general maintenance of creaturely being. For Calvin, divine
sustenance means that God stands in an intimate relation
with every event and creature. He is actively involved in
every event; his omnipotence is not distant but of "a
watchful, effective, active sort, engaged in ceaseless
activity" (Inst. 1.16.3).
Because of this insistence on the ubiquity of divine
activity, he is able to maintain the Augustinian denial of
both fate and chance. Both alternatives deny the absolute
sovereignty of God. For Calvin, sovereignty is a clear
characteristic of God's sustaining activity.
God's sovereignty in every event is also reflected in
his view of concurrence: that any individual creature can be
an efficient cause is God's gift to bestow or withold as he
wills30 . However, his insistence on the intimacy of God's
relationship with his creation leads him to deny the causal
necessity of natural events. Nothing occurs without active
divine regulation. He argues from scriptural testimony to
miracles, not for the existence of God but for the ubiquity
of divine action. Thus, referring to Ex. 16:13, Num. 11:31,
and Jonah 1:4, he says,
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Those who do not think that God controls the government
of the universe will say that this was outside the
common course. Yet from it I infer that no wind ever
arises or increases except by God's express command.
(Inst. 1.16.7)
One implication of this emphasis is the rejection of
the Augustinian doctrine of permission (Inst. 1.18.1; Praed.
10.11). God's role in any event is never the purely passive
one of giving permission31
That God is sovereignly active in every event, no
matter how insignificant (e.g., the random decay of a sub-
atomic particle) easily gives rise to accusations of
omnicausality (e.g., Deason 1986, 178; Mason 1982, 360).
However, such accusations only carry weight if it can be
shown that Calvin understands God's sovereign activity in
terms of efficient causality. That he does not can be seen
from his rebuttal of the related charge of fatalism: he
draws a clear distinction between the idea that God governs
every event and the idea of a necessary chain of cause and
effect (Inst. 1.16.8).
Two other elements in his treatment of providence
support the rejection of this accusation. First, in his
discussion of the universality of God's providence he
insists that divine activity transcends natural law (Inst.
1.16.3).	 Second, as his inclusion of a doctrine of
concurrence suggests, he would not deny or undermine the
efficient causality of creatures. However, like the
scholastics he would insist that such finite causes are
always secondary causes:
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God's providence . . . is the determinative principle
of all things in such a way that sometimes it works
through an intermediary, sometimes without an
intermediary, sometimes contrary to every intermediary.
(Inst. 1.17.1)
Calvin's theology is sometimes characterised as
voluntarist to distinguish it from the more essentialist
approach of the great mediaeval syntheses (Klaaren 1977, 39-
45). Insofar as this highlights his stress on the activity
as opposed to the being of God this is an accurate
assessment. However, it should not be taken to suggest that
he regarded God's omnipotence as arbitrary absolute power
after the fashion of the late mediaeval nominalists (contra
Hunter 1950, 55). On the contrary, God is never arbitrary:
"it is easier to dissever the light of the sun from its heat
than to separate God's power from His righteousness."
And, "to make God beyond law is to rob Him of the greatest
part of His glory, for it destroys His rectitude and
righteousness" (Praed. 10.13).
Thus a second characteristic of God's sovereign
sustaining activity is that it always operates according to
divine wisdom and righteousness.
A third characteristic of sustenance, which underpins
its intimacy, is that it is to be understood as fatherly
care. Commenting on Psalm 104, Calvin notes that "no part
of the world is forgotten by Him, who is the best of
fathers, and . . . no creature is excluded from His care"
(C.Ps. 104:16). And on more than one occasion, Calvin
alludes to Mt. 10:29 in order to underline the fact that
God's fatherly care is not restricted to humankind but
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extends to every creature (e.g., Inst. 1.16.1).
Turning briefly to God's government of events; we are
told that he does so by, and in, wisdom (C.Ps. 104:24),
suggesting that government is primarily a role of the Son.
Once again, Calvin insists that this is an active regulation
of events (Inst. 1.16.7). It appears that sustenance and
government while distinct activities of God's providence are
nevertheless inseparable. 	 Thus the continuation of the
natural world is contingent upon God's sustaining activity.
But this is no aimless preservation. On the contrary,
sustenance is characterised by its being directed towards a
specific end (C.Ps. 104:5; Inst. 1.16.8).
(iii) The telos of creation: Calvin holds that the
universe was created with the express purpose of imageing
forth God's glory. This is clear from the early chapters of
The Institutes and is a recurring theme in his exegesis of
Biblical passages referring to creation, e.g., "When it is
said that the heavens are a curtain, it is not meant that
under them God hides himself, but that by them his majesty
and glory are displayed; being, as it were, his royal
pavilion" (C.Ps. 104:1). As a result, there is a sense in
which Calvin can speak of both creation as a whole and the
most insignificant creature as images of God (C.Gn. Arg.;
C.Heb. 11:3; Torrance 1949, 37).
This understanding of the purpose of creation underlies
his favourite metaphors for the universe. Thus he sees
the universe as the theatre of God's glory (C.Gn. Arg.;
Inst. 1.5.8; 1.14.20), or as a mirror for God's glory
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(Cat.Gen.,; CGn. Arg.; Inst. 1.5.1). However, both
metaphors have anthropocentric overtones. Thus, "After the
world had been created, man was placed in it as in a
theatre, that he, beholding above him and beneath the
wonderful works of God, might reverently adore their Author"
(C.Gn. Arg.).	 And, as a theatre needs its audience, so a
mirror calls for a spectator: "our mind is incapable of
entertaining his essence. Therefore there is the world
itself as a kind of mirror, in which we may observe him,
insofar as it concerns us to know him" (Cat.Gen., q.25).
The latter quotation suggests a highly anthropocentric
view of the purpose of creation: the rest of the universe
exists in order that we may encounter God. However, his
language is usually more moderate than this (although still
anthropocentric). He frequently states that the universe is
so designed and regulated as to evoke worship of the Creator
from humankind (C.Gn. 1:26; C.Heb. 11:3; C.Ps. 103:4, 136:3;
C.Rom. 3:23; Inst. 1.5.1,6,14; 1.6.1).
In this connection, Calvin relates God's sustaining
activity and humankind's worship in a remarkable way. At
the end of his comments on Psalm 104, having reminded us of
the good things God has bestowed upon us, he adds, "when he
sees that the good things which he bestows are polluted by
our corruptions, he ceases to take delight in bestowing
them," and concludes,
the stability of the world depends on this rejoicing of
God in his works; for did he not give vigour to the
earth by his gracious and fatherly countenance, he
would make it tremble, and would burn up the very
mountains. (C.Ps. 104:31)
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In other words, God's continued sustenance of creation
is made contingent upon our right response to his
generosity. And our right response is worship:
This is, indeed, the proper business of the whole life,
in which men should daily exercise themselves, to
consider the infinite goodness, justice, power, and
wisdom of God, in this magnificent theatre of heaven
and earth. (C.Gn. 2:3)
If praise is indeed the telos of creation then it is
hardly surprising to find humankind and especially the
Church singled out by Calvin as the particular objects of
God's providential care (Inst. 1.5.7,8; 1.17.1,6). Thus
there is some justification in Niesel's ascribing to Calvin
the belief that God "guides the movements of nature and
history because He wills to guide and maintain His church in
this world" (Niesel 1956, 74). However, to be fair to
Calvin, there is no suggestion in his writings that God
guides the universe solel y for the sake of the Church. On
the contrary, at the very point that he is expounding
providence as the solace of believers, he follows Scripture
in basing it on God's fatherly care for "a tiny sparrow of
little worth" (Inst. 1.17.6).
(d) Humankind and creation
(i) The human creature: Calvin follows the Augustinian
tradition in holding that a human being is the union of
diverse components: body and soul (Inst. 1.15.2).
As regards the human body, Calvin stresses its
creatureliness (C.Gn. 2:7). We must never forget our humble
origins. We are creatures fashioned from the dust of the
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earth. This is a recurring feature of his sermons. He
takes delight in reminding his congregations that they are
creatures of mud (even, of excrement), that they are
composed of the same material as cattle, asses, and dogs
(Stauffer 1977, 199). Thus one is not surprised to find
that, in The Institutes, he presents the human body
primarily as the prison house of the soul (Inst. 1.15.2,
3.9.4). What is surprising is that this metaphor from the
young Augustine never appears in his sermons (Stauffer 1977,
206). On the contrary, in spite of his stress on the
lowliness of our origins, he presents the relationship
between soul and body in a much more positive light.
There is no doubt that, of the two, Calvin regards the
soul as the more important, as "the principal part" (Inst.
1.15.2) of what it is to be human. The soul is an immortal
essence (Inst. 1.15.2) which distinguishes humankind from
the lower animals by virtue of its understanding and will
(Inst. 1.15.7; C.Gn. Arg.) 32 .	 His account of the soul is
very similar to the Augustinian tradition. Indeed he
asserts that, of all the philosophers, only Plato had come
close to an adequate view of the soul (Inst. 1.15.6).
However, he departs from Augustinianism in one very
important respect: he does not simply equate the soul with
the image of God. Instead he resorts to circumlocutions,
e.g., "although God's glory shines forth in the outer man,
yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of his image is
in the soul" (Inst. 1.15.3). Thus the image is to be sought
within the soul, or, alternatively, the soul is modelled
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upon the divine image (C.Ps. 104:30).
This refusal to equate soul and image provides us with
another reason for his rejection of the Augustinian
analogies of the Trinity. If the soul is not the image of
God then the analogy between the faculties of the soul and
the Persons of the Trinity collapses (C.Gn. 1:26).
(ii) Imago dei: This raises the notoriously difficult
issue of his understanding of imago dei. Negatively, we can
see that, because his concept of God is focussed on divine
activity rather than being, he must reject the traditional
understanding of imago del (with its close association with
essentialism).	 For Calvin, the image of God is not a
possession of man.
	 Just as God can no longer be seen in
static terms as divine being, so God's image in man must be
seen in more dynamic terms. That he is seeking a more
dynamic understanding of ima qo is reflected in his
preference for dynamic metaphors when speaking of it, e.g.,
as a mirror in the act of reflecting God33.
But what is his positive understanding of the image of
God? The consensus amongst Calvin scholars is that he
identifies the image not with any permanent aspect of the
soul in itself but with the soul's right orientation towards
God, in its integrity or rectitude 34
 (Inst. 1.15.8). In
other words, the image of God is to be sought not in human-
kind's psychophysical constitution but in the quality of our
relationship with God (Niesel 1956, 67; Torrance 1949, 44;
Wendel 1963, 176).
Since it is relational in character, the image of God
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is manifested in activity. It is to be sought in the
practical exercise of knowledge and will (i.e. all the
faculties of the soul) in alignment with God (Klaaren 1977,
44).
(iii) Dominion and stewardshiD: One outcome of this
dynamic view of the image is that man is called to manifest
his likeness to God through his dominion over the earth
(Klaaren 1977, 44-45).
In common with his Augustinian predecessors, Calvin has
no difficulty in determining man's place in the order of
nature. He is without question the apex or crown of
creation (C.Gn. 1:26; C.Ps. 8:6; Inst. 1.14.2, 22, 1.16.6).
Thus he is still able to use the term 'microcosm' to
describe man (Inst. 1.5.3), albeit without the wealth of
ontological connotations associated with its older use35.
His understanding of the telos of creation and of
humankind's place within it leads him to the view that the
nonhuman creation is ordained to serve man. Thus "mortal
man, as the representative of God, has dominion over the
world, as if it pertained to him by right" (C.Ps. 8:6).
This stark statement of human dominion seems to justify
fully the environmentalists' critique of the Christian
doctrine of dominium terrae. If everything in the world is
ours to dispose of as we think fit then the environment has
no defence in Christian thought against purely human
interests or even human convenience. However, Calvin's view
of dominion is not the absolute rule which these words seem
to suggest.	 Human dominion is always qualified by two
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factors.
In the first place, humankind's dominion is explicitly
restricted to the earth (C.Ps. 104:5). Calvin was a child
of the preCopernican era and clearly regarded the earth as
the lowest part of the world (or universe). In his view man
was given dominion only over that part of creation which was
ordained to be his home (C.Gn. 2:1; Inst. 2.1.3).
Secondly, and more importantly, humankind's dominion
over the earth is understood to be conditional upon glad
submission to God's sovereignty. It is quite wrong to think
of it in terms of an absolute power of disposal. Thus
Calvin comments that "it is of great importance that we
touch nothing of God's bounty but what we know he has
permitted us to do" (C.Gn. 1:28). If it be argued that
God's declaration of the dominium terrae permits us to do
whatever we want, his response would be "that all things
were ordained for the use of man, that he, being under
deeper obligation, might devote and dedicate himself
entirely to obedience towards God" (C.Gn. Arg.). In other
words, as we noted above, the dominium terrae is a
correlative of the imago dei understood as a right
relationship with God.
Man is called to exercise this dominion both
practically and theoretically. Taking the latter first,
creation serves man as the medium through which he can
attain knowledge of God.
	 Conversely, it is man's primary
duty (C.Gn. 2:3) to use creation in this way.
	 Calvin's
belief in the immediate presence of God to every one of his
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creatures creates in him a very strong sense of the presence
of God in creation36 . Thus he can say,
We see . . . the world with our eyes, we tread the
earth with our feet, we touch innumerable kinds of
God's works with our hands, we inhale a sweet and
pleasant fragrance from herbs and flowers, we enjoy
boundless benefits, but in those very things of which
we attain some knowledge, there dwells such an
immensity of divine power, goodness, and wisdom, as
absorbs all our senses. (C.Gn. Arg.,)
But creation is not one medium amongst several through
which we can encounter the divine. It is the onl y medium
through which we encounter God. We cannot know God by any
means other than that by which he has chosen to reveal
himself. And , ultimately, he has revealed himself to us by
becoming incarnate, a part of this physical universe. Thus,
we know the most perfect way of seeking God, and the
most suitable order, is not for us to attempt with bold
curiosity to penetrate to the investigation of his
essence, which we ought more to adore than meticulously
to search out, but for us to contemplate him in his
works whereby he renders himself near and familiar to
us, and in some manner communicates himself. (Inst.
1.5.9)
Indeed, for Calvin, the contempt for knowledge of the
material world and the corresponding preference for
autonomous rational speculation about God which he detects
in the Augustinians is tantamount to an intellectual
expression of human sinfulness. The world is the mirror in
which we may see God so long as we use the spectacles of
Scripture, but "As soon as ever we depart from Christ, there
is nothing, be it ever so gross or insignificant in itself,
regarding which we are not necessarily deceived" (C.Gn.
Arg.).
By the same token, all purely naturalistic study of the
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world is an expression of sin37 . Calvin warns against being
so concerned with secondary causes that we lose sight of the
hand of God (Praed. 10.6).
This material recalls the contemplative dominion
advocated by Augustine and Bonaventure. However, Calvin
places much more weight on humankind's relative practical
dominion over creation. 	 This is not the absolute power
condemned by environmentalists. On the contrary, he insists
that man was created to nurture this world! "In the
beginning, God commanded that the earth produce all kinds
of herbs and fruit without the aid of human art or
cultivation; but He now invites the hand of man and works by
means of it" (Praed. 10.8). Or, as he says to his readers,
"it was thy business to nurture the things provided for
thee" (C.Gn. 1:28)
This interpretation of dominion as nurture
(paralleling, as it does, his belief in God's fatherly
sovereignty) leads him to make what is, perhaps, the
classical statement on our stewardship of creation:
we possess the things which God has committed to our
hands, on the condition, that being content with a
frugal and moderate use of them, we should take care of
what shall remain. Let him who possesses a field, so
partake of its yearly fruits, that he may not suffer
the ground to be injured by his negligence; but let trim
endeavour to hand it down to posterity as he received
it, or even better cultivated. Let him so feed on its
fruits, that he neither dissipates it by luxury, nor
permits to be marred or ruined by neglect. Moreover,
that this economy, and this diligence, with respect to
those good things which God has given us to enjoy, may
flourish among us; let every one regard himself as the
steward of God in all things which he possesses. Then
he will neither conduct himself dissolutely, nor
corrupt by abuse those things whtch God requires to be
preserved. (C.Gn. 2:15)
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However, just as man's theoretical dominion has been
corrupted by the Fall, so has his practical dominion.	 The
result is immoderation (in modern terms, ruthless
exploitation). Amongst the forms of behaviour towards our
environment which Calvin condemns is gratuitous cruelty to
animals (Praed. 10.4). Man is no longer the rightful master
of creation but a thief, taking from it what he can without
reference to God. Thus creation no longer serves man
willingly but resists his efforts to cultivate it. All that
prevents the animal kingdom from rising up and destroying
the human race is an instinctive fear of man which is the
providentially preserved remnant of man's original dominion
(C.Gn. 9:2).
(iv) The telos of man: Unfortunately, the very
positive tone of Calvin's doctrine of dominium terrae is
undermined by his retention of the otherworldly eschatology
of Augustine.
His modified Augustinianism puts much more emphasis on
the transformation of life in this world as the way in which
man achieves his telos (Gilkey 1976, 184-87). By
implication, a transformation of the world is also to be
expected. This enabled protestant Christians influenced by
Calvin to see their relationship with nature as one of
control leading to the greater glory of God. Man is called
to cooperate with God in the hastening of the eschaton by
acting prudentially.
However, the eschaton remains a transformation of man
from his earthly state to a celestial one (C.Gn. 2:7,8).
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The result is a paradoxical view of this life and our
environment.
(e) The p lace of the nonhuman in Calvin's thought
Thus the Augustinian contem ptus mundi does not disappear
from his thought.
	
Instead it undergoes considerable
revision. This world is a transient dwelling place.
Ultimately our earthly life is one of vanity and futility.
In Calvin's eyes the nonhuman creation (and our knowledge of
the things of this world) is of strictly temporary
significance (C.Gn. 2:8,16; Inst. 3.9.1,2). This is
compounded by the fact that, as a result of the Fall,
existence in the body is an alienated one.
On the other hand, our earthly existence and our
environment are the gifts of a loving God. Thus it is our
duty to respond with gratitude for this existence (Inst.
1.14.21,22). The result is a paradoxical principle at the
heart of the Christian life: one of a grateful disregard for
this life (Inst. 3.9.3).
In the section which follows his statement of our
grateful indifference, Calvin draws from it a number of
implications which indicate its close relationship to his
understanding of stewardship. He uses it to legitimise the
moderate use of the physical creation but immediately
balances this with an equal emphasis on gratitude and
meditation on the God who has given us such gifts(Inst.
3.10.2,3). In subsequent sections he warns Christians to
avoid dependence on material goods, advocating instead
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acceptance of poverty or moderation in the use of wealth
(Inst. 3.10.4,5).
While this has the positive effect of underlining our
responsibility to care for the natural world, Calvin's
belief in its transience means that the new found dynamism
of his theology and anthropology does not spill over into
his treatment of the nonhuman creation. The natural world
continues to be regarded as essentially static. The telos
of creation and the object of providence are both extrinsic
to the natural order. Ultimately God governs human society
(Inst. 1.5.7,8) but merely sustains creation.
This is compounded by his belief in the primordial
perfection of creation. As ordained by God, creation is a
static order. The only change which Calvin can envisage is
defection due to the sinfulness of God's representative in
creation.
There are also traces of an underlying hostility
towards the material world. For example, there is the
extravagance of his language when describing the origins of
the human body. Or there is his belief that the animal
kingdom poses a threat to human existence which is only
restrained by divine providence.
In conclusion, we may say that Calvin's change of
emphasis in theology has the potential to provide a
corrective to the negative view of nature found in Augustine
and Christian Platonism. God is encountered as active in
creation rather than reached by rational speculation (with
its attendant downgrading of the world of senses). However
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Calvin himself was content with the anthropocentrism he
inherited from the Augustinian tradition. Thus his revision
of Augustinianism remains far from complete and his theology
retains Augustinian features (e.g., a transhistorical and,
hence, otherworldly eschaton) which tend to obscure the
positive implications of his work for a Christian view of
nature.
NOTES
1. It is striking that Aristotle is the philosopher most
frequently cited by Bonaventure and the only one whose
errors he seeks to excuse (e. g ., Hex. 7.2).
2. It should be noted that his appropriation of Augustine
was not uncritical. In the example cited, he actually
disagrees with Augustine but reinterprets him to cohere
with his own opinions.
3. According to legend he was educated by the Franciscans
at Bagnoregio. He, himself, claimed to have been
healed as a child by the intercessions of St Francis.
Furthermore he appears to have regarded the saint as
the angel of the sixth seal of the Apocalypse (McGinn
1978, S71).
4. According to Bonaventure, this trinitarian emphasis was
characteristic of St Francis' spirituality (e.g.,
Leg.mai. 3.3).
5. Thus he admits the hypothetical possibility that any or
all of the Divine Persons might have become incarnate
(Hayes 1981, 56).
6. The connection between Bonaventure and Dionysius is
often overplayed to create the impression that his
theology has somehow been more deeply affected by
Eastern Orthodox thought than that of his
contemporaries. However, this principle was well-known
to western theologians of the time.
	 Richard of St
Victor (whose influence is clearly visible in
Bonaventure's writings) used the principle in a very
similar way. It is also to be found in the writings of
Peter Abailard (Weingart 1970, 32).
7. This follows from the principle that power is
proportional to priority, which he attributed to
Aristotle.
8. He draws on this to justify speaking of the divine
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self-knowledge as the basis for omniscience.
	 God's
knowledge of the world is in no sense contingent upon
the world, its citizens and its events.
	 Indeed it is
not so much knowledge of another as part of the divine
self-knowledge. In knowing himself, God has an
exhaustive knowledge of all the possibilities open to
him including all the possibilities actualised in
creation. This raises the question of whether the Son
is to be regarded as the basis or ground of the
Father's knowledge (thus suggesting a move towards uni-
personalism). While this has become a popular way of
interpreting Bonaventure, it should be noted that he
followed Augustine in denying such a suggestion (1
Sent. 33.2.1, arg. 4 cited by Quinn 1973, 576).
9. The potential for infinite regress inherent in this
understanding of the Son appears to have escaped his
notice.
10. Hierarchy appears to be the only form of order that he
recognises. The Trinity itself is hierarchically
ordered (though without subordination of one Person to
another!) and it forms the model for all other
hierarchies (Hex. 21-23). In spite of his denials this
lends a decidedly subordinationist tone to his
doctrines of God and creation.
11. A corollary of this is that he defends the Platonic
doctrine of the ontological priority of universals
against Aristotle.
12. Thus he rules out the concept of analo g ia entis, at
least as it is commonly understood today.
13. Quinn has based this summary on statements in 1 Sent.
3.1.un4, 3.2.2.3, and Qu.dis p .trin. 1.1.ad9.
14. This may be an allusion to the teachings of Roger Bacon
who was silenced by the Franciscan Order in the year
that Bonaventure became 1inister General.
15. He classifies the forms of terrestrial creatures thus:
substantial forms (the forms of inanimate bodies);
irrational souls (the forms of plants and animals,
sometimes subdivided into vegetative and sensitive
souls); and rational souls (the forms of human bodies)
(Quinn 1973, 235- 316). He distinguishes the human
soul from lower forms on the basis of their
origination: irrational souls are produced by the power
of nature, from seminal reasons, whereas rational
souls, since they are spiritual substances, are
immortal and hence must be the direct creation of God
(Brev. 2.9.4).
16. Thus he anticipates Teilhard's concept of the
hominisation of the cosmos.
17. However he undermines his insistence on a physical
resurrection by stipulating that the resurrection body
be celestial as opposed to corporeal. He outlines a
threefold glorification of the resurrection body to fit
it for existence in Paradise: a glorification which
includes its endowment with the attributes of spiritual
substance (Brev. 7.7.1). His conclusion is that the
resurrection body "resembles the heavenly bodies for by
- 1 65-
these qualities a heavenly body is removed in degree
from the four elements" (Brev. 7.7.4). Since the four
elements pertain to the terrestrial creation, this is
virtually a denial of physical resurrection.
18. Both speak of the image of God in terms of rectitude.
In Bonaventure, however, it refers to the rightness of
God to which the human soul is conformed. When it is
thus conformed to rightness (rectitudo), the soul is
made upright or right (rectus), and his dominion over
creation also becomes upright so that man is truly
ruler (rector) and king (rex).
19. He was certainly familiar with such a concept and says
of St Francis that "When he considered the primordial
source of all things, he was filled with even more
abundant piety, calling creatures, no matter how small,
by the name of brother or sister, because he knew they
had the same source as himself" (Le g .mai. 8.6).
20. This special relationship between humankind and the
second Person of the Trinity is used by Bonaventure as
a justification for the fact that the Son became
incarnate when any or all of the Persons could have
done so (Brev. 4.1.4).
21. These analogies are inconsistent in one important
respect. He never suggests a collapse of the rational
soul into God, or of the Trinity into Christ. However,
he apparently has no such difficulty when it comes to a
collapse of the nonhuman creation into humanity.
22. The best known is his Itinerarium in which the three-
fold division is transformed into six ways of
contemplating God (corresponding to the six wings of
the Seraph, Itin. prol.3) by the simple device of
talking about contemplation of God through, and in, his
vestiges, etc. By adding a seventh book on the
ultimate repose of the soul he is able to make the
whole correspond to the seven days of creation (a
pattern which reappears in a still more elaborate form
in the Collationes in Hexaemeron). A quite different
elaboration of the basic pattern is to be found in
Tri p lici via. Here the three ways are each applied to
three spiritual exercises, resulting in three ends
(which parallel the threefold angelic hierarchy).
23. This understanding of dominion is reminiscent of
Augustine (an approach which Paul Santmire has labelled
contemplative dominion).
24. Reformed thought was not the source of the mechanistic
world picture. Bonaventure used the metaphors of
machine and art to describe the Creator's handiwork and
the organic and mechanistic metaphors existed side by
side throughout the Middle Ages. In any case, it is
arguable that the apparent dominance of the mechanistic
view after the Reformation is to some extent an
artefact created by looking only at developments in the
physical sciences (Glacken 1967, 391).
25. However, as we shall see, Calvin's theology remains
sufficiently anthropocentric for him to overlook the
implications for the nonhuman creation.
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26. It is worth noting that Calvin used only verbal forms
in speaking of the being of God. Torrance comments
that, "Calvin's doctrine of the living God is in
complete contrast to the Aristotelian and Scholastic
conception of the divine Being" (Torrance 1949, 29).
For Calvin, the Christian God was primarily the living
God. Furthermore 'living' and 'triune' were
correlative terms.
27. He is aware of the trinitarian interpretation of elohim
in Gn. 1:1. However, he rejects it since it could be
seen as relativising the distinctions within the
Godhead, thus lending support to the Sabellian heresy.
28. Calvin could not have been unaware that 'virtue' was
commonly appropriated to the Holy Spirit in the
theological systems of his predecessors.
29. This suggests a possible trinitarian development of the
doctrine of sustenance by the appropriation of
different aspects of that work to different Persons of
the Trinity.
30. Admittedly he expresses this in terms reminiscent of
Augustinian utilitarianism:
And concerning inanimate objects we ought to hold
that, although each one has by nature been endowed
with its own property, yet it does not exercise
its own power except in so far as it is directed
by God's ever-present hand. These are, thus,
nothing but instruments to which God continually
imparts as much effectiveness as he wills, and
according to his own purpose bends and turns them
to either one action or another. (Inst. 1.16.2)
However, this is a less damaging instrumentalism than
that of Augustine.	 For Calvin it merely reflects the
subordination of all created reality, including human-
kind, to the purposes of God.
31. This is often seen as greatly exacerbating the problem
of evil but it should be remembered that the context is
one of unshakeable trust in God. For Calvin and his
contemporaries the effect of this denial was to give
meaning to what one suffered at the hands of one's
enemies.
32. Calvin did not intend this to be taken as an exhaustive
definition of the human soul. As he says, "I shall not
strongly oppose anyone who wants to classify the powers
of the soul in some other way" (Inst. 1.15.6). However
he did believe that the consensus of philosophers and
theologians would agree that understanding and will
were the two fundamental faculties of the soul.
33. He uses static terminology for the image of God in man
more often than Torrance 1949 suggests. However, this
static terminology appears mainly when he is stressing
the superiority of humankind over the animals (Stauffer
1977, 201).
34. As we have seen in the section on Bonaventure this
understanding of ima go del does not originate with
Calvin. However, it remained subordinate to the
traditional Augustinian view until the Reformer's
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dramatic change in emphasis in the doctrine of God.
35. As Klaaren points out, Calvin's anthropology and
epistemology entail a radical revision of the
microcosm-macrocosm relationship (Klaaren 1917, 45).
36. This explains his notorious statement that, 'it can be
said reverently, provided that it proceeds from a
reverent mind, that nature is God (Inst. 1.5.5).
Nature is God only in the sense that it is charged with
God's glory. It reveals God to him who beholds it with
the eye of faith.
37. Is it significant that Calvin, who sings the praises of
Astronomy when it is pursued for the glory of God,






1.	 THE AUGUSTINIAN LEGACY IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH
Paul Tillich often stressed his indebtedness to Augustine',
e.g., in his discussions of the early Franciscans, and in
his treatment of the two types of philosophy of religion.
However, it should be noted that his Augustinianism was
mediated to him through a tortuous line of descent including
the mysticism of Eckhart, Boehme and Schelling, and the
absolute idealism of Hegel2.
In his own view what marks him out as Augustinian is
his espousal of existentialism as opposed to essentialism3.
He is an existentialist in the sense that he is aware that
essence is never more than partially or ambiguously present
in reality. However, his theology has also been influenced
by modern existentialists, notably Nietzche and Heidegger,
e.g., in his understanding of time (Annala 1982). Their
influence is also visible in his existential epistemology
which, as we shall see, has a restrictive effect on his
doctrine of providence.
	 But for Tillich, the main
attraction of contemporary existentialism was its sense of
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the distortion and alienation which constitute human
existence (a sense which it shared with Augustinianism).
Another factor which marks him out as an Augustinian is
his preference for what he calls an ontological philosophy
of religion as opposed to a cosmological one. A corollary
of this is his preference for realism (in the Platonic
sense) as against nominalism (and its modern successors,
empiricism and scientific realism).
In spite of this legacy, a number of theologians, while
expressing various reservations about his system, look to
him for the basis of a theological response to the
ecological crisis. His extensive use of the concept of life
in his later theology, his belief that God is intimately
related to nature (e.g., Tillich 1967, 126), and his
insistence that theology must always address itself to the
issues of the society in which we live4 combine to suggest
that his system might lend itself to the development of a
theology of nature5 . This opinion receives additional
support from his own awareness of the fragility of our
environment, and his belief that the ecological crisis was
sufficiently serious to warrant a theological response
(e.g., Tillich 1973, 55-66).
(a) God as Being-itself
One characteristic of Tillich's theology is the way in which
he consistently equates ontology and protology. His
understanding of ontology has clearly been influenced by
Heidegger: like Heidegger he holds that the question of
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being entails a questioning subject. But what does he mean
by protology? The term is sometimes used to refer to the
doctrine of creation but, for Tillich its significance lies
in its etymology: it is the scientific study of to p roton (a
term used by Plotinus to denote the One, and equated with
the Holy Trinity or God the Father by Christian Platonists).
This term corresponds to his use of the term das Erstes:
that which is ontologically ultimate. The science of being
is the science of the One. Putting it another way, he has
equated ontology and theology. This equation is reflected
in the method of correlation which determines the structure
of his entire theological system: existential questions are
to be given theological answers 6 . As Lewis Ford points out,
this starting point may be regarded as a minimal, but
nevertheless formidable, natural theology, and, "On its
strength alone Tillich is prepared to reject every natural
or revealed theology which insists that God be conceived as
a highest being" (Ford 1971, 264).
Following St Augustine and the Neoplatonists, Tillich
operates with a tripartite ontology. The three distinct
levels of being in his system are the One, finite being, and
nothingness.
In identifying ontology and protology (or theology) he
explicitly makes the One the starting point of his system.
This One he calls Being-itself. It is neither an object in
our world nor an idea in our subjectivity. Rather, Being-
itself is the depth (both the ground and the abyss) of all
finite being and, as such, is logically and ontologically
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prior to the subject-object cleavage. 	 It is the ultimate
source, ground and fullness of all finite being.
Furthermore Being-itself is identified with God. Or rather,
"The religious word for what is called the ground of being
is God" (Tillich 1953, 156).
His Systematic Theology clearly stands in the
Augustinian tradition which gives treatment of the one God
priority over the Trinity. Indeed his explicit treatment of
the doctrine of the Trinity is relegated to a few pages
halfway through the last volume (Tillich 1964c, 301-14).
However, in spite of this lack of direct reference to the
doctrine, an examination of his trinitarianism in relation
to his doctrines of creation, providence, and life is
justified by a dialectical streak running right through his
system. This dialectical element is so closely related to
his understanding of the Trinity that it has led to the
suggestion that his system is implicitly trinitarian
(Dourley 1975, 5, 108, 159).
What Tillich has to say about the one God is largely
consonant with the Augustinian tradition. However, he
departs from it at one important point. He does not attempt
to defend the doctrine of the immutability of God. Instead
he introduces two important qualifications of Being-itself:
God is love, and God is the power of being (Thatcher 1978,
40). Both suggest a more dynamic concept of God than is
permitted by classical understandings of immutability. Thus
he is able to evade the charge of Neoplatonism by insisting
that the eschatological return of finite being to its divine
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ground enriches God.
The concept of God as power of being relates to the
experience of God as the abyss of self and world. If, with
Tillich, we accept Rudolf Otto's definition of religious
experience as mysteriurn tremendum et fascinosum, then the
experience of God as the power of being corresponds to the
tremendum. Similarly the experience of God as love relates
to the experience of him as the ground of being and to the
term fascinosum in Otto's definition7 . Together they
anticipate Tillich's way of developing a trinitarian concept
of God: God is living rather than an undifferentiated monad.
(b) The dialectics of the livin g God
Tillich is highly critical of the Nicene doctrine of the
Trinity (Tillich 1964c, 305). However, because of his
stress on the livin g God, he is unwilling simply to drop
trinitarianism in favour of an undifferentiated monotheism.
In his search for an adequate modern interpretation of
the trinitarian symbols he is struck by the apparent
frequency with which trinities occur in the world's
religions (Tillich 1953, 143). This lends weight to his
view that trinitarianism should be seen as the most adequate
way of speaking of God as living. Trinitarianism is not a
fact (or even implication) of revelation but simply a
frequently recurring way of talking about the dialectics of
life (Tillich 1957, 143): "an attempt to speak of the living
God, the God in whom the ultimate and the concrete are
united" (Tillich 1953, 228).	 Or, more sharply,	 The
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doctrine of the Trinity does not affirm the logical nonsense
that three is one and one is three; it describes in
dialectical terms the inner movement of the divine life as
an eternal separation from itself and return to itself"
(Tillich 1953, 56).
	 This threefoidness is, in effect, a
linguistic artefact of the dialectics of life. It is a
side-effect of any attempt to speak concretely about a
dynamic reality.
For Tillich, all life processes are dialectical.
	 Life
itself is the process of actualisat-lon of being, a synthesis
of power (abyss, depth, chaos, novelty) and form (order,
intelligibility, meaning). His dialectical trinitarianism
follows immediately from this understanding of life:
adequate discourse about the living God is appropriately
structured in an analogous way.
Thus the three principles or moments (never Persons) of
the divine life are self-identity, self-alteration and
return to self.	 God as self-identity is the fount of
Godhead. This is the abyssmal dimension of God: God as
naked power. In order to be a living God this God cannot
exist in isolation but must also exist in self-alteration as
its own antithesis. This is so because he adheres to the
principle of coincident-la oppositorurn: nothing is revealed,
expressed, or fulfilled except by its opposite.
The antithesis of God as self-identity is God
understood as meaning or form: the divine Lo gos8 . It is at
this point that the distinctively Christian element of the
doctrine is introduced.
	 For Tillich, this consists in the
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identification by the early church of the Christ with the
Logos (Tillich 1957, 143), and our trinitarian discourse has
content only so long as it is rooted in our experience of
the New Being in the Christ, and of the living God (Tiulich
1957, 143f). However, some of his ways of expressing this
identification raise the spectre of adoptionism. For
example, "there is one man in whom God found his image
undistorted," who is, therefore, representative of human-
kind, and "who for this reason, is called the Son and the
Christ" (Tillich 1973, 64).
Finally, the actuality of God is to be located in the
return to self.	 Power and form are united and given
actuality in the Spirit (Tillich 1953, 250f).
	
Thus, for
Tillich, God is Spirit. The Spirit is the divine reality
which transcends and reconciles in itself the incomplete
opposites of Father and Son: "The divine life is the dynamic
unity of depth and form. . . . In religious language the
dynamic unity of both elements is called "Spirit"" (Tillich
1953, 156).
	
Or, "God as living is God fulfilled in himself
and therefore spirit. God is Spirit. This is the most
embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the divine
life" (Tillich 1953, 249).
'God is Spirit' is another way of saying that God is
the fulfilment of life. Thus not only is Spirit the most
embracing symbol for the living God but it forms the basis
for all trinitarian statements. This is his justification
for delaying his explicit treatment of the doctrine of the
Trinity until after his account of life and spirit. But he
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goes even further when he adds that, "Both power and meaning
are contained in it and united in it . . . The third
principle is in a way the whole" (Tillich 1953, 251).
This stress on God as Spirit to the exclusion of the
other Persons suggests that his understanding of God is
fundamentally unipersonal. Other features of his thought
also point to this conclusion: specifically, his avoidance
of 'Person' in favour of 'principle' or 'moment'; his
insistence that Augustine's use of persona was not identical
with the modern understanding of person , and, indeed that
the personal distinctions are without content (Tillich 1957,
144); and his suggestion that the trinitarian moments be
thought of as characteristics of the one divine life
(Tillich 1953, 157). That the orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity has been seriously weakened by Tillich is further
suggested by the adoptionist tendency referred to above. We
may conclude that Thatcher is right when he denounces
Tillich's equation of dialectical thought and trinitarian
thought as an error and a confusion 9 (Thatcher 1978, 91).
However, other features in his theology raise doubts
that he envisaged even a unipersonal deity. For example, he
agreed with Einstein that God is not a Person (Tillich
1964a, 130). He believes that treating God as a person
reduces him to an object: it denies his ontological priority
over everything that partakes of the subject-object
cleavage. Thus it would be a denial of his most fundamental
definition of God. He prefers to present God as the hyper-
personal ground which embraces all finite being, including
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personal being'°. For Tillich, trinitarianism functions
primarily as a way of symbolically underlining the fullness
of this divine life.
We have already seen, in the cases of Augustine and
Bonaventure, that such an understanding of God can promote a
negative attitude to the nonhuman dimensions of creation.
This raises the question of whether a Christian doctrine of
creation, and hence a properly Christian understanding of
the natural world, can be maintained in conjunction with
such an understanding of God.
(c) Life and the livin g God
Tillich never uses nature as a category in his Systematic
Theology11 . However, all that is usually denoted by this
term is subsumed under the broader category of life, which
he treats at some length in Volume 3.
In The New Bein g , he rejects the mechanistic and
reductionistic understanding of life found in classical
physics and biology: "Life is not a machine well-constructed
by its builder and running according to the forces and laws
of its own machinery." Rather, it is "a creative and
destructive process in which freedom and destiny, chance and
necessity, responsibility and tragedy are mixed with each
other in everything and in every moment" (Tillich 1956, 57).
His formal definition is that life is the actuality of
being (Tillich 1964c, 12). Thus it becomes impossible to
exclude any aspect of created reality from the category of
life. For example, "the genesis of stars and rocks, their
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growth as well as their decay, must be called a life
process" (Tillich 1964c, 12). In effect he seems to be
proposing a sophisticated form of hylozoism.
Clearly the application of this category of thought to
all finite being brings all things into an intimate
relationship with the living God. All finite being bears
the hallmarks of the same dialectical process which
characterises Tillich's God: the movement from self-
identity,	 through self-alteration,	 to self-fulfilment
(Tillich 1957, 90). This is highlighted by his
identification of the telos, or fulfilment, of life: with
spirit.
In the context of his discussion of life, he takes the
important step of rejecting the notion of a hierarchy of
being. This is particularly striking since it is a
prominent feature of most of the theological and
philosophical systems to which he expresses indebtedness.
He regards any form of hierarchy (even the perception
of hierarchies in nature) as radically opposed to what the
Reformation stood for. Thus he insists that, "Both the
Protestant and the democratic principles negate the mutually
independent and hierarchically organized levels of the power
of being" (Tillich 1964c, 14). Hierarchy suggests that the
different levels of reality can only relate to each other in
terms of superiority or inferiority. Different levels can
only interact heteronomously as master and slave' 2 .	 He
demonstrates	 this by examining	 the application of
hierarchical thinking to various realms of reality.	 He
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argues that the relation of the organic to the inorganic,
thus understood, can only be seen in terms of reductionism
or vitalism. Similarly, he perceives hierarchical thinking
at the heart of other long-standing controversies such as
that between materialism and psychological dualism, and
religion and secular culture.
In place of a hierarchy of levels Tillich proposes a
new metaphor: that of life as a unity of many coordinated
ontological dimensions. In his view this eliminates the
tendency to interpret the interaction of different
dimensions as interference.
His proposal to treat life as a multidimensional unity
also implies an attack on the tendency to dissociate human
history from its natural context which is so often a feature
of hierarchical thinking. This is promising for anyone
interested in restoring theology of nature to its rightful
place.	 But the question arises of how Tillich himself
relates these different dimensions of finite being.
He retains the division of the created order into a
variety of realms defined according to which dimension of
life is dominant. Specifically, he distinguishes the
material, vegetable, animal and historical (or spiritual)
realms, i.e., those aspects of the created order in which
the inorganic, the organic, the psychological (the dimension
of inner awareness), and the spiritual dimensions dominate
respectively' 3 .	 Of these the one of most interest to
Tillich is the last: the personal-communal or spiritual
dimension.	 It is at this point that history and genuine
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novelty emerge explicitly into creation.
All this may sound similar to the older hierarchies of
being but the difference lies in the absence of any
suggestion of domination of higher over lower. Each new
dimension emerges from and remains embedded within the
context of previously existing dimensions14.
Of particular significance for our present discussion
is Tillich's insistence on the divine involvement in this
process of emergence. The appearance of a new dimension
depends on the development of a particular constellation of
conditions in the preceding, conditioning dimension; and
this development "is a matter of the interplay of freedom
and destiny under the directing creativity of God" (Tillich
1964c, 26).
His rejection of the metaphor of hierarchy by no means
excludes statements about the relative value of different
beings from his own system. On the contrary he asserts that
"Historical man adds the historical dimension to all other
dimensions which are presupposed and contained in his being.
He is the highest grade from the point of view of valuation"
(Tillich 1964c, 17). It should be emphasised that he does
not mean 'most perfect' when he says 'highest'. Humankind,
precisely by virtue of its being highest can become less
perfect than any other creature (Tillich 1964c, 38).
What then are his criteria for determining the relative
grades of the ontological dimensions of life? They are
based on the three functions of life: "self-integration
under the principle of centredness, self-creation under the
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principle of growth, and self-transcendence under the
principle of sublimity" (Tillich 1964c, 34). Thus the
highest finite being is the one with the greatest capacity
to manifest the ontological polarities of life:
individualisation and participation, dynamics and form (life
and death; culture), freedom and destiny. As such humankind
has the greatest capacity to assimilate the world: "the
world is indefinitely open to man; everything can become a
content of the self" (Tillich 1964c, 43). Indeed, "man does
not have only environment; he has world, the structured
unity of all possible content" (Tillich 1964c, 38).
Tillich unashamedly puts most emphasis on the
historical dimension: the realm of spirit. 	 This is the
ultimate dimension of life. It is the dimension in which
genuine novelty can occur; the level at which life can find
its fulfilment; and the level at which the justification of
human history, the earth itself, and even the entire cosmos
becomes possible (Tillich 1973, 64f.). Even if we are the
only rational creatures in the universe, the threat of
nuclear self-destruction cannot detract from this:
a being will have at least appeared once, in the
billions of years of the universe, towards whose
creation all the forces of life on earth worked
together, and in whom the image of the divine Ground of
all life was present. At least once, a living being
will have come into existence, in whom life achieved
its highest possibility--spirit. (Tillich 1973, 64)
This is reminiscent of Schelling, in whose nature
philosophy progress "reaches its goal in man" (Tillich 1974,
56). The human creature retains a crucial role in Tillich's
system: in that he presupposes and contains all the
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dimensions of life, man is the microcosm.
(d) Creation and the livin g God
Superimposed upon this understanding of life is a very
strong sense of the ambiguity of created existence. Tillich
has inherited from contemporary existentialism an
overwhelmingly negative valuation of finite existence. Thus
Dourley argues that, "Tillich sees all of created reality
outside of the divinity as a mixture of essence and
existence in which essence is always partially hidden,
always distorted, and yet always retentive of its ability to
shine through its existential distortion" (Dourley 1975,
57). Tillich himself puts it thus:
being a creature means both to be rooted in the
creative ground of the divine life and to actualize
one's self through freedom. Creation is fulfilled in
the creaturely self-realization which simultaneously is
freedom and destiny. But it is fulfilled through
separation from the creative ground through a break
between existence and essence. Creaturely freedom is
the point at which creation and the fall coincide.
(Tillich 1953, 256)
Here we have his doctrine of creation in a nutshell.
Creation is not a story, not an account of past events,
historical or mythological. It is Christian theology's
central symbol for the relationship between God and all that
is not God (Tillich 1953, 254). "The doctrine of creation
does not describe an event. It points to the situation of
creatureliness and to its correlate, the divine creativity"
(Tillich 1953, 252f.).
	
It is an active relationship rather
than an action: it stands for the eternal calling of being
out of non-being 15 .	 One result of this is that Tillich
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tends to lose creation in preservation and providence'6
(Tillich 1953, 267). Thus he has departed from the
traditional protestant approach which is to separate
creation and providence from the being of God and to deal
with them either as one mode of the divine activity (e.g.,
Barth) or as a transitional doctrine linking the doctrine of
God with the doctrine of the creature (e.g., Dorner).
Instead, in a move reminiscent of mediaeval scholasticism,
he has expounded providence as an element of the divine
creativity within his treatment of the reality of God.
Why does Tillich choose this approach? The answer
probably lies in his consistent use of the method of
correlation 17 rather than the influence of the early
Franciscans. One can clearly see this method at work in the
large-scale structure of his theology, though it is not
always obvious in the case of individual theological
statements. Nevertheless, he insists that every theological
statement is the aq swer to a corresponding existential
question. If this is the case here, then the doctrines of
creation and providence must be an essential part of any
theological answer to the question of finite being. 	 In a
sermon on this issue, Tillich puts the question thus18,
Life, personal and historical, is a creative and
destructive process in which freedom and destiny,
chance and necessity, responsibility and tragedy are
mixed with each other in everything and in every
moment. These tensions . . . drive us to the question
of a courage which can accept life without being
conquered by it, and this is the question of
providence. (Tillich 1956, 57)
In spite of the unusual location of his treatment of
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the doctrines of creation and providence, Tillich's division
of the content is familiar. He adopts a conventional
tripartite division of the material into creatio ex nihilo,
preservation, and consummation. However, his unusual
terminology reminds us that he thinks of these as in terms
of divine attributes rather than activities: he speaks of
God's originating, sustaining, and directing creativity.
(i) Ori g inatin g creativity : God is the creative source
of all being. He is the ground of every existent. In this
way Tillich establishes a continuity of being between God
and the world (Thatcher 1978, 39).	 God is immanent in
creation in the sense that every finite existent
participates in him. This continuity is underlined by the
fact that, for Tillich, God as the power of being is also
the power of nature 19 (Tillich 1951, 113). Thus, in sharp
contrast to the rational-objective view of nature associated
with Descartes, he insists that "the apprehension of the
inherent powers of nature is not a possible task for
rational discourse" (Tillich 1951, 115).
At the same time he is careful to insist that God is
not limited by the totality of existents. Actual creation
cannot fully express its creative source. In this sense,
God remains transcendent, free with respect to his creation.
Thus Tillich avoids (to his own satisfaction) any charge of
pantheism (Dourley 1975, 62).
But what does God create?	 Creaturely existence is
distorted, alienated from its creative ground. 	 Tillich
claims that creation and fall coincide in the freedom of the
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creature (Tillich 1953, 256). Does this mean that God
creates a fallen world? Or is the Fall due to the rebellion
or irrational resistance of free finite spirits (as in
Origen or Schelling)? 	 Tillich tries to avoid giving
affirmative answers to either of these questions. The
creation which God judges to be very good is not creation as
it has been actualised. God's good creation is creation in
its essential being. But this essential creation must still
be actualised if it is to be creation in the usual sense,
and if it is to achieve its telos. Actualised creation
coincides with estranged existence not because actualisation
as such leads to estrangement (this would be the Origenist
view) but because human freedom, as a matter of fact, always
distorts existence (Smith 1984). Thus estrangement, or sin,
is not a necessary condition of existence but rather an
almost universally realised possibility20.
However, this alienation is also the means whereby
finite being, seeks to achieve self-actualisation. Thus the
Fall is identified with the creature's free choice of self-
actualisation. Significantly Tillich regards this freedom
of decision as the locus of irrationality: the transition
from essence to existence has no basis in the essential
goodness of the structure (Tillich 1957, 91). This recalls
Schelling's division of the Un g rund into two equally eternal
beginnings: Yes (the divine self, the ideal, light, freedom)
and No (nature in God, reality, darkness, necessity). The
latter is that which gives rise to all things through its
eternal struggle with its positive counterpart; a struggle
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which like the transition from essence to existence has no
basis in rationality (Tillich 1974, 94).
In other words, the creature is a tertium quid between
Being-itself and non-being. As Thatcher points out, this
understanding of created being is common not only to Tillich
and Schelling but also to Eckhart and Augustine (and, we
might add, Bonaventure) (Thatcher 1978, 33).
(ii) Sustaining creativit y : For Tillich the doctrine
of preservation speaks of "the relation of God to the
creature in its actualized freedom" (Tillich 1953, 261). He
wants to retain the doctrine but he is fearful of some of
the inferences which have been drawn from it. Specifically
he is anxious to avoid any hint of deism, any suggestion
that God might be "a being alongside the world' (Tillich
1953, 262).
The approach which he adopts (and which he traces back
to Augustine) is to treat preservation as continuous
creativity. This coheres with his treatment of creativity
as a divine attribute: "God is essentially creative, and
therefore he is creative in every moment of temporal
existence, giving the power of being to everything that has
being out of the creative ground of the divine life"
(Tillich 1953, 262).
However the distinguishing mark of sustaining
creativity, in Tillich's view, is that it relates to the
static element in finite being, to the unchanging structures
of reality: "Faith in God's sustaining creativity is the
faith in the continuity of the structure of reality as the
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basis for being and acting" (Tillich 1953, 262). The danger
of this approach is that, if it appears in conjunction with
a doctrine of directing creativity which focusses
exclusively on the human (on the personal-communal dimension
of life), it may result in the nonhuman being regarded as
basically static. Thus it may sustain the dichotomy between
nature and history in direct contradiction to the rationale
behind treating life as a multidimensional unity.
(iii) Directin g creativity :	 This is the dimension of
God's creativity which has to do with change, novelty, and
evolution. We have already noted that Tillich regarded
God's directing creativity as intimately involved in the
emergence of one dimension of life fron another. It is this
aspect of the divine creativity which he identifies as the
classical Christian doctrine of providence. Its importance
in his thought is clear from his tendency to speak of it in
all-inclusive terms, e.g., "Faith in providence is not PART
of the Christian faith . . . FAITH IN PROVIDENCE IS FAITH
ALTOGETHER	 (Tillich 1956, 53; cf. Tillich 1953, 	 157,
Tillich 1962, 109).
As with preservation, Tillich is concerned about what
he regards as the widespread misunderstanding of providence.
Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that he sees
this as a major cause of contemporary atheism. Thus he
devotes much of his section on providence to attacking
erroneous views.
He begins with a critical examination of the notion of
the purpose of creation in which he seeks to eliminate the
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idea that there is something which God can achieve only
through an act of creation. To speak in these terms would,
in his view, be to reduce God to the status of a finite
being alongside creation: a process which he regards as
fundamentally atheistic. In order to emphasise that the
divine creativity has no purpose beyond itself, he proposes
to replace the idea of the purpose of creation with that of
the telos of creativity.
He then turns his attention to "Fate and Providence,"
adopting the traditional opposition of the two concepts:
"Faith in providence is faith 'in spite of'--in spite of the
darkness of fate and the meaninglessness of existence"
(Tillich 1953, 264). However, he does not deny the
existence of fate altogether, but sees it, rather, as an
aspect of destiny. It is our experience of frustration in
the face of the apparent inexorability of creaturely
causality (the static structures of reality sustained by
God), and it is this experience which is overcome by faith
in providence. By thus restricting fate to the sphere of
existence he deprives it of ultimate significance and rules
out the tragic view of life beloved of classical thought.
This discussion of fate introduces what he regards as
the chief misunderstanding of providence, namely its
treatment as a rational principle. The assumption of, and
search for, reasons underlying God's directing creativity
is, of course, closely connected with the idea that creation
has a purpose. He analyses this approach into three main
ways of treating providence: the teleological way, the
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harmonistic way, and the dialectical way. From Tillich's
viewpoint, their most significant common feature is an
invasion of theology by autonomous human reason with a
consequent loss of the paradoxical dimension of the
doctrine.	 This renders the doctrine of providence
empirically falsifiable and he believes that the
catastrophes of the twentieth century have been more than
sufficient to falsify such a doctrine (Tillich 1953, 266).
In contrast to this, Tillich holds that, "It is the paradox
of the belief in providence that, just when the conditions
of a situation are destroying the believer, the divine
condition gives him a certainty which transcends the
destruction" (Tillich 1953, 268).
In addition to this explicit criticism, his entire
approach to divine creativity is opposed to the treatment of
providence as a rational principle. He renders the question
of the contingency or necessity of creation meaningless by
equating the divine creativity with the divine life. Thus
the only reason for creation lies in the fact that God is
the living God. Furthermore, since the doctrine of creation
is now located within that of the reality of God, the sort
of questions raised by rational principles of providence are
ruled out as introducing an unacceptable degree of
separation between God and creation. It is significant that
elsewhere Tillich regards such dualism as the root cause of
the tragic view of life which Christianity has overcome but
to which a rational view of providence inevitably returns.
Two positive affirmations about providence arise
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directly from Tillich's critique of of the rational
principle of providence: Providence is the motive force for
the telos of creativity, and any expression of it must be
paradoxical21
Central to his doctrine of providence is the concept of
the telos of creativity. He defines this singularly opaque
term as, "the inner aim of fulfilling in actuality what is
beyond potentiality and actuality in the divine life"
(Tillich 1953, 264). Given that "what is beyond
potentiality and actuality" is the divine life itself,
Tillich appears to mean that this inner aim is nothing other
than the seif-actualisation of the divine life in creation.
This is supported by his statement that, "The divine life is
creative, actualizing itself in inexhaustible abundance"
(Tillich 1953, 252). Thus providence or directing
creativity is the divine urge which manipulates every
creature towards this end: a statement which clearly leads
to a contradiction of his remarks about the purpose of
creation.
In his positive treatment of providence Tillich makes
two more major points:
First, providence is a divine activity: "Providence is
a permanent activity of God . . . he always directs
everything towards its fulfilment" (Tillich 1953, 266). The
Christian God may not be treated as an omniscient spectator
after the fashion of deism. This is in line with his
rejection of the idea of God as a being alongside creation.
Superficially it resembles the traditional view. 	 However,
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the qualification 'permanent' distinguishes his approach
from some traditional doctrines of providence which see it
as an activity bounded by creation and the eschaton (God
directing the created order from the former to the latter).
For Tillich, providence knows no such bounds.
	 The divine
seif-actualisation in creation is eternal.
Second, God acts exclusively through creaturely
causality:
God's directing creativity always creates through the
freedom of man and through the spontaneity and
structural wholeness of all creatures. Providence
works . . . through the polar elements of being
All existential conditions are included in God's
directing creativity. (Tillich 1953, 266)
Tillich rejects the deterministic tendency towards
omnicausality (e.g., in Zwingli and Spinoza). But he goes
further than is strictly necessary to protect the reality of
secondary causes in order to exclude interventionism (or
supernaturalism). As he says, "Providence is not
interference" (Tillich 1953, 267). By making this assertion
he ensures that the notion of providence as divine activity
remains paradoxical. It is not possible to single out
events in human history as specific acts of God (which would
not only lay providence open to falsification but also
present God as a finite being acting within the confines of
finite existence). By the same token, God has to be
regarded as immanent lest his activity be regarded as a
violation of the structures of creation, a force tending
towards disintegration and chaos (Dourley 1975, 114).
Tillich rounds off his positive exposition with a
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number of statements which relate these points back to the
central idea of the telos of creativity. Providence is "a
quality of every constellation of conditions . . . which
• . . 'lures' toward fulfilment" (Tillich 1953, 267). Not
only is it a permanent activity but it is a universal one
bringing the promise of ultimate fulfilment to every
situation no matter how fate-ridden. Tillich underlines
this universality by saying that it is, ""the divine
condition" which is present in every group of finite
conditions and in the totality of finite conditions
(Tillich 1953, 267).
This concept of the telos of creativity warrants
careful re-examination. Similar concepts appear in other
contemporary treatments of divine action. Process theology,
for example, reinstates a form of final causality in its use
of the concept of the lure of God. Or one may cite
eschatological theologies in which a future God draws a god-
less present towards himself. Each of these examples bears
a certain resemblance to the Hegelian cunning of the idea.
In Tillich's case, although he is highly critical of the
Hegelian dialectical approach to providence, his criticism
is focussed on its rational character rather than its
content. He recognises buried in the Hegelian approach, the
basis for a properly paradoxical treatment of providence.
What then is the telos, the end, of God's creativity?
The final act is instigated by the grace of God who enables
the essentialisation of finite being 	 (this	 is the
fundamental meaning of new being).	 This is a return from
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alienated existence to a state of complete participation in
the divine life. It entails the fulfilment of life through
the overcoming of the ontological polarities which form the
basis of alienated existence. The end result is the
perfection of creation and the divine self-fulfilment22.
However, this has to be thought of in dialectical rather
than historical terms. There is no question of Christ
coming in glory at some future historical epoch. History is
not a simple linear progress from creation to eschaton.
The reason for this is to be found in his understanding
of time and eternity. He rejects both of the traditional
concepts of eternity, namely that it is either timelessness




eternity is the transcendent unity of all three modes of
created time (Annala 1982, 121). As for time, Tillich
adopts the subjectivist approach of modern existentialism:
time is a form of sensible intuition which is given its
content by our existential concerns. 	 Thus there is one
supremely important instance of time: 	 the extended
existential now. Whenever the anxiety of temporal existence
is overcome23 , time is transformed into eternity. This
understanding causes him to modify the traditional linear
model of history as follows:
I would suggest a curve which comes from above, moves
down as well as ahead, reaches the deepest point which
is the nunc existentiale, the "existential now," and
returns in an analogous way to that from which it came,
going ahead as well as going up. This curve can be
drawn in every moment of experienced time, and it can
also be seen as the diagram for temporality as a whole.
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It implies the creation of the temporal, the beginning
of time, and the return of the temporal to the eternal,
the end of time. But the end of time is not conceived
in terms of a definite moment either in the past or in
the future. Beginning from and ending in the eternal
are not matters of a determinable moment in physical
time but rather a process going on in every moment, as
does the divine creation. There is always creation and
consummation, beginning and end. (Tillich 1964c, 449)
And this cycle of descent and return is the work of
providence:
God determines every moment so that in it an experience
of the ultimate is possible, . . . For the individual
human being, providence means that in every moment of
the time process, there is the possibility of reaching
toward the kingdom of God. (Tillich 1967, 38)
His account of creation, existence and new being
clearly has the same dialectical structure as that of life
and the living God. This structure also resembles the Neo-
Platonic schema of descent from the divine unity to the
vicious multiplicity of finite existence and the subsequent
return to unity.
(iv) Creation and Tillich's 'trinitarianism':
	 The
procession of creation from God is analogous to the intra-
trinitarian procession, and the clear threefold division of
divine creativity into originating, sustaining, and
directing creativity offers Tillich an excellent opportunity
to make some connection between them. He even goes as far
as to say that,
Since the divine life is essentially creative, all
three modes of time must be used in symbolizing it.
God has created the world, he is creative in the
present moment, and he will creatively fulfil his
telos. Therefore we must speak of originating
creation, sustaining creation, and directing creation.
(Tillich 1953, 253)
Thus far, but no further.
	 With Augustine, Tillich
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insists that, "Since God is a person, and that means a
unity, all acts of God toward the outside (ad extra) are
always acts of the whole trinity, even the act of the
incarnation" (Tillich 1968, 117). This statement recalls us
to the practical monotheism which has dominated western
theology. Far from establishing a permanent relationship
between the triune God and creation, a relationship which
could form the basis of a theology of nature, Tillich's
system suggests an eschatological pantheism in which God's
re-essentialisation of creation is identified with his self-
fulfilment (Dourley 1975, 69f.).
Ce) Pros pects for a theology of nature
Does Tillich's system really promise the basis for a
Christian theology of nature?
His doctrine of providence is clearly neutral with
respect to God's activity in nature. He makes no reference
to providential activity in nature as distinct from
providential activity with respect to mankind. This silence
does not, in itself, warrant the conclusion that Tillich
neglects nature. However, it does require us to look more
closely at his attitude to nature.
Neither is his avoidance of the term nature, in itself,
an insuperable difficulty. He discards it for the sake of a
coherent ontology rather than any doubts about the propriety
or possibility of theological engagement with that which the
word is commonly understood to denote.
Its content may be subsumed into his category of life.
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Thus we are, in effect, inquiring into the possibility of
developing a theology of the nonhuman dimensions of life.
Tillich himself made little effort to develop this aspect of
his work preferring to concentrate instead on spirit as the
key dimension of life. However, the explicit rejection of a
hierarchy of being does hold out some promise for a less
anthropocentric approach to nature than has been traditional
in Augustinianism24 . Whether such a development would
actually achieve the desired results may, however, be
questioned on several counts.
First, the rejection of the metaphor of a hierarchy has
not removed from Tillich's thought the relative valuation of
different levels of being. It has merely become implicit in
his understanding of man as microcosm. However, as regards
the relationship between humankind and the nonhuman, the
concept of the microcosm is deeply ambiguous. It could
denote the human as the representative participant in
created being (the microcosm as mediator or priest of
creation). On the other hand, it has also come to suggest
that everything of significance about created being is
recapitulated in man himself.
Second,	 Tillich retains the descent and return
structure of Neoplatonic cosmology. 	 He disavows the
intellectualism associated with later Christian
interpretations of this schema. Nevertheless it is strongly
suggestive of a highly spiritualised view of salvation and
fulfilment. Salvation is the return of creaturely existence
to the realm of essential being. 	 It entails transcending
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the ontological polarities of finite existence so that full
participation in Being-itself is again possible. But is
such a re-essentialisation possible without leaving behind
the nonhuman dimensions of creation?
Third, it is clear, on closer examination of his
treatment of directing creativity that he shares with his
contemporaries the limitations imposed by an existentialist
epistemology. This becomes explicit in his treatment of
theodicy. There he reminds us of his belief that,
All theological statements are existential: they imply
the man who makes the statement or who asks the
question. The creaturely existence of which theology
speaks is "my" creaturely existence, and only on this
basis is the consideration of creatureliness in general
meaningful. (Tillich 1953, 269)
This is not as disastrous for a putative theology of
nature as, say, Bultmann's position. Tiulich combines his
existentialism with a doctrine of participation which goes
some way towards ameliorating the anthropocentrism of much
modern existentialism. It is possible to speak
theologically of others. To do so, we must seek the point
at which the destiny of others becomes our own destiny"
(Tillich 1953, 270). That point is the participation of
their being in our being. TiUlich expands on this point as
foil ows:
The principle of participation implies that every
question concerning individual fulfilment must at the
same time be a question concerning universal
fulfilment. Neither can be separated from the other.
The destiny of the individual cannot be separated from
the destiny of the whole in which it participates. One
might speak of a representative fulfilment or
nonfulfilment, but beyond this one must refer to the
creative unity of individualisation and participation
in the depth of the divine life. (Tillich 1953, 270)
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The individuation sought by existentialism stands not
in opposition but in polar relation to participation in the
whole. However, this is still not the end of the matter.
He characteristically refuses to state explicitly the place
of nature in theology. He is so consistent in this refusal
that Konrad Stock speaks of his question regarding the
participation of humanity and nature (Stock 1976).
Finally these doubts about the significance placed on
the material creation by Tillich seem to be confirmed by his
view of the telos of life. The immanent fulfilment of all
life processes is spirit. His own neglect of the material
aspects of life in favour of an account of spirit bears
witness to this stress.
In conclusion, it may still be argued that Tillich's
theology highlights certain of the ontological roots of the
ecological crisis (Stumme 1984), thus allowing his followers
to create a critique of the present situation. However, our
analysis of his attitude to the natural world and its
relationship with God suggests that it must be doubted
whether his theological system is capable of yielding a
positive Christian theology of nature.
2.	 THE TRINITY AND THE NONHUMAN CREATION IN THE THEOLOGY
OF KARL BARTH
If Tillich represents the contemporary continuation of the
Augustinian tradition, Barth is the representative of the
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Calvinist modification of that tradition.
The thrust of the thesis so far has been to suggest
that a Christian understanding of God's providential care
for the nonhuman creation is closely bound up with an
appropriate concept of God. Thus some consideration of Karl
Barth's contribution to theology is essential. He has re-
awakened western Christians to the centrality of the Trinity
in Christian dogmatics; and he has done this, not merely by
returning to trinitarian speculation but by transforming it
into a doctrine with a key hermeneutical function in the
Reformed theological enterprise.
However, important as it is, the sheer extent of his
treatment (extending through several hundred pages of the
first part-volume of the Church Do gmatics and informing and
pervading the entire structure of the rest) precludes
anything but the sketchiest of outlines in this present
work. What I propose to concentrate on here are those
aspects of the doctrine with the greatest relevance for a
Christian doctrine of creation and, hence, for a Christian
understanding of nature, namely, his understanding of divine
activity as trinitarian.
(a) The main contours of Barth's trinitarianism
The most striking feature of Barth's doctrine of the Trinity
is its location. He rejects the traditional practice of
treating it as the conclusion to a doctrine of God. Instead
he locates it in the Prolegomena to his dogmatics, arguing
that it provides the only satisfactory answer to the
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question, "Who is the subject of revelation?" He develops
his trinitarian answer both by means of an analysis of the
concept of revelation and with reference to the witness of
Holy Scripture.
The main effect of this relocation of the doctrine is
to create the basis for a distinctively Christian doctrine
of God (and, hence, a distinctively Christian dogmatics).
By refusing to begin with an abstract consideration of the
one God he hopes to avoid the importation of concepts drawn
from natural theology or secular philosophical discussions
of the Absolute. He assumes that the only valid source of
Christian knowledge (as opposed to speculation) is the form
and content of revelation itself. As Richard Roberts points
out, "God's act in Jesus Christ is not merely the exclusive
source of the knowledge of God but also supremely inclusive,
for in it the Trinity of God is revealed and along with this
the total theological potential of Christian dogma" (Roberts
1980, 81).
The implications for a theology of nature are clear.
For Barth and his disciples, any theological engagement with
the nonhuman creation must be governed throughout and
ultimately limited by the Christian revelation. Because of
the inclusiveness of revelation any doctrine of creation or
providence must be derived from that revelation and hence it
must itself be distinctively Christian (i.e., trinitarian).
Barth himself uses just such an argument to restrict the
scope of his own doctrine of creation to a theological
anthropology:
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by the nature of its object dogmatics has neither the
occasion nor the duty to become a technical cosmology
or a Christian world-view. Were it to do so, it would
be losing its way in a sphere essentially foreign to
it.	 Its true object is the revealed, written and
declared Word of God.
	 . . the Word of God does not
contain any account of the cosmos; any ontology of the
created totality.	 The Word of God is concerned with
God and man. (CD 111/2, 6)
Returning to the content of his doctrine of the
Trinity, Barth puts great emphasis on the unity of God.
This is, of course, presupposed in the question to which the
Trinity is the answer. "God is fully trinitarian but any
such assertion is subordinated to the demands of singularity
posited in the act of revelation" (Roberts 1980, 85). But
Barth does not stress the unity of God merely because his
concept of revelation demands it. Rather, it is because he
is very conscious of the scriptural witness to the unity of
God's activity and lordship.
The result of this stress on unity is a very forceful
insistence on the unipersonality of God. For example, in his
1938 Gifford Lectures, he insists that the message of the
doctrine is that,
from eternity and to eternity God is the Subject, the
Person, who establishes Himself and is founded on
Himself . . . He is thrice named, and thrice truly
exists as the One God, the one Subject, the one Person,
but the Person who begets Himself, proceeds from
Himself and Himself is master of His own existence and
essence. (Barth 1938, 31)
This must cause us to look more closely at the way in
which Barth's trinitarianism influences his doctrine of
creation for, as we have been seeking to show, it is
precisely the monistic tendency of the Augustinian tradition
which has allowed an ambivalence to creep into Christian
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attitudes to the nonhuman creation. But what does Barth
mean by unipersonality? Is this stress on the unity of God
p rima fade evidence of the Augustinian heritage of monism?
In discussing the divine h ypostases, Barth rejects the
use of the word Person. He notes that the modern concept
"is distinguished from the patristic and mediaeval persona
by the addition of the attribute of self-consciousness"
(CDI/l, 357). This he considers sufficient to render a
doctrine of the Trinity so interpreted, "the worst and most
extreme expression of tritheism" (CD I/i, 351).
What are the three, if not persons in the modern sense?
Barth accepts the risk of being accused of modalism and
insists that they are modes of the divine being: three ways
in which God is God. His defence against this accusation is
that the essence of modalism is the reduction of the
hypostases to the level of economic manifestations of the
one God. This destroys the Christian concept of revelation
by denying that God reveals Himself.
When Barth speaks of the h ypostases as ways of being,
he intends to convey that, in Himself, God is only as
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit but that He ever is as Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. The one divine subject exists three
times over as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This is not the
same as the suggestion that the one divine subject consists
of three subpersonal hypostases. In other words, Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are each fully personal but it is the
same person in each case.
Barth has inverted the Augustinian approach to the
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Trinity. The latter can be summarised in the formula that
the three hy ostases subsist in the one divine essence
(leaving room for personality to be attributed to the
essence rather than the Persons). For Barth, the reverse is
the case: the one divine essence subsists in three ways of
being.
One positive implication of this is that God is
essentially relational. The divine unity is constituted by
the relations between the h ypostases. In keeping with this
relational basis for trinitarianism a tendency towards a
more pluralistic understanding of the Trinity has often been
discerned in Barth's later work. For example, Kaiser points
to the influence of Buber's work which begins to appear in
CD III (Kaiser 1982, 114) while Rowan Williams comments that
his acceptance of a substitutionary theory of the atonement
in CD IV entails a more pluralistic understanding of the
Trinity25
 (Wifliams 1979, 176).
Finally the Augustinian heritage appears to be alive
and well in his spirited defence of the filio gue clause. To
be fair to Barth, his defence is based on his desire to be
true to the witness of Scripture and his understanding of
revelation. He believes that the Orthodox acceptance of an
economic filiogue without a corresponding acceptance of the
essential filiociue is tantamount to a denial that God
reveals Himself.
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(b) Perichoresis and the opera ad extra principle
Barth maintains his strong doctrine of divine unity by means
of the concept of perichoresis. By this he means us to
understand that there is such a high degree of mutual
interpenetration of the hypostases that any one is always
present in the other two. In other words, the three ways of
being do not have any autonomous existence or operation.
Any attempt to distinguish them is analytic in the sense
that while it aids our understanding it should not be taken
to represent the living reality.
This concept is of interest to us primarily because it
leads immediately to a fairly strict interpretation of the
patristic principle, o pera trinitatis ad extra indivisa
Sunt. For Barth, this affirmation of the indivisibility of
divine activity ad extra entails not only the indivisibility
of divine agency but also the indivisibility of the action.
In other words, all divine activity is one work: "all God's
work, as we are to grasp it on the basis of His revelation,
is one act which occurs simultaneously and in concert in all
His three modes of being" (CD I/i, 375). This is a
corollary of his belief that divine activity is the essence
of God in relation to creation (CD I/i, 371).
Barth's use of the principle has two important
implications. First, in keeping with his understanding of
the basis of Christian knowledge, every o pus ad extra is a
work of the triune God. The activity of origination,
sustenance, reconciliation and consummation is an activity
in which all three h ypostases participate throughout.
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Second, although the three h ypostases are intimately
involved in all divine activity none of this activity may be
used as a basis for distinguishing the h ypostases. He
insists on this latter point to forestall any speculation
which might undermine the unity of God (or even suggest that
the divine essence is somehow comprehensible).
Once again we appear to be faced with the spectre of
modalism. And, once again, Barth explicitly defends his
position against such an accusation. He limits his stress
on the unity of the opera ad extra by insisting that it may
not be taken to the point of extinguishing the genuine
independence of the h ypostases. He vigorously denies the
modalistic view that, "no statement relating to this o pus ad
extra can be seriously made about a specific mode of being,
and all statements relating to this o pus ad extra can be
made indiscriminately about any individual mode of being"
(CD I/i, 396).
Thus for Barth, "Not the Father alone, then, is God the
Creator, but also the Son and the Spirit with Him. And the
Father is not only God the Creator, but with the Son and the
Spirit He is also God the Reconciler and God the Redeemer"
(CD I/i, 394f.).
(c) App rop riation and creation
Barth balances his strong interpretation of the unity of
opera ad extra with an equally strong understanding of the
doctrine of appropriation. In a sense this is Barth's sole
concession to the tradition of seeking vesti g ia trinitatis
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in created reality. He asserts that revelation itself (and
only revelation) contains legitimate vesti g ia. And these
are to be found in Scripture not because of any continuity
of being between God and created reality but solely because,
by the grace of God, the Christian revelation somehow
corresponds to the divine essence.
In Barth's view, Scripture bears witness to particular
divine activities ad extra in such a way that they seem
particularly appropriate to particular modes of being. But
the appearance of such correspondences within Holy Scripture
places us under an obligation to make responsible use of
them. They are not an optional extra that the Christian
theologian is free to ignore in favour of some other
dogmatic structure.
He explains what he means by responsible use of
appropriation as follows.	 Following Aquinas, he insists
that an appropriation must be intelligible. "There has to
be a manifest kinship, similarity and analogy between the
three things signifying and the three things signified" (CD
I/i, 374). It must also be inclusive, i.e, it must not
destroy the unity of God by attributing some quality or act
exclusively to a particular h yDostasis so that it becomes
constitutive of the h ypostasis. Finally, he adds to these
Thomistic rules a third which governs the others:
appropriations "are authentic when they are taken literally
or materially or both from Holy Scripture, when they are a
rendering or interpretation of the appropriations found
there" (CD I/i, 374).
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As far as the doctrine of creation is concerned, Barth
notes that the Christian tradition recognises in Scripture a
correspondence between the origination of created reality in
and with time and the eternal generation of the Son from the
Father. Thus he follows the first article of the creed in
appropriating creation to the Father. This means that a
trinitarian interpretation of creation will recognise that
it is appropriate to the Father. However, it may not be
treated as exclusively the activity of the Father without
losing its Christian character. Creation is not proper to
the Father: a treatment of creation as the work of the
father will not be exhaustive.
(d) A trinitarian doctrine of creation?
The above suggests that Barth has recognised the importance
of treating creation as a trinitarian activity. At the
beginning of his own doctrine of creation he stresses that
when he speaks of the Father as Creator he is using this as
shorthand for "the Father of Jesus Christ, who as such in
eternal generation posits Himself in the Son by the Holy
Spirit" (CD 111/i, 11). And, elsewhere he explicitly makes
a very close connection between a properly trinitarian
account of creation and its character as a good work of God
(CD 111/1, 332).
Barth insists that both the Son and the Holy Spirit
have their own distinctive roles in creation. And yet we
have seen that he does not fully escape the ambivalence
which is so characteristic of the tradition. In his case it
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is expressed by his reduction of creation to anthropology.
The justification for this reduction is precisely the
absence of a convincing systematic exposition of the
material creation in the Christian traditions he draws upon
(CD 111/2, 4-6). In spite of his insistence on a
trinitarian account he still seems able to accept a
basically negative approach to the nonhuman creation.
This raises the question of how trinitarian his account
really is. In seeking to answer this question we shall
focus our attention upon CD 111/3 in which Barth expounds
his doctrine of providence. The reason for this attention
is twofold: on the one hand, this aspect of his doctrine of
creation has been neglected relative to the first two part-
volumes26 , and, on the other, it is precisely here that I
would wish to locate a theological account of God's dealings
with the nonhuman.
(i) The form of Barth's doctrine of providence:
Standing as he does in the Calvinist tradition, Barth takes
a more activist view of God's involvement in his creation
than does Tillich. He understands providence as a voluntary
and caring activity of maintenance and direction. This is
reflected in his definition: "By 'providence' is meant the
superior dealings of the Creator with His creation, the
wisdom, omnipotence and goodness with which He maintains and
governs in time this distinct reality according to the
counsel of His own will" (CD 111/3, 3).
In line with Reformed theology, he has opted to make
his doctrine of providence part of the doctrine of creation.
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He does so because, in his view, providence belongs to the
doctrine of the execution of God's will and therefore
presupposes creation. This is the basis for his criticism
of the mediaeval Scholastic tendency to locate providence
alongside predestination as part of the doctrine of God. In
so doing they implied that the being of God somehow depends
on the existence of the created order. This led ultimately
to the pantheism of some of the later mediaeval mystics27.
However, he is equally unhappy with the Protestant
tendency to identify providence with creation. He rejects
the concept of creatio continua adopted by Tillich 28 , seeing
in Gn. 2:1-3 a clear Biblical distinction between creation
and providence. Creation is a single prehistorical act in
which God posits a reality distinct from himself.
Providence, however, is a continuing relationship, a history
based on the presupposition of the act of creation.
To deny this distinction is to risk two possible
dangers. Providence may overwhelm creation, in which case
the concept of creatio ex nihilo may be lost (as in Tillich
and Schleiermacher). Alternatively, creation may dominate
with providence reduced to a series of re-creations, a set
of still pictures arranged sequentially to give the illusion
of change. Thus, by destroying the limits laid down by Gen.
2:2 some theologians29 have threatened the autonomy and
activity of the creature with a reduction to mere
appearance.
However his emphasis on the distinction between
creation and providence is, perhaps, made at the expense of
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obscuring their relationship. He refers to providence as a
continuatio creationis, a continuation of creation rather
than the continued creation to which he takes exception.
This could easily suggest that creation and providence are
distinct works with a common origin. As Robert Jenson has
pointed out their relationship has to be expounded with some
care if we are to avoid giving the impression that the
primal act of creation has no relevance to religion (Jenson
1982a). Unfortunately Barth offers no such exposition.
Before moving on to the content of his doctrine we
should note one more characteristically Barthian departure
from the western theological consensus. He rejects out of
hand any speculative basis for providence. There is no
evidence for providence which is accessible to natural
reason. This is, of course, a corollary of his rejection of
natural theology.	 For Barth, the only basis for the
Christian doctrine of providence, as for every Christian
doctrine, is Christian faith. Thus, "We can believe in
providence only on the basis of a Nevertheless which does
not spring from our own pious hearts but is forced upon us
from without" (CD 111/3, 17).
God's providential relation to the world can be known
only because it is revealed as an element of salvation
history, and, specifically as an element of God's self-
revelation in Christ. It follows that providence is
Christocentric and Barth can say that, "it is the execution
of the election of grace resolved and fulfilled by God from
all eternity. It is thus the history of the covenant between
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God and man . . . There is no other meaning or purpose in
history" (CD 111/3, 36).
Although creation as a whole is appropriated to the
Father by Barth, this is purely formal. The content of the
doctrine of providence is focussed exclusively on the Son.
For Barth, a Christian conception of providence can only be
derived from the reconciliation and redemption accomplished
by the incarnate Christ.
This has a significant effect on his understanding of
the relationship between salvation history and all other
world-occurrence (i.e., the totality of creaturely events
including those which make up human history). He repeatedly
appears to subordinate the latter to the former. Thus the
theologian can understand world events only in the light of
Biblical events, which are,	 "the inner basis of all
creaturely occurrence" (CD 111/3, 183). Conversely, the
theologian may not dwell on world events in themselves but
only as they reflect Biblical events. He justifies this as
follows,
The general events do not happen for their own sake.
They do not form a self-contained and self-motivated
whole as contrasted with the particular events. The
general events have their meaning in the particular
• . . They are not, therefore, a final end, an end in
themselves; they serve rather as the copy and
reflection of the particular events. (CD 111/3, 184)
Covenant history is the key for understanding all other
events. The theologian, "can and will understand all other
occurrence only in its relation to this special occurrence"
(CD 111/3, 37). Covenant history, and hence Christ, is the
noetic basis for general history and our knowledge of
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creation.	 This arises	 naturally enough from his
understanding of revelation. Christian knowledge of
creation can come only from the revelation of God in Christ.
It follows that Christ is the noetic basis of creation: "It
is here that God Himself has revealed the relationship
between Creator and creature--its basis, norm and meaning"
(CD 111/1, 25).
So seriously does he take this that he uses the
existence of Christ as an argument for the actuality of
creation (since the existence of Christ indicates that there
exists a sphere in which divine activity and relationship
can occur ad extra). Furthermore, if Christ is the noetic
basis of creation, He is the ontic basis also, the
constitutive centre of creation: Jesus Christ is the Word
by which the knowledge of creation is mediated to us because
He is the Word by which God has fulfilled creation and
continually maintains and rules it" (CD Ill/i, 28).
This Christocentricity gives rise to a good deal of
criticism. Typical is Santmire's argument that, under the
guise of a doctrine of creation, he has merely reaffirmed
the twentieth century neglect of creation, that instead of a
theology of nature he gives us only a theology of the human,
and that at best the natural order is regarded as a backdrop
for the human drama of salvation (Santmire 1982). Barth's
apparently unqualified approval of Calvin's metaphorical
reference to the cosmos as theatrum q loriae dei (with its
strongly anthropocentric overtones) seems to give substance
to these charges.
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However, his use of world-occurrence and covenant
history suggests that the charges may be misdirected. This
twofold	 division	 replaces	 a	 threefold	 division	 in
traditional treatments of providence. Covenant history
corresponds to the old providentia specialissima: God's
providential care for the elect, while world-occurrence
corresponds to both p rovidentia s pecialis and providentia
generalis: God's providential care for man and creation in
general, respectively. In other words, humanity and nature
are together subordinated to the history of Jesus Christ.
Barth himself develops the idea that the humanity of Christ
is the key to a theology of the human. However, he does not
attempt the parallel task of relating the physical world to
the physicality of Christ. The accusations, and his failure
to develop the concept of the dependence of the nonhuman
clearly warrant further investigation.
Finally the internal structure of his doctrine should
be noted. He adopts, apparently without explanation, the
traditional threefold structure of the Reformed doctrine,
i.e., preservation, concurrence, and government. However
the apparent repetitiousness of his treatment of these
topics suggests that he does not see them as separate works
but rather as three aspects of the one divine work of
providence30.
(ii) Preservation: Barth links preservation with
redemption by the way in which he expresses the divine work
of maintaining creation as a distinct reality. God is doing
what the creature cannot do for itself, namely, preserving
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it against overthrow, against dissolution into the chaos of
das Nichtige.
However, he does not simply identify preservation with
redemptive grace. As Brunner has pointed out, this would be
to entail universalism (Brunner 1952, 154f.): providence,
unlike redemptive grace, operates indirectly. On the other
hand, he objects to Brunner's insistence on a preserving
grace independent of redemption on the grounds that it would
lead to a form of natural theology (Barth 1946, 84). For
Barth, providence is still an activity of God mediated by
creatures, but, as such, it is not knowable apart from the
self-revelation of God in his redeeming activity.
As one would expect, he criticises the other extreme
interpretation of providence, i.e., its identification with
the nexus of natural laws (a position taken by, e.g.,
Lipsius and Schleiermacher). This could lead us to overlook
the contingency of creation. Furthermore, in his view, it
would constitute a denial that providence is a divine
activity since it implies that creatures are sustained by
other creatures: that the causal nexus is self-grounded.
Barth	 is reticent about the mode of divine
preservation.	 All he is prepared to say is that it is a
work of God's free goodness, a work of grace, and that, as
such, it confirms that election is eternal. The Biblical
revelation of the graciousness of divine preservation points
to the trustworthiness of God and, for Barth, this finds
ontological expression in terms of eternity. He uses this
to confirm his earlier rejection of the understanding of
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providence as a continuous re-creation.
One point that warrants careful consideration is his
insistence on the spatio-temporal limitation of all
creaturely existence and, indeed, of creation as a whole.
This must be set alongside his apparentily contradictory
insistence on the eternal preservation of creation by God.
Thus he can say, "To no creature does it belong to be
endless, omnipotent or enduring" (CD 111/3, 61), and
immediately balance it with, "He preserves it eternally. He
does not allow His creation to perish (CD 111/3, 61). And,
then, on the next page, "A preservation whiiich consisted in
extending the being of creation to infinity would not be the
work of God" (CD 111/3, 62).
In such statements and parallel passages relating to
the goal of the divine government we are given a few
fragmentary glimpses of the eschatology which Barth did not
live to write. We are also introduced to one of the most
complex issues in the study of Barth's theology, namely, his
concept of eternity. He clearly expects a real and final
end to creaturely existence. It cannot continue after death
(which is a part of God's good creation and not the
consequence of some primal Fall). Similarly he envisages an
end for creation as a whole:
it will not need to progress any further, it will have
fulfilled its purpose. Everything that happened in the
course of that history will then take place together as
a recapitulation of all individual events. It will be
made definitive as the temporal end of the creature
beyond which it cannot exist any more . . It will not
need any continuation of temporal existence. And since
the creature itself will not be there, time . . . will
not be there. (CD 111/3, 87f.)
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Creaturely existence is spatlo-temporal existence.
Beyond the limits placed on the creature there is only
divine existence and eternity. Preservation means that God
creates a time for the cosmos within his eternity: within
the divine time. But it means more than this for, when the
ultimate limit of creaturely existence is reached, 'in the
totality of its temporal duration it will still be open and
present to Him, and therefore preserved: eternally
preserved" (CD 111/3, 89).
Eternal preservation means that God's fidelity towards
his creation is such that its end is not an annihilation or
a merely objective immortality 31
 but a recapitulation or
consummation. Barth expands on this as follows,
Everything will be present to Him exactly as it was or
is or will be, in all its reality, in the whole
temporal course of its activity, in its strength or
weakness, in its majesty or meanness. He will not
allow anything to perish, but will hold it in the
hollow of his hand as He has always done, and does, and
will do.
	 He will not be alone in eternity, but with
the creature. He will allow it to partake of His own
eternal life. And in this way the creature will
continue to be, even in its temporal duration. (CD
111/3, 90)
We noted above that, for Barth, providence and
redemption are inseparable but distinct. However, the
universalism implicit in this and similar passages makes one
wonder whether he has succeeded in maintaining the
distinction.
Another question is raised by his use of the term
creature. In this context it could very easily be taken to
mean a cosmic totality of which individuals are mere
component parts. This would recall Dorner's post-Hegelian
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concept of the cosmos as a whole as the image of God (Dorner
1881, 27). As we shall see later, Barth clarifies his
language to avoid such a possibility (which he regarded as
offering a theological justification for totalitarianism).
(iii) Concurrence: This is probably the most
controversial area of the Reformed doctrine of providence
but Barth unhesitatingly reaffirms the traditional view,
asserting that God is Lord, "in relation to the free and
autonomous activity of the creature' (CD 111/3, 90).
Concurrence is distinguished from preservation by a
difference of emphasis. Preservation focusses on the divine
work of maintaining the creature while concurrence focusses
on the proper autonomy of the creature.
The above statement of the meaning of concurrence has
three important implications for Barth. It means that God
does not abandon the creature to its autonomy (as in
theologies which tend towards deism) but that, on the
contrary, all creaturely activity occurs in God's presence.
However, the divine presence does not undermine the autonomy
of the creature. Instead God affirms and respects the
relative autonomy of the creature's actuality and activity.
Finally, he insists that, "nothing may or can take place as
the action of the creature which is not in a very real sense
His own action" (CD 111/3, 93). In other words, since God's
activity determines creaturely activity, every creaturely
action is the product of a double agency. By affirming
double agency, he is following the lead of Aquinas and
Quenstedt (but he is also flying in the face of strong
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contemporary philosophical opposition to the concept).
He puts up a vigorous defence of concurrence without,
however, referring directly to contemporary critics of the
notion. His main reason for maintaining the idea is that he
sees it as having an important role in defending theology
against various errors in our understanding of God's
relation to the world. By affirming that the relative
autonomy of the creature is guaranteed by the sovereign act
of concurrence, he hopes to avoid both a denial of divine
sovereignty which would allow the creature to limit the
activity of God (as, e.g., in Process theology), and the
tendency to Stoic determinism and resignation which is an
ever present temptation for Reformed theology32.
How then would Barth reply to criticisms of
concurrence? Emil Brunner attacks the notion on two main
grounds (Brunner 1952, 153f.). First, it relates the causal
nexus of the natural order and the divine work of
preservation by applying the idea of causality to God. But
Brunner regards God's actions as personal and therefore not
describable in terms of causality.
	 Thus the use of
concurrence entails either equivocation or the
depersonalisation of God. Second, it severs the autonomy of
the created order from the divine work of preservation by
introducing it as a distinct activity of God.
Barth simply denies the second criticism. The three
aspects of providence cannot be separated in this way.
Because they are interdependent, concurrence, far from
severing creaturely autonomy and preservation, actually
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guarantees that God preserves and governs autonomous
creatures. For Barth, concurrence prevents providence from
collapsing into omnicausality. Thus a denial of concurrence
is tantamount to a denial of the Christian doctrine of
providence.
His defence against the first charge takes the form of
a long excursus on the theological use of the concept causa.
He denies that Aristotelian terminology is in itself a
source of error. The failure of Protestant orthodoxy was
due instead to its inadequate biblical exposition which
failed to relate providence to grace 33 . As a result, the
orthodox doctrine of concurrence, while formally correct,
lacked any distinctively Christian content. Therefore Barth
responds to the critics by laying down guidelines for the
correct use of causa in the context of a Christian theology.
His main points are as follows. First, the concept, as
used in theology, must not be confused with the efficient
causality of natural science. This was what led Ritschl, he
suggests, to reject concurrence. Second, it is not to be
used as a common factor to bridge the gap between God and
man. It must not become the basis for an analo g ia entis.
The correct analogical use of causa is in the formation of
an analo q ia operationis between utterly dissimilar beings.
Finally, causa must be personalised by relating it to the
personal activity of God as revealed in Jesus Christ.
Barth develops his second point by examining the
qualitative difference between the potency of divine
causality and that of creaturely causality. This implies an
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irreversible order of precedence of the divine over the
created. "God alone is genuinely and ultimately and
absolutely superior in relation to all the reality which is
distinct from Himself" (CD 111/3, 108). His emphasis on the
unique and incomprehensible majesty of God makes it
impossible to present the creator-creature relationship in
mechanical terms or as a divinisation of nature or history
(with its consequent secularisation of providence).
He concludes his treatment of concurrence by examining
it with	 reference	 to	 past,	 present,	 and	 future.
Concurrence, he believes, encompasses all three moments of
the divine activity. 	 Praecurrit: there is always an
activity of grace preceding the creaturely event in which
God creates the conditions, preconditions, pre-
preconditions, etc. of that event. Concurrit: God undergirds
the contemporary context of all creaturely action.
Succurrit: the outcome of all creaturely action is in the
hands of God. Once again this points to the interdependence
of the three aspects of providence. In preserving the
world, God gives every creaturely event or action its past
and present context, while in governing the world he takes
charge of the outcome of each event.
(iv) Government: Fundamental to this element of
Barth's doctrine of providence is the affirmation that God's
preservation of, and cooperation with, his creation is not
arbitrary. On the contrary it is directed towards a goal:
-220-
He rules as a Father. His ruling is the ruling of His
definite and conscious will. 	 Behind it there is
meaning and purpose, plan and intention. God has an
aim for the creature when He creates and accompanies
it. (CD 111/3, 155)
This is the dogmatic development of the Old Testament
insight that Yahweh is king. His is a dynamic and salvific
kingship. Thus his preservation of and cooperation with the
natural order are not to be regarded as mere maintenance of
the status quo as a backdrop to salvation history. God, in
preserving and accompanying (a favourite Barthian synonym
for concurrence) creation, also directs it towards a telos,
a consummation in accordance with his will. We have already
had cause to examine this goal in connection with God's
eternal preservation of the cosmos. However Barth now makes
several points which qualify and clarify his earlier
remarks.
He begins by considering the uniqueness of the divine
sovereignty and the indissoluble subjectivity of God. This
causes him to make the striking assertion that, "God Himself
is irreplaceably and unexchangeably the Subject of this
rule" (CD 111/3, 157). 	 This has two major implications.
The first is that there can be no legitimate goal which
is independent of God's will. Any attempt to achieve
autonomy would constitute a rebellion against God's will.
But, in fact, such attempts are doomed to failure (CD 111/3,
157).
The second implication is summarised by Barth as
follows,
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the fact that God alone rules includes the further fact
that He Himself is the only goal which He has appointed
for the creature and towards which He directs it.
Proceeding from God and accompanied by God, the
creature must also return to God. It must; for this is
its greatness and dignity and hope. The movement
towards God is the meaning of its history. (CD 111/3,
158)
A more literal translation of the central sentence in
this passage would be, "Coming hither from Him and
accompanied by Him, he Ithe creature] must go again to meet
Him." This suggests a final encounter with God: a meeting
in which, by the grace of God, the creature retains its own
identity, its own subjectivity. Taken in conjunction with
his earlier remarks, it rules out the interpretation of
eternal preservation in terms of a purely objective
immortality.
Barth uses his discussion of the uniqueness of the
divine rule to clear up a number of important
misconceptions. Once again he reminds us that one of the
major functions of an adequate doctrine of providence is to
act as a bulwark against the errors of Stoic pantheism and
Epicurean deism: the Scylla and Charybdis of God's relation
to the world. This time he does so by affirming that divine
government, properly understood, encompasses both necessity
and contingency. Thus it can be reduced neither to the
uniformity of natural law (as in Stoicism and its offshoots)
nor to a series of discrete divine interventions in an
otherwise autonomous cosmos (a semi-deistic position). He
adds the comment that, "God honours law as well as freedom.
He loves the law-abiding bourgeois as well as the nomad" (CD
111/3, 161).
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A corollary of this is that God's rule must be hidden
by virtue of its very transcendence. As creatures, we are
embedded in the antithesis of law and freedom. We are
unable to see reality in its wholeness and are similarly
unable to comprehend God's rule in its transcendence. For
Barth, of course, this is an ideal cue for yet another
warning about the dangers of natural theology: "We cannot
identify with the divine dynamic, or substitute for it, that
which we ourselves think to be dynamic as opposed to static"
(CD 111/3, 161).
He then discusses the divine rule itself in the light
of these clarifications. God rules the cosmos by ordering
it. This immediately brings to mind the Calvinistic
tendency to see the divine ordering as a predetermination of
the cosmos.	 But Barth rejects the notion that God's
ordering is in any way like the clockwork unfolding of an
eternal plan. Of course, there is an eternal plan but it
takes the form of God's eternal election of Jesus Christ.
And God's ordering of the cosmos according to that plan must
be seen as a dynamic operation: a continuous divine activity
within the time of the creature. In this way he is able to
maintain that God is not the prisoner of his own design in
contrast to the Calvinistic emphasis on the eternity of
God's ordering (which led eventually to the determinism of
Schleiermacher).
Perhaps because of the challenge of Calvinism, he is
unusually forthcoming about how he conceives of this
continuous divine ordering.	 It is to be understood as a
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series of permissive acts in which God places limits on the
activity of the creature. By thus limiting their activity
God subordinates all creatures to the divine goal of
creation while at the same time creating the space, as it
were, for the relative autonomy of the creature:
God controls all things because in and with and by and
for all things He wills and actually accomplishes one
thing--His own glory as Creator, and in it the
justification, deliverance, salvation, and ultimately
the glorification of the creature as it realises its
particular existence as a means of glorifying the
Creator. He gives it this office by subordinating its
particular ends to this common end, by allowing it even
in the particularity of its activity and effects to
have a place in the fulfilment of His own plan. (CD
111/3, 168f.)
As a corollary, Barth argues that it is precisely this
subordination to a common end which forms the basis for all
relationships between creatures. He refers to this as, "a
coordination of the creatures one with another" (CD 111/3,
169). The divine subordination of the creatures to Himself
and coordination with each other serves the important
purpose of guaranteeing the meaning, rights and value of
every individual creature; even the most insignificant.
"God harmonizes and coordinates the creatures one with
another, but this does not mean that the individual creature
has no meaning nor right to exist except as a non-autonomous
atom, a mere cog in a machine" (CD 111/3, 169).
His discussion of subordination and coordination
strengthens his defence against the accusation that he has
subordinated general world-occurrence to salvation history
(except insofar as salvation history means the personal
history of the incarnate Christ). For Barth, each creature
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stands in a direct relationship with God by virtue of which
it has worth and a place in the history of creation as a
whole. He sees this individual subordination of every
creature directly to God as an essential defence against all
hierarchical and totalitarian world views. Without it there
is the constant risk of the individual being degraded by
subordination to natural occurrence as a whole. And
wherever this doctrine of the whole being greater than the
sum of the parts takes hold there exists the further risk of
the parts being sacrificed for the sake of the few who
represent or embody the whole. Against this, Christian
theology affirms that all are abased and that therefore all
are also exalted by their relationship with God.
(v) Providence and evil: Barth's treatment of
providence is such that it makes some form of theodicy an
urgent necessity. Preservation is not mere maintenance but
the protection of the creature against the threat of chaos
posed by das Nichti ge. Concurrence leads to the affirmation
of double agency thus implicating God in the evil actions of
his creatures and undermining the freewill explanation of
evil. And his exposition of God's sovereign government
stresses the impossibility of creaturely resistance to the
divine will.
His discussion of the problem of evil involves a
significant departure from tradition which is relevant to
any theological understanding of the natural order, namely,
the rejection of the concept of natural evil. For Barth,
natural evil is a contradiction in terms. If it is natural,
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it is part of God's good creation and therefore to call it
evil is not only inaccurate but also blasphemous. Instead
he talks of the shadow-side of creation. Even death is not,
in itself, evil. God's good creation contains, "Not only a
Yes but also a No; . . . not only growth but also decay;
not only beauty but also ashes; not only beginning but
also end" (CD 111/3, 296f.).
And yet, "It is irrefutable that creation and creature
are good even in the fact that all that is exists in this
contrast and antithesis" (CD 111/3, 297).
The darkness and misfortunes of the natural world are
not evil, for in them there remains the possibility for
praise of God. We can see this in the poetry of William
Blake or Gerald Manley Hopkins but, for Barth, it was most
evident in the music of Mozart (CD 111/3, 297-99).
The real root of evil and sin is das Nichti ge (usually
translated 'nothingness'). 	 Barth's explanation of this
concept is, to put it mildly, tortuous.	 It is something
unnatural.	 It is the actual source of the impossible
resistance to God's will which characterises this fallen
cosmos.	 It is more than a mere p rivatio boni or privatio
entis. It is an active malevolence. It is a privation of
grace. It is part of creation but was not created by God.
It is an impossible possibility arising out of the eternal
election of Christ. One is not surprised when John Hick
dismisses it as mythological or Brunner declares that it is
self-contradictory.
How do we know that the negativities of creation are
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not part of this impossible possibility? Barth discerned
this from the way in which Mozart wove together themes of
darkness and light in his music. More significantly we find
it in God's self-revelation. Mere physical suffering and
death are not the enemies against which the Gospel warns.
On the contrary, they are affirmed, together with the rest
of the natural order, in the Incarnation.
But why does Barth find the notion of natural evil
blasphemous? By mistaking the shadow-side of creation for
the true enemy we run the risk of concealing the true enemy.
As a consequence, das Nichti ge is not taken sufficiently
seriously. Real sin is reduced to venial error. Real evil
is seen as temporary. And the devil is granted a share in
the Kingdom by way of a general a pokatastasis. This, rather
than the implied contradiction of the goodness of God's
creation revealed in Scripture, is the blasphemy of natural
evil.
(vi) God's providential care for the nonhuman?: Does
Barth's doctrine of providence offer an adequate basis for
the development of a theology of nature? As we have seen,
he makes a number of points which, if generalised to include
all creatures, do seem to promise such a basis. However,
there has been considerable criticism of his doctrine of
creation (particularly from those who want to establish a
theology of nature) which raise questions about the validity
of such a generalisation.
The most comprehensive of these critiques, at least in
English, is Linzey 1986.	 In what follows, I propose to ask
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whether the above survey of CD 111/3 bears out his
investigations (which focussed on CD 111/1 and 111/2).
Linzey gathers his criticisms of Barth together into
four major categories of deficiency (Linzey 1986, 150-63):
the Christological, the Biblical, the ontological, and the
trinitarian. His Christological deficiency lies in the fact
that he neglects an essential dimension of Christ's
relationship with creation. He is so concerned with
Christ's relationship with mankind that he completely fails
to develop the implications of the incarnation for Christ's
relationship with the nonhuman. The Biblical deficiency is
due to a theological concentration on the divine-human
dimension of the covenant which blinds him to the
possibility of a scriptural witness to nonhuman involvement
in the covenant34
 .	 According to Linzey, his ontological
deficiency lies in his failure to define the relationship of
the nonhuman creation to the human. As a result of this
failure he tends towards an instrumental view of this
relationship. Linzey concludes that,
the danger in Barth's exposition is that man as created
is seen as existing within his own morally exclusive
world. The reality of Creator and created gives way to
a quasi-Platonic notion of the real (human) creation
and the unreal (nonhuman) creation. What appears
solely real and purposeful is human creation as
affirmed in Christ. Man is thus set adrift from
creation for the relationship of purpose which unites
the Word with the creation as a whole, and through
which the world is redeemed, is unavoidably severed.
(Linzey 1986, 160)
Finally Linzey points out that, notwithstanding Barth's
insistence on a fully trinitarian treatment of creation, for
all practical purposes he operates within a binitarian
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framework.
Our examination of CD 111/3 suggests that, here too,
Barth has lost sight of the trinitarian perspective which,
in his view, ought to characterise all Christian doctrine.
Indeed the extent of his Christological concentration is
such that one wonders whether he even retains a binitarian
outlook. Formally, of course, he regards providence as a
work of the Father because of its location within the
doctrine of creation. However, the Father is mentioned only
five times in the entire work. The Holy Spirit does rather
better with twelve references, but only four occur within
the sections containing the positive exposition of the
doctrine (and, almost unbelievably, only one of those
references relates to the divine government).
Of course one can always reply to such a criticism by
invoking the principle opera trinitatis ad extra indivisa
sunt, and Barth (following Calvin) does remind us that
unqualified references to God should be treated as referring
to the entire Trinity. But merely reminding us of this when
he displays such a degree of Christological concentration
within a doctrine formally appropriated to the Father is not
enough. Indeed it suggests that, here at least, he has not
taken the doctrine of appropriation sufficiently seriously.
This in turn suggests that we have here a trace of the
Augustinian legacy of monism.
Barth's monistic interpretation combines with the fact
that he sees Jesus Christ as the key to God's self-
revelation and results in a Christological domination of the
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doctrine. This Christocentricity is illustrated by the fact
that there are no less than thirty seven separate references
to Christ in Church Dogmatics 111/3 (of which five are
passages of several pages in length). We also see it in
Barth's insistence that, to be distinctively Christian,
faith in providence must be faith in the Christian God and
that this means faith in Christ (rather than faith in the
Trinity).	 This	 orientation	 has	 several	 unfortunate
implications.
We noted earlier that, for Barth, Christ is the noetic
and hence the ontic basis of creation; the constitutive
centre of creation.	 It is in this sense that he calls
Christ the Mediator of creation (CD I/I, 441). This
concentration is reflected in the way in which the laws of
nature are both relativised and guaranteed by his doctrine
of providence. As the outworking of the divine will they
may not be regarded as autonomous. On the other hand, just
because they are the outworking of the divine will, they are
guaranteed a real existence.
Since, for Barth, Christ is central to our concept of
deity, it follows that the natural order is constituted
solely by its relation to Christ. Thus it is perfectly
natural for him to regard the incarnate Christ as the
paradigm of the creature.	 A theological understanding of
man and nature is possible only by means of an understanding
of Christ.	 It is at this point that Linzey's first
criticism begins to bite. 	 Barth is so concerned with the
implications of his theology for human life that he fails to
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develop a theological understanding of nature. At the same
time an element of anthropocentricity has crept in.
	 He
allows the humanity of Christ to blind him to the
physicality of Christ.
	 He proclaims, "Here is the Son of
Man. Here is humanity at the heart of the cosmos" (CD
Ill/i, 28). But the heart is too easily substituted for the
totality so that, "in practice the doctrine of creation
means anthropology" (CD Ill/i, 3). Ironically on the very
next page he warns that "If we forget that he (man] must
remain loyal to the earth, we shall never truly understand
him." Barth clearly does not remember his own warning: his
recurring tendency to equate Jesus Christ and/or humankind
with the creature is well documented.
That this is not a conscious policy of anthropocentrism
is clear from the absence of its corollary, a utilitarian
view of nature. Linzey points out that in spite of his
tendency to appear utilitarian by default, Barth does reject
this option in his treatment of the 18th and 19th century
utilitarian teleologists 35 . In CD 111/3 this rejection is
reflected in his assertions about the subordination of all
creatures to God and their consequent coordination with one
another. Admittedly his primary concern here, as elsewhere,
is with the divine-human axis: his comments reflect his own
rejection of totalitarianism.	 But his doctrine of
providence does not exclude the nonhuman in the same way as
the earlier part-volumes of CD III.
	 Indeed at times his
language about God's care for the nonhuman becomes almost
lyrical.	 For example with respect to preservation he can
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say,
Therefore nothing will escape Him: no aspect of the
great game of creation; no moment of human life; no
thinking thought; no word spoken; no secret or
insignificant enterprise or deed or omission with all
its interaction and effects; no suffering or joy; no
sincerity or lie; no secret event in heaven or too
well-known event on earth; no ray of sunlight; no note
which has ever sounded; no colour which has ever been
revealed, possibly in the darkness of oceanic depths
where the eye of man has never perceived it; no wing-
beat of the day-fly in far-flung epochs of geological
time. (CD 111/3, 90)
Another implication of his stress on the centrality of
Christ in creation is that he runs the risk of allowing
creation to be swallowed up by redemption. Creation has
been made entirely dependent on the eternal actuality of
Jesus Christ and only his insistence on the historical
physical character of the incarnation prevents his theology
from becoming purely idealistic. His invariable failure to
develop the implications of the physicality of Christ for
the nonhuman is largely responsible for the sense of
unreality which so many commentators feel pervades his
doctrine of creation and providence.
Finally we ought to examine his treatment of the role
of the Holy Spirit in creation. It is arguable that he has
so emphasised the role of the Son that both Father and
Spirit are marginalised.	 Certainly his treatment of the
Holy Spirit in relation to creation is less than
satisfactory.	 For Barth, the Spirit's role is primarily
noetic (pertaining to the subjective dimension of creation).
He admits the biblical witness to the Holy Spirit as
life giver and works from that to the statement that the
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Holy Spirit is the goal of creation (CD I/i, 472). But when
he comes to expand on this in his doctrine of creation what
he, in fact, says is that,
it is in God the Holy Spirit that the creature as such
pre-exists. That is to say, it is God the Holy Spirit
who makes the existence of the creature as such
possible, permitting it to exist, maintaining it in its
existence, and forming the point of reference of its
existence. (CD 111/i, 56)
The orientation towards the past is quite striking. In
keeping with this, Barth fails to appropriate the three
dimensions of eternity (pre-temporality, supra-temporality,
and post-temporality) to the hypostases in CD 11/1. And he
fails to do so in spite of the fact that this clearly meets
his own conditions for a responsible appropriation and,
furthermore, that he recognises that overemphases on one or
other of these aspects have been accompanied in the history
of Protestant theology by overemphasis on the corresponding
Person36
 (CD 11/1, 630ff.).
In conclusion, Barth's theology promises much that is
of positive value to the theologian of nature.
Unfortunately his own theological concerns not only
prevented him from developing that promise but have done
much to obscure the ecological promise that is there. To
move forward from this position it will be necessary to
retrace his steps with a different set of concerns and with
a view to making up the deficiencies which have been
discerned in his system.
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NOTES
1. His debt to Augustine (and Origen) was so great that
Braaten has commented "it was often difficult to
distinguish Tillich's own doctrine from theirs"
(Braaten 1967, xxi)
2. Of these influences the greatest was undoubtedly
Schelling whose nature philosophy was the subject of
his dissertations for his Ph.D. and his Licentiate.
3. Essence and existence may be used either descriptively
or prescriptively. Essentialism is Tillich's term for
the mainly descriptive approach of Aristotle, Aquinas,
and Kant. Existentialism denotes the more prescriptive
approach of Plotinus, Augustine, and Schelling (Dourley
1975, 50-71). This distinction corresponds exactly
with his very sharp distinction between cosmological
and ontological philosophies of religion (Tillich
1 964a).
4. In addition to its insistence on relevance, it is
argued that the specific content of Tillich's theology
lends itself to a more balanced critique of our
technocentric society than either the technological
optimism of Harvey Cox or the prophetic warnings of
Jacques Ellul and the environmentalists (Bulman 1984).
5. This suggestion has been made not only by former pupils
and disciples of Tillich (e.g., Gilkey 1985; Santmire
1985, 141; and, Shinn 1985) but also by Pannenberg
1973.
6. The Heideggerian starting point in the questioning
subject and Tillich's method of correlation recall the
introspective theological method of the Neoplatonists
and Augustinians. The infinite and the finite meet and
interpenetrate in the essential structure of reality
(Dourley 1975, 53). Thus man encounters God by
becoming at one with his own essence. This suggests
that Tillich's methodology is in some ways the
contemporary philosophical parallel of Augustine's
spirituality. This connection is further underlined by
the possibility that the method of correlation is as
idealist as it is existentialist, presupposing, as it
does, an underlying correspondence between the human
situation and the divine Word; between thought and
reality (Young 1976, 103).
7. For Tilhich, as for Augustine and Bonaventure, love is
primarily unitive: it is eros, the ontological power
which enables the self-return of the self-separated.
8. This identification of the Father with power and the
Son with form recalls the trinitarian theology of Peter
Abailard condemned by St Bernard.
9. This is not to deny that this dialectical structure may
be a formal condition for life. His error lies in the
reduction of the Trinity to such a formal structure.
Jenson comments that early Christian efforts to soften
the paradox of trinitarianism invariably led to




appears to use dialectics to soften the paradox in
precisely this way (e.g., Tillich 1957, 90f.).
10. He does not dwell on the difficulties of using person
as a symbol for that which transcends personhood. Such
a use of symbols in theology recalls the via negativa
of the Christian Platonists.
11. He uses the term in a non-technical sense, e.g., in
sermons and in his discussion of "Nature and Sacrament"
(Tillich 1951). However, his insistence that time must
take priority over space (Tillich 1964b) means that
nature must be historicised. This, in turn, means that
he is unable to treat nature and history as polar
elements in the structure of being (Tillich 1953, 183).
12. Compare Augustine and Bonaventure's view of the
relationship of soul and body.
13. These are ontological dimensions not biological ones.
For example, his understanding of inner awareness as
characteristic of the animal realm leads to a
scientifically heterodox definition of animal. Nor is
inner awareness a particularly clear way of defining a
particular dimension. What constitutes inner
awareness? Is it sense perception? And, if so, can it
be identified with response to external stimuli? The
answer must be 'no', else many plants and even mouse
traps would have to be defined as animal. Is it some
form of rudimentary self-awareness? Then many forms of
animal life (including creatures as complex as insects)
would have to be re-classified as members of the
vegetable kingdom!
14. One minor weakness in Tillich's use of the metaphor of
dimensions is the suggestion that all dimensions are
present, actually or potentially, in every situation
(Tillich 1964c, 16). This raises the question of
whether genuine novelty is possible.
15. He has so elevated the concept of non-being that it
appears to have become for him a polar element of deity
itself. To speak of creation out of nothing is thus to
speak of creation out of the abyssmal aspect of God.
16. What is more, he reads this tendency back into
Augustine (Tillich 1968, 117).
17. Another possibility is that he is forced to regard God
as intrinsically creative because of the correspondence
between his dialectical conceptions of life and
creativity. Life is creativity, the union of power and
form. If God is Spirit, unbounded life, he must also
be unbounded creativity. However, Tillich could not
admit this possibility because it violates his
theological method (if it were true, it would undermine
his claim that philosophical considerations were merely
determinative of the form of his theology).
18. While one must make allowances for the fact that this
was said in the context of a sermon, it clearly
suggests that the insistence on an existential starting
point for every doctrine leads to the danger that every
doctrine becomes anthropocentric.
19. This is reminiscent of Schelling or, at least, of
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Tillich's interpretation of him: "When I am one with
nature, I am one with God, who is nature's quickening
force" (Tillich 1974, 55).
20. The one exception would be the new being, Jesus who is
identified with the Christ.
21. For Tillich this means that it contradicts agreed
opinion based on the whole of ordinary human
experience. It does not imply irrationality or
absurdity.
22. In both cases, the fulfilled state is denoted by
spirit. God as spirit is God fulfilled in himself.
Spirit is also the resolution of the ontological
polarities, the perfection or re-essentialisation of
finite being (Tillich 1953, 249f.). Thus the eschaton
may be characterised as the spiritualisation of created
being.
23. i.e., when the past is no longer experienced as loss
and the future is not experienced as threat, but both
are completely united with the now.
24. This would not be easy since it would throw into relief
a possible element of incoherence in Tillich's thought,
namely, the tension between the concepts of actuality,
life and existence (Thatcher 1974).
25. The evidence for this pluralism should be treated with
caution since the Barth of CD III could speak in a
strongly monistic way at times, e.g., Barth 1949, 42.
Furthermore it is likely that the young Barth was
familiar with the work of Buber and Rosenzweig through
his membership of the Patmos Circle (McLean 1981, 2).
Why, then, should evidence of this familnarity only
appear from CD III on?
26. This neglect may be due to his formal adherence to the
Reformed tradition. Reviewers of CD 111/3 have tended
to dismiss his treatment of providence as conventional
and focus on the less conventional aspects of that
book, namely, his theodicy and angelology (e.g.,
Whitehouse 1951, 241).
27. His critique also applies to Tillich who, as we have
seen, integrates his treatment of providence into the
doctrine of God (and, who, at times appears to be
coming to similar conclusions to those of the mediaeval
mystics).
28. This concept recurs regularly in Reformed theology,
being found in the work of Heppe, Schleiermacher, and
Brunner, amongst others.
29. Barth cites Thomasius. However, this view of time is
by no means restricted to theologians. Similar
speculations can be found in the writings of both
classical and contemporary physicists.
30. This contrasts with Brunner, who drops concurrence and
treats preservation and government as distinct
activities (Brunner 1952, 153f.).
31. In contrast to the divine memory of process theology.
32. This appears in Zwingli, and later in Schleiermacher
and Alexander Schweizer but Barth discerns the roots of
it even in Calvin.
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33. Barth makes extensive use of the Heidelberg Catechism
which, unusually for Reformed statements, refers to
Christ's role in providence.
34. Linzey contends that the Old Testament bears witness to
a peripheral but, nonetheless, real participation of
nonhuman creatures in the covenant.
35. Barth's reference to their 'gastrocentricity' recalls
Feuerbach's critique of the Christian doctrine of
providence.
36. The Reformers overstressed pre-temporality together
with the sovereignty of the Father; pietism and 19th
century Protestant Liberalism overstressed supra-
temporality together with the immanence of Jesus
Christ; and the recent rediscovery of eschatology has




THE PLACE OF THE NONHUMAN
IN THE BIBLICAL TRADITIONS
Previous chapters have highlighted the ambivalence of
several major western theologians towards the nonhuman
creation. We have also noted the inadequacy of dogmatic
treatments of the subject and the recurrent tendency for
this ambivalence to give way to antipathy.
This antipathy is often taken by critics to be the
Christian view of nature. But can its roots be traced, as
environmentalists argue, to the foundational traditions and
documents of the Christian faith? Is the Judaeo-Christian
tradition incorrigibly opposed to contemporary environmental
anxieties? To answer these questions, we must examine what
the biblical authors have to say about the relationships
between God, humankind, and the nonhuman creation.
However, as with any other book, it is not possible to
read the Bible without bringing some pre-understanding to
the text. All reading occurs in the context of a tradition
of interpretation. The hallmark of responsible reading is
its willingness to let the text speak out and, where
appropriate, to contradict the tradition within which it is
being read. In other words, responsible reading permits the
text to maintain its integrity. Or, as Josipovici puts it,
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"a book will never draw me out of myself if I only accept as
belonging to it what I have already decreed should be there"
(Josipovici 1988, 15).
The main reason for delaying the examination of
biblical material until this stage of the thesis was to
allow the preceding chapters to stress the tradition of
interpretation which has informed most readings of the
relevant texts (including the readings of their critics). A
common factor amongst the theologians examined has been a
tendency to favour anthropocentric interpretations of the
biblical accounts of the nonhuman creation. If anything,
this tendency has been reinforced by the influence of
existentialism.
Another factor which has tended to reinforce
anthropocentric readings of the text has been the dominance
of the historical-critical method amongst biblical scholars.
While recognising that the traditional tools of literary
criticism have done much to enrich our understanding of the
Judaeo-Christian scriptures, it must also be admitted that
their analytical approach tends to result in the
fragmentation and diachronic reading of the biblical texts.
More seriously, a parallel assumption (which usually remains
implicit) that the earliest texts (or the earliest stages in
the evolution of a text) represent the creative phase of
Hebrew (and Christian) theology has resulted in the
concentration of effort on these strata (and on the
speculative reconstruction of literary and preliterary
sources) at the expense of later strata (Anderson 1978, 23-
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28). Since some of the most important biblical material on
creation and nature is to be found in texts usually regarded
as late, this has had the effect of playing down the
importance of this aspect of the biblical witness.
More recent forms of literary criticism (specifically
structuralism, stylistic criticism,and canonical criticism)
have placed more emphasis on a synchronic, wholistic
approach to the text. This has had the effect of correcting
this particular distortion in our reading. Thus, while
allowing source, form, and tradition criticism to make us
more aware of the hidden depths within the canonical texts,
we must remember that their rightful place is secondary (and
preliminary)	 to theological	 attention to the texts
themselves. After all, it is the texts, and not their
sources, which have been preserved and revered as revelatory
by the Jewish and Christian communities.
It may be objected that it was precisely this canonical
synthesis of disparate and even antagonistic theologies of
nature which has led to the present situation. In this
case, it might be argued that the historical critical
approach has set us free from the traditional
misunderstandings and so enabled us to make a new selection
of more appropriate attitudes from amongst those on offer in
biblical theology.	 Two responses may be made to this
suggestion. First, it would have to be proven that the
canonical synthesis was indeed responsible for the
exploitative attitude of western society and, second, it may
be objected that the selectivity of such a procedure carries
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with it presuppositions which may take its practitioners
beyond the scope of Christian theology1.
In what follows I begin to explore what might happen if
the Bible were read with the working hypothesis that it does
attend to the nonhuman creation (and, not merely as the
background to God's dealings with the human race). The
sheer quantity of biblical (especially Old Testament)
references to the nonhuman creation precludes an exhaustive
study.	 Instead several passages have been selected for
detailed examination. They have been chosen to represent
major theological strands within the Old and New Testaments
and because they speak of the nonhuman creation as such
rather than merely using natural imagery to speak of human
experience.
1.	 GENESIS 1-11: THE PRIMAEVAL HISTORY
These chapters constitute the most extensive and most
important treatment of creation in the entire biblical
tradition. In their canonical form and because of their
location, they place the very heart of both the Hebrew and
the Christian religious traditions in a cosmic context.
From the outset, the God who brought Hebrew slaves out of
Egypt and created from them the nation of Israel, who
revealed himself in Jesus Christ, and who acted decisively
to overcome human sin through Jesus' death and resurrection
is presented as the creator of the entire universe. 	 By
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reporting the foundational events, not only of the church
and the nation of Israel but of the entire universe, the
Primaeval History reminds us that the scope of divine
activity is more than sufficient to contain salvation
history (whether Jewish or Christian). There can be no
question of restricting its scope to specifically salvific
events. On the contrary, it must be taken to include Jj..
things and events.
By the same token, the reporting of these primaeval
events in this context (as the prologue to the human drama
of salvation history) rules out any merely speculative
interest. These events are not merely past occurrences (of
academic interest perhaps, but with no relevance to the
present) but, rather, "events which laid down what was to be
valid for all periods to come" (Steck 1980, 91). A
mythological interpretation 2
 is ruled out by the way in
which the author has related the foundational events to the
present. They are not timeless transcendent realities
related to our world through their reenactment in ritual.
On the contrary, they stand in clear temporal relation to
the events of salvation history.
However, many twentieth century biblical scholars
reject this commonsense view. One of the assured results of
Old Testament studies is that consciousness of the cosmic
scope of God's activity was not part of the religious
experience of the earliest Hebrews. Considerable effort has
been put into attempts to reconstruct the development of
this facet of their experience and it is usually traced to
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their consciousness of having been created as a people by
Yahweh (e.g., Robinson 1913, 71).
It is less clear how belief in their creation as a
people evolved into belief in a cosmic creator but their
growing awareness of the surrounding cultures certainly
played an important part. In particular, they were forced
to reflect on the relationship between Yahweh and the gods
of their neighbours and the implications of asserting his
preeminence over what were mostly nature deities. Thus the
different uses of 'creation' which may be discerned in the
Old Testament (Anderson 1984d, 1-24) are widely regarded as
stages in the evolution of the concept, with the explicit
account of the origination of the nonhuman creation in
Genesis 1 as a late extrapolation3 (e.g., Scheffczyk 1970,
5; Young 1976, 27). One effect of these efforts to
reconstruct the historical development of Yahwism has been a
tendency to make value judgments about the relative worth of
the various strata exposed by tradition criticism.
Generally speaking this has appeared in the form of a search
for an authentic Yahwism assumed to be embedded in the
earliest strata of the biblical texts.
The effect on the later cosmic dimensions of the text
has been to reduce them to a mere backdrop for the drama of
salvation-history. Thus von Rad can say, "Presumptuous as
it may sound, Creation is part of the aetiology of IsraelV
(von Rad 1975, 138). Biblical statements about creation are
to be read with the understanding that the authors intended
to collapse creation into soteriology (von Rad 1975, 139).
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The roots of this negative attitude are to be found in the
philosophical and theological presuppositions described in
the preceding chapters. These presuppositions have hindered
the use of the Bible as the source for a modern theology of
nature.
Only with a different set of presuppositions does it
become possible to treat the relevant texts as valid
developments rather than potential corruptions of the
original faith. The question of which presuppositions to
adopt is, for Christian dogmatics, to be answered primarily
with reference to the internal evidence afforded by
Scripture.
Throughout our examination of the Primaeval History we
must bear in mind the following warning, °An almost
necessary consequence of separating chs. 1-3 from chs. 4-11
is to misunderstand them. The God-created man and the God-
created world are presented not in chs. 1-3 but in chs. 1-
11 , (Westermann 1974, 24). This misunderstanding is nowhere
clearer than in those accounts which, in their concentration
on the different strata of tradition (and their
interrelationships) within the texts, fail to recognise the
care with which the whole has been constructed. That the
author of Genesis 1-11 drew on a range of traditional
materials is not in question.
	 The attempt to reconstruct
his raw materials by means of a diachronic reading of the
text is even of some interest. 	 However, it is vital, if
misunderstanding is to be avoided, to recognise that he j
an author and not merely a redactor or compiler. 	 As
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Brueggemann points out, "the traditions are shrewdly held
together in the canon. The expositor is not free to choose
one at the expense of the other" (Brueggemann 1982, 15).
Thus we must take into account the entire text if we are to
obtain a coherent theological account of the creation of the
physical and biological worlds. Indeed, it is arguable
that, in order to understand Genesis 1-11 properly, it must
be read in its larger scriptural context rather than as a
relatively self-contained unit (Anderson 1984b, 41).
(a) The Priestl y hymn of creation
(i) Critical considerations: Because of its canonical
location, Genesis 1 is widely regarded as the fundamental
text on which to base any Judaeo-Christian theology of
creation. It also contains the clearest statements about
the nonhuman element of creation to be found in the
Primaeval History.
Form critical and other literary considerations suggest
that the author of the canonical form has drawn on
traditional materials to create this introduction. Its
strongly rhythmic language and its use of repetitive
formulae together with its very pronounced temporal and
thematic structure seem to indicate an original Sitz im
Leben in the corporate worship of the Hebrew community4
(hence the tendency to refer to it as a hymn or litany).
Furthermore, there is a clear, albeit implicit, doxological
dimension to the text which marks it out as originally part
of an act of worship (Westermann 1984, 92).
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That this was its most likely original context may be
maintained in spite of the difficulties created by its
unusual form5 . Its structure is, indeed, quite striking.
In its canonical form the text consists of two major
movements (each consisting of four divine acts spread over
three days) and concludes with an account of the divine rest
on a seventh day6 . Furthermore there is a clear
correspondence between the two movements 7 : the creation of
light on the first day corresponding to the creation of sun,
moon, and stars on the fourth; the separation of heaven and
the waters (of chaos) corresponding to the creation of birds
and sea creatures; the separation of dry land from the
waters and the creation of vegetation corresponding to the
creation of land animals and humankind.
Clearly the material has undergone a significant change
in function as a result of being incorporated into its
canonical context 8 . The important issue for our purposes is
its present function. Westermann describes it as a solemn
overture (Westermann 1984, 93). As we have already noted,
it has the effect of putting what might otherwise be
regarded as esoteric and exclusive traditions in a cosmic
context. While by no means denying the believer's right and
duty to concentrate on the individual and communal
implications of salvation history, it forbids from the
outset any attempt to make this the exclusive concern of the
believer.
(ii) Ex nihilo or from chaos?:	 There has been much
debate about whether Genesis 1 supports the Christian
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doctrine of creatio ex nihilo or a doctrine of divine
ordering of a primordial chaos (e.g., Fisher 1965, Lane
1963). At present Old Testament scholarship appears to
favour the former interpretation, taking verse 1 as a
principal sentence prefixed to the chapter as a whole
(Westermann 1984, 94-97). Thus the first verse of the Bible
makes an assertion quite unprecedented in Ancient Near
Eastern literature: it ascribes the entire work of creation
exclusively to the one God.
Of course the conceptual framework of this passage is
quite different from that in which the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo evolved. However, both serve to cut off human
speculation about origination from a chaotic pre-creation
state. In the case of the Priestly writing it
demythologises and degrades the primordial chaos which, in
the mythology of the Ancient Near East (and, indeed, that of
Hellenism) was regarded as the matrix of the gods. The
doctrine of creatlo ex nihilo may thus be regarded as a
legitimate extrapolation of these verses to deny any
equation of the creator God with the Platonic demiurge.
How then are we to interpret the Tohuwabohu of verse 2?
Is it "nothing more or less than a very concrete way of
saying "absolutely nothing whatever"" (Renckens 1964, 84)?
Such an interpretation is tempting but does not cohere with
subsequent verses in which this dark and watery void is
stated explicitly to be the raw material for the divine acts
of separation. For the same reason, Barth's suggestion that
it is das Nichtige is unsatisfactory (CD Ill/i, 101-110).
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Westermann tells us that "it means the desert waste and
is used as the opposite of creation" (Westermann 1984, 103).
Elsewhere in the Old Testament it carries sinister
overtones: it is a howling waste (Ot. 32:10) where people
wander aimlessly (Job 12:24) and perish (Job 6:18).
Significantly the concept also appears in the prophetic
theme of divine judgment as a de-creation (Is. 24:10, 34:11,
40:23; Jer. 4:23) 9 . But in spite of these overtones it is
still an integral part of the reality created by God.
Indeed, it is presented as the very substructure of
creation. This leads us back to the traditional
interpretation of this as the raw material of creation'°.
One final point is worth making about this primordial
material. P refrains from attributing its creation directly
to God. This attribution appears only as an implication of
the verse's qualification by the prefatory remarks of the
preceding verse. Instead the attention of the passage is
focussed on the creative ordering of that material.
(iii) Creation as a s peech-act: At eight points in the
text God speaks creatively: "And God said, "Let .......
(Gen. 1:3,6,9,11,14,20,24,26), and with the exception of the
creation of birds and sea creatures the divine speech
formula concludes with "And it was so" (Gen. 1:3,7,9,11,
15,24,30).	 Again it should be noted that this is not
peculiar to the Hebrew creation account. There are clear
parallels with Memphite theology's account of creation by
means of a divine speech-act. Nevertheless, the influence
of the prophetic tradition means that P understands creation
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in a quite different manner11.
Brueggemann says of these formulae, "God creates by
speaking. Creation is to listen and answer. Language is
decisive for the being of the world" (Brueggemann 1982, 18).
This use of speech as a metaphor for the divine activity of
creation suggests something voluntary, effortless, and
rational.
It follows that creaturely existence is to be
understood as the appropriate response to the divine word.
But what sort of speech-act and response are envisaged here?
Different answers to this question will result in different
understandings of the God-world relationship.
It is undeniable that the speech formulae of Genesis 1
take the form of commands and their fulfilment. Westermann
regards this as distinctive of P's entire theological
outlook:
Creation through the word as such is not what P is
about. P's purpose is to arrange God's work of
creation into a network of sentences whose succession
follows the pattern of the fulfilment of a command.
The word of command has a special significance that
colors the whole of P's theology. Everything that
happens has its source in God's word of command. The
only difference between God's action in history and his
action in creation is that in the one case his command
is directed to a person (Abraham) or a mediator
(Moses), while in the other it is a command without an
addressee, and hence a creation command. (Westermann
1984, 85)
The absence of an addressee may suggest that the
creative speech-act is best understood as a word of magic12.
However, Westermann points out that such words of magic are
essentially a-historical: they belong to the realm of
mythological discourse.	 Such an interpretation of the
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creative speech of Genesis 1 is possible only by ignoring
its context as the preface to a history. God's word of
command in creation operates effortlessly in obtaining what
it has defined. But this is not magic, for it is continuous
with his words of command spoken in human history.
However, some theologians are uneasy with this emphasis
on the divine command in creation.
	 Brueggemann, for
example, while admitting its command and execution
structure, denies that Genesis 1 is in at all authoritarian.
"God gives permission for creation to be. The appearance of
creation is a glad act of embrace of this permit
(Brueggemann 1982, 30). More generally, Robert Jenson draws
a sharp distinction between promise and command: "a promise
poses a future in a very particular way: as gift. All the
rest of our communication, various as it is, shares one
common character: it poses the future not as gift but as
obligation" (Jenson 1973, 7).
Does a command and fulfilment structure, with its
attendant obligation upon the creature, result in closure of
the future as Jenson's distinction suggests? Clearly it
does to a certain extent. The divine commands of Genesis 1
lay down boundaries for all time to come. But they are by
no means exhaustive. 	 Every event is founded u pon divine
command, but it would be a mistake to deduce from this that
every event is the direct result of divine command. Thus
interpreting these as words of command need not involve us
in acceptance of a closed future. Rather, they present God
as establishing the permanent basis, the order, the stable
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framework without which future possibility would be
indistinguishable from chaos.
Brueggemann's interpretation of the divine commands
remains tempting. Permission is, after all, a special form
of command.	 It may be said to occupy the middle ground
between 'Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not". 	 "Thou mayst"
shares with the creation command the openness of texture
described in the preceding paragraph.	 In placing certain
limits on creatures, God is at the same time permitting them
considerable freedom13 . Nevertheless, while there may be
theological justification for such an understanding of
creation, certain considerations weigh against it as an
exegesis of Genesis 1. Its acceptance would suppress
certain nuances in the text itself, namely, the parallel
activity of divine naming and the different speech formula
associated with the creation of humankind.
The divine acts of naming are appropriately dealt with
here because of their close association with the divine
commands on the first three days of creation. Unlike the
creative word, the act of naming does not confer life or
being.	 Instead it expresses the right of the master
(Blocher 1984, 67; von Rad 1972a, 53).	 It suggests an
active expression of sovereignty. Significantly, God
refrains from naming the specific creatures created on and
after the third day: a privilege and responsibility which is
at least partially devolved upon the human race in both this
and the Yahwistic account.
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(iv) The acts of se paration and the temporal nature of
divine creative activit y : What are we to make of the
creative activity of the first three days of creation? Is
it to be understood simply as a pre-scientific description
of the process by which the earth came into being? And, if
so, why does God content himself with expressing his
lordship over the habitat and not the inhabitant?
The very fact that the process of ordering is closely
associated with separation is important. God's good
creation is a differentiated totality (Blocher 1984, 71).
This contrasts very sharply with Hellenism's denigration of
such differentiation as vicious multiplicity.
Westermann argues that the theological purpose of this
passage is not to commend to us an (incorrect) historical
account of the process by which our world came into being.
He points out that the three acts of separation, temporal
(night and day), vertical (the waters above and below the
firmament) and horizontal (dry land and seas), represent the
establishment of the basic categories of time and space
which condition all creaturely existence (Westermann 1984,
119). This, in turn, sheds new light on the fact that God
actively expresses his sovereignty over these categories.
Also significant is the priority given by P to the
category of time. Light is the first of all God's creations
because, for P, it makes possible the temporal succession
which is the fundamental context of created reality
(Westermann 1984, 112). And its separation from darkness
creates "the rhythms in which the creation rests"
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(Bonhoeffer 1959, 25).
The priority given to the category of time and the
placing of creation within a clear temporal sequence clearly
distinguishes this text from the cosmological myths of the
Ancient Near East. In contrast to the essentially atemporal
(hence mythological) creation accounts of their
contemporaries the Hebrews worked with an account of God
creating the world over a period of seven days which was
clearly intended to be related to subsequent history.
The prominence of this temporal sequence becomes even
more striking when contrasted with the mode of creation
employed by God. As Westermann points out, "it is the work
of an instant and not the work of a day" (Westermann 1984,
110). As such, creation by the divine act of speaking does
nothing to distance this account from its mythological
counterparts. It is this temporal framework, the conception
of creation as taking place in time, as a process moving
towards a goal in time, which works the transformation. In
transferring creation from the mythological realm of
transcendent realities into history (or, more precisely,
pre-history) P has opened up the way for creation to be seen
as continuing in history14.
The symmetry of the passage, however, seems to run
counter to this interpretation. By presenting the six days
of divine activity as a balanced pair of groups of three
days each, and by making days four to six the fulfilment of
days one to three respectively the author has succeeded in
making the pre-historic act of creation seem quite self-
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contained. This impression of stasis is further reinforced
by the account of the seventh day. The very fact of a
seventh day suggests completion while the text states
unequivocally that, "on the seventh day God finished his
work which he had done, and he rested on the seventh day"
(Gen. 2:2). One is therefore not surprised to find that Old
Testament scholars regularly interpret the passage in this
way. For example, in the course of an article stressing the
theme of continuing creation in the Wisdom tradition, Hans-
Jurgen Hermisson says of this passage, "For the Priestly
writing creation concludes with the seven days, and we
cannot speak at all of a continuing creation by Yahweh"
(Hermisson 1984, 134). A corollary of this is that the
dominium terrae is sometimes interpreted as God's provision
of a being to carry on where he has left off. Odil Steck
comments that, "after the completion of the work of creation
the Creator himself no longer intervenes in it, to give it
design and form. Consequently the Creator needs a governor
on earth" (Steck 1980, 104).
But is such a semi-deistic interpretation of P's
understanding of the God-world relation justified? This
verse marks the end of God's creative activity only if
Genesis 1-3 is treated in isolation from the rest of the
Primaeval History. 	 However, such isolation ignores the
parallels between the priestly creation narrative and the
Flood Narrative. It is clear from the latter that P
understands God as active both in nature and history. The
view that Gen. 2:4a marks the termination of divine creative
-254-
activity is also undermined by Westermann's point about the
continuity between the creative commands of Genesis 1 and
God's commands in subsequent history.
(v) The de-divinisation of nature: In a more polemical
vein, Genesis 1 :1-2:4a systematically de-divinises nature.
In the above discussion of tohuwabohu we saw that primordial
chaos was reduced from the actively aggressive matrix of the
gods which must ever be defeated to mere raw material for
the categories of existence.
This process is most clearly visible in the unusually
long description of the fourth day of creation. It is
longer not because it is more detailed than its counterparts
but because of extra repetition. P takes particular pains
to stress the functions for which the sun, moon, and stars
were created. The reason is clear: in the world inhabited
by Israel astral deities were of the utmost importance. In
1:14-19 this assumption is completely negated.
A third example of this process of de-divinisation is
given by Zimmerli. He points to the significance of the
divine blessing in this respect: "It is not nature, it is
not an animated cosmos that enables the earth to bring forth
plants, and animals and men to be fruitful and to multiply;
it is the divine creative word that has opened up these
hidden powers" (Zimmerli 1976, 30). Putting it another way,
fertility is not an attribute of a divine nature (it is not
even a capacity of an autonomous nature) but remains the
gift of God the creator.
(vi) The goodness of creation:	 Seven times in the
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course of Genesis 1 God declares the response of creation to
his creative command to be good' 5 . It is striking that non-
human creatures are unequivocally stated to be good without
reference to humankind. The only suggestion of
anthropocentric utilitarianism appears in connection with
the creation of the heavenly bodies (and that is explicable
in terms of P's polemic against astral cults).
However, this does not mean that creatures are good in
themselves. Goodness is not presented as an attribute of
creatures either individually or as a whole. Rather, it is
a divine judgment about creation.
What, then, does P mean when he has God declare that a
creature is good? The Hebrew term, tob, includes but is by
no means restricted to a moral judgment. It is a moral
judgment (Anderson 1984b, 31), an evaluation of the
creatures' correspondence to the divine purpose (von Rad
1972a, 52). However, it also carries the connotation
'beautiful': it involves an aesthetic judgment. This should
not be interpreted in terms of Hellenistic aesthetics since
In the Old Testament the beautiful is primarily an
event; the proper approach to the beautiful is in this
context not the beholding of something which is there,
an image or perhaps a statue, but the encounter. The
beautiful is experience in the encounter. This is true
of beauty both in regard to man and in regard to what
has been created. (Westermann 1974, 63)
The divine assessment is thus to be understood not as
the result of detached contemplation but of active
engagement with the creature. The creature is good and
beautiful by virtue of its standing in appropriate
relationship to its creator.	 Bonhoeffer rightly relates
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this divine act of seeing to the preservation of creation:
1t does not sink back again into the moment of becoming,
God sees that it is good and his eye resting upon the work
preserves the work in being. . . . The world is preserved
not for its own sake but for the sake of the sight of God"
(Bonhoeffer 1959, 23).
One point worth emphasising is that the temporal
framework is an integral part of the creation which God
judges to be very good. The priority given to temporal
existence is vital to an understanding of the biblical
conception of created existence but it contrasts sharply
with much of the Christian tradition. It implies that
temporal existence is very good but, more than this, it
requires us to accept that the divine purpose for creation
is worked out in time. A transhistorical eschaton such as
is looked for in the Augustinian tradition is fundamentally
incommensurable with this hymn to the creator. Furthermore
change, decay, and death are integral to temporal existence:
they are not the consequence of human disobedience.
(vii) The divine blessin g :	 In turning to the divine
blessings, we are moving from the consideration of creation
in general to living creatures. The divine blessing is
reserved until the fifth and sixth days where it is applied
first to birds and sea creatures (v. 22) and then to human-
kind.	 In addition, we are told that God blessed and
hallowed the seventh day.
The fundamental meaning of the verb 'to bless' (which
commentators agree is the meaning in use here) is "to confer
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the power to be fruitful and multiply (Westermann 1974,
139f). As we have already noted the text thus wrests
responsibility for fertility from an autonomous nature and
makes all life the gift of God (clear evidence of P's belief
in direct divine involvement in the entire created order).
How are we to understand the absence of such a blessing
from the creation of land animals? Westermann argues that P
has amalgamated the blessings at this point purely for
stylistic reasons and that the only difference lies in the
directness with which God addresses the human creature.
Thus he insists that,
the same blessing is imparted both to humans and to
animals. The blessing is effective for all living
creatures . . . This blessing does not give humans any
advantage over the animals; it is the power of
fertility that makes the continuance of the species
possible,	 as	 the	 words	 of	 the	 blessing	 say
unequivocally. (Westermann 1984, 160)
The continuing efficacy of this blessing is illustrated
clearly, in the case of humankind, in the genealogies which
form such an important part of P's redaction of the
Pr-imaeval History and Patriarchal Narratives. At this point
we have once more come close to the theological concept of
preservation. Westermann cites W. H. Schmidt to this
effect: "Apparently the priestly writing intends the words
added to the blessing to indicate the transition from
creation to preservation (Westermann 1984, 161).
This blessing is no mere permission for the maintenance
of the status quo. That possibility is ruled out by the
overtones of fulfilment in the words of the blessing. It is
better understood as a divine commitment to be ever present,
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conferring fertility on every living creature and, thus,
making the future possible.
(viii) The p lace of humankind:	 However, traditional
readings of this blessing tend to focus on the special
status it appears to confer on humankind. In conjunction
with the doctrines of the imago del and the dominium terrae,
such readings form the basis for the contemporary argument
that the Genesis account of human origins is intrinsically
dualistic and exploitative (of nature).
It is argued that this passage presents an unacceptably
anthropocentric picture of creation. Instead of God's
creative command we are presented with an image of divine
deliberation. Unlike the rest of creation, the first human
is addressed directly16 . This act of creation is further
emphasised by the appearance of bara' in the account 17 ; and
its location at the end of the hexaemeron suggests that
humankind is the climax and purpose of creation 18 (e.g.,
Lampe 1964, 450).
P clearly intended to distinguish and elevate the
creation of humankind over the other creative works.
However, it is misleading to see ttiis as an attempt to
suppress the intimate relationship between humans and the
nonhuman creation (contra Baker 1975, 87). Against such
anthropocentric readings we may cite several important
features of the text which point to the interdependence of
human and nonhuman in God's good creation.
We have already noted that the divine blessing of
humankind, while apparently conferring upon them special
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status, is actually inclusive of nonhuman living creatures.
Additionally humankind is created on the same day as the
land animals: suggesting a certain kinship (Blocher 1984,
82). Unlike the other living creatures, humankind is not
declared good in itself but only in the context of the
whole. Finally, the very fact that the creation of human-
kind appears in the same passage as the creation of the non-
human contrasts with the Ancient Near Eastern tendency to
separate cosmogony and anthropogony19.
(ix) The Ima ge of God and creation as a g ift:	 Lynn
White sees the doctrine of the ima go del as creating a
dualism which sets humankind over against nature. 	 It
relates us to God and alienates us from our fellow
creatures.
It is true that many traditional interpretations do
suggest the dualism criticised by White. However, the
tendency to treat ima go del as a human attribute (that which
distinguishes the essentially human from the nonhuman and
allies it with God) is by no means universal, nor does it
find any particular support in the text.
Other explanations of the imago del have sought more
explicit textual support. For example, Barth sought an
explanation in verse 27: "in the image of God he created
him; male and female he created them." Thus the divine
image is connected with human sexuality: specifically, with
the personal relationship between man and woman entailed in
bisexuality.	 Alternatively, it has been suggested that
there is a parallelism between image and dominion in verse
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26. However, this latter suggestion is rejected by most
modern commentators, who read dominion as a consequence
rather than a definition of image (e.g., Barr 1972, 20).
Bonhoeffer lights on the different creation formula of
verse 26 as the basis for his explanation of image. Command
has given way to deliberation: the created image is not
merely commanded to be. If it were, it would not be his
image, for Bonhoeffer says of the nonhuman creation,
The work does not resemble the Creator, it is not his
image. It is the form of his command. . . . Even in
its aliveness the work is dead, because it is an event
that has happened, because, while it comes out of
freedom, it is itself not free but determined.
(Bonhoeffer 1959, 33)
However, the freedom which he discerns in the ima qo dei
is not the formal autonomy of Enlightenment thought. It is
not an innate quality or substance possessed by humankind.
On the contrary, "freedom is a relationship between two
persons. Being free means "being free for the other",
because the other has bound me to him. Only in relationship
with the other am I free" (Bonhoeffer 1959, 35).
This raises the possibility of understanding the act of
creation, at least in relation to humankind, as a gift.
Certainly, the act of creating a free being in the above
sense is, at the same time, an act of self-giving. But,
more than that, the created context in which this freedom in
relationship is worked out is itself, by virtue of its
createdness, a gift.
This notion of the world as a gift must be clearly
distinguished from the classical western scientific view of
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the world as a given, a self-enclosed brute fact (Schmitz
1982, 34). The latter places limits upon the possibilities
that are open to us; it determines our existence. In
contrast to this, the biblical view of the world as a gift
opens up new possibilities: "the term g ift is rooted in a
domain of significance that is charged with discontinuity
and contingency, with risk, vulnerability and surprise"
(Schmitz 1982, 44).
Understood as a gift, creation points to God as the
giver. A gift never refers the recipient only to itself.
Rather, in the act of endowment (the dynamics of the gift)
the giver offers himself to the recipient: "in this
attentive presence he does not only give what is his, he
commends himself" (Schmitz 1982, 59).
Then again, a gift which is truly a gift is
unconditional. It is gratuitous. Looked at in this light,
human dominion over the earth is merely stewardship.
According to P, God places no conditions upon the gift
(except the charge to use the gift to the full).
Finally, to understand creation as a gift entails its
right reception. Such an understanding is a call for
gratitude and openness to the intentions of the giver.
There are, of course, inappropriate ways of receiving a
gift: strategies for its refusal. For example, the
recipient may refuse to acknowledge it as such (thus
exploitation of the environment may be related to the denial
of the existence and call of a creator); or, he may simply
reject the gift itself (e.g., the idealism of much western
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theology and spirituality); or, he may refuse to be
obligated to the giver (e.g., by insisting on compensating
the giver: the path of religious legalism).
(x) Dominion and creation as vocation: We find the
command to have dominion over the animals standing in
organic relationship to the divine blessing: "Be fruitful
and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have
dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the
air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth"
(v. 28).
It is sometimes suggested that this command is couched
in the language of victory over an adversary: that humankind
is called to trample nature underfoot. While it is true
that radah sometimes has this meaning (e.g., Joel 4:13), it
often signifies the activity of ruling.	 Furthermore, such
terminology was part of the common currency of Ancient Near
Eastern court language (Westermann 1984, 159). In a study
of this passage, James Barr concludes that it is this
derived sense which is used here, and that,
Human exploitation of animal life is not regarded as an
inevitable part of human existence, as something given
and indeed encouraged by the ideal conditions of the
original creation; at most, it is something that comes
along later, after a deterioration in the human
condition, as a kind of second-best. (Barr 1972, 21)
In any case, the divine gift is not a carte blanche to
exploit the environment. The human race is permitted to
subdue the earth, but this is a warrant for agriculture and
nothing more. We are given the fruit of the earth to be our
food. Dominion over the animals does not extend to killing
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them for food (or clothing).
Taken together, these considerations rule out any
suggestion that the text implies an adversarial view of
humankind's relation to the environment. The whole thrust
of Genesis 1 is towards an understanding of the environment
as a divine gift. It is true that we are distinct from the
animals but we are also one with them. This basic tension
is subtly expressed by the biblical text when God pauses to
reflect before the creation of the human race. The
distinction -is reinforced by the statement that the human
was created in the image of God. But, as Westermann has
pointed out, the unity is also reinforced by the fact that
the first part of the blessing of the sixth day includes the
animals as well as humankind.
The command to have dominion transforms the blessing,
at least as far as humankind is concerned, into a divine
vocation.	 And the scope of our dominion is intimately
related to the divine blessing. Steck expresses it thus:
"The function of man's task as ruler is to guarantee the
continuance of the created world as a whole . . . for the
benefit of all created life" (Steck 1980, 106). 	 It is a
vocation which -is best understood in relation to ancient
near eastern concepts of kingship. Such a ruler exists fp
his subjects:
As lord of his realm, the king is responsible not only
for the realm; he is the one who bears and mediates
blessings for the realm entrusted to him. Man would
fail in his royal office of dominion over the earth
were he to exploit the earth's resources to the
detriment of the land, plant life, animals, rivers, and
seas. (Westermann 1974, 52)
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As God's vice-gerent on earth, humankind is called to
care for the nonhuman, to be responsible for it before God,
and to mediate between God and nature: offering the praises
of creation to God, and cooperating in the bestowal of
divine blessings upon creation.
(b) The ori g in of humankind accordin g to the Yahwist
Considerable attention has been paid to the Yahwistic
element of the Primaeval History in the belief that it
represents a very early Israelite creation tradition20.
This has led to speculative attempts to reconstruct a
Yahwistic Primaeval History which would, it is believed,
have formed part of a Davidic precursor of the Pentateuch.
The resultant cosmogony is highly anthropocentric.
However, the canonical function of this passage is not
that of a cosmogony. As Brueggemann points out "We should
not speak of a second, parallel story of creation. Rather,
this is a more intense reflection upon the implications of
creation for the destiny of humanity" (Brueggemann 1982,
40). Whatever its original function, it now appears as an
expansion of the latter half of the sixth day of creation.
It functions as an explanatory link between chapter l's
affirmation of the goodness of creation and chapter 6's
assertion that creation is filled with and polluted by
(human) violence.
(i) Humankind and nature: Genesis 2 certainly
underlines our special status but it does not support the
suggestion that God has abandoned the rest of creation to
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us. Once again our kinship with the animals is noted: it is
revealed in the common origin of humankind and animals.
Both are created from the earth. J celebrates our sheer
physicality. We were called forth from the earth: a direct
contradiction of all gnostic, dualistic, or idealistic
interpretations of the gospel. Bonhoeffer rightly points
out that human bodiliness should recall us to our
relationship to the earth, to the nonhuman creation: "In his
bodiliness he finds his brother and the earth. As such a
creature man of earth and spirit is in the likeness of his
Creator, God" (Bonhoeffer 1959, 46).
Two elements of this narrative highlight humankind's
distinctive role: Adam is called to till and keep the
garden, and God invites him to name the animals. The
priestly redactor clearly intends us to understand them as a
distinctively Yahwistic form of the dominium terrae.
Naming the creatures is a demonstration of human
dominion.	 Adam is ordering his world, incorporating the
animals into his life (von Rad 1972a, 83).
	
It is also a
demonstration of human insight and wisdom (Blocher 1984,
91). However the context of this act should not be
forgotten. In Genesis 1 God has forgone his right to name
the animals; in Genesis 2 Adam does so in the presence of
God. Furthermore, the scene arises from the search for a
suitable partner for Adam: no animal was suitable but the
entertainment of the possibility bears witness to a positive
relation to the nonhuman. Thus it is not merely a primitive
act of taking control of his environment. 	 It is not the
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first step on the road to the exploitation of nature.
(ii) The ambivalence of nature: Adam's disobedience in
Genesis 3 and its ecological consequences highlight the
ambivalence of nature that was experienced by the Hebrews
(and which is shared by country people to this day). On the
one hand it is to be recognised as a gift of God but it is
also a place of thorns and thistles, of stinging insects and
predatory animals. Above all, it threatens us with personal
extinction through disease and natural disaster.
Remarkably, this ambivalence is explained by the Yahwist not
in terms of the recalcitrance of matter but in terms of
human disobedience. The disobedience of Adam consisted in
his rejection of the divine boundaries placed upon his
dominion of the earth (Brueggemann 1982, 51). It was thus a
rebellion against the good order of creation established by
God in chapter 1.
The result, expressed in terms of divine judgment, is
the disruption of the relationships established by God
(specifically between God and humankind, between man and
woman, and humankind and other creatures). Adam no longer
has a harmonious relationship with God, Eve, or nature: he
has lost his dominion over the earth. Furthermore, there is
no way in which he can regain that dominion for himself: he
is barred from Eden by the kerubim, the forces of nature
personified2'
The present ecological crisis may be regarded as a
contemporary expression of that disruption since, "The
narrator believes it is the subjection of the world to the
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interests and values of man as he breaks away from God which
leads to the profound damage and depreciation of the created
world that is plain to everyone" (Steck 1980, 75). In this
connection it is worth recalling Bonhoeffer's judgment on
western technology made some years before society became
conscious of an environmental crisis. He argued that
technology was fallen humankind's substitute for God's gift
of dominion. However, as the story of Babel makes clear,
far from being our key to mastery over nature, our fellow
men, and ultimately God himself, it is the agent of our
enslavement and destruction: "Technology is the power with
which the earth grips man and subdues him" (Bonhoeffer 1959,
38). He concludes,
We do not rule because we do not know the world as
God's creation, and because we do not receive our
dominion as God-given but grasp it for ourselves.
There is no 'being-free-from' without 'being-free-for'.
There is no dominion without serving God. . . . Without
God, without his brother, man loses the earth.
(Bonhoeffer 1959, 38)
(c) The Flood and the re-orderin g of creation
Source criticism has established that this narrative is a
composite of traditional sources. However, it is a
composite created with a high degree of artistic and
theological skill. Bernhard Anderson stresses the artistic
and theological unity of the text with its rising and
falling movement22 recalling the flow and ebb of the flood
waters of chaos (Anderson 1978).
(i) The interdependence of humankind and nature: The
Flood Narrative presents a world in which the vocation of
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humankind to be stewards of creation has been supplanted by
the quest for autonomy. This quest is characterised by the
spread of human violence. However, the unique status of
humankind means that this violence corrupts the whole of
creation. Violence, hamas, denotes "the flagrant breach of
a just order and particularly of an order divinely
constituted" (Dumbrell 1984, 20). It is the very antithesis
of the divine evaluation of creation in Geri. 1:31.
God's response to this violence is suffering and
judgment. In Gen. 6:6, the author speaks of God's grief
('asav): a term which elsewhere expresses the pain of a
woman in childbirth (e.g., Gen. 3:16, Chr. 4:9). As
Brueggemann points out, "The story is not about the world
assaulted and a God who stands remote. It is about the hurt
God endures because of and for the sake of his wayward
creation" (Brueggernann 1982, 79).
The form of the judgment is in keeping with the spread
of violence from humankind to all flesh, i.e., a temporary
suspension of the order imposed on the chaos of Gen. 1:2
during the second and third days of creation. There is a
virtual return to the initial "waste and void" brought about
by the temporary withdrawal of the active divine care
implicit in Genesis 1. The way in which the Flood Narrative
consciously parallels Genesis 1 clearly implies that the
Hebrew conception of creation included an element of
continuing divine activity: the suspension of that activity
constitutes the divine condemnation of Genesis 7. As we
have already commented, this notion of a divine de-creation
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is by no means limited to the Primaeval History. The Flood
Narrative functions as a paradigm for the prophetic theme of
the reversal of creation as divine judgment.
At the same time Noah's family and the animals in the
ark constitute the first appearance of that leitmotif of the
Old Testament, the faithful remnant. God gives Noah the
responsibility of maintaining the continuity of human
stewardship of creation by enabling him to preserve the
lower animals from the catastrophe that is to overwhelm
humankind.
There is no suggestion that God has abdicated
responsibility of the earth to humankind: although Noah co-
operates willingly with the divine plan there is no doubt
that the initiative remains with God. The text leaves the
initiative firmly with God both in initiating Noah's project
and in closing the doors of the ark against the Flood.
The climax of the Flood Narrative (some would say of
the entire Primaeval History, e.g., Brueggemann 1982, 21-22)
comes in 8:1. In the midst of God's forgetfulness of
creation, we are told that "God remembered Noah and all the
beasts and all the cattle that were with him in the ark."
Westermann says of the verb used that it "describes a
process of thought and action, bridging the internal and the
external" (Westermann 1984, 441).	 This verse marks the
beginning of God's gracious turn to the creature and the
consequent re-ordering of creation. Significantly the
author explicitly includes nonhuman creatures within the
sphere of God's gracious remembrance. Having briefly, but
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from the perspective of creation disastrously, withdrawn
from the relationship he had established in the beginning,
God now begins to restore the creator-creature relationship.
(ii) Covenant and creation as promise: This process of
re-ordering reaches its climax in the establishment of a
berith olam, an everlasting covenant, with Noah and his
descendants and ever y living creature. Covenants which
include the nonhuman are a recurring theme in the Old
Testament, particularly amongst the prophets (e.g., Hos.
2:18; Jer. 33:20-25; Ezek. 34:25). It is symptomatic of the
pervasive anthropocentrism of our culture that so many
commentators simply overlook this fact.
What is the content of this covenant? Dumbrell reminds
us that "covenants presupposed a set of existing
relationships to which by formal ceremony they gave binding
expression" (Dumbrell 1984, 20). Here the relationships
which receive formal expression are those which endured
through the Flood, including Noah's care for the animals.
The wording of the covenant recalls the divine blessing of
chapter 1. But, in addition to the blessing, God now gives
an unconditional promise to maintain for all time the basic
conditions of order which are a precondition for being able
to respond to the blessing.
The Noahic Covenant institutionalises humankind's
alienation from nature by granting us permission to eat
flesh. However, it does not constitute a charter to exploit
the nonhuman. On the contrary, the divine prohibition on
the drinking of blood may be taken as a reminder that human-
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kind has not been given arbitrary power over other living
creatures (Gowan 1987, 104).
Perhaps the most important point which arises from this
is that the meaning of creation is covenantal. An
explanation in terms of creation is not mythological
(explaining essentially transcendent realities in material
terms). Nor is it scientific (an explanation in terms of an
autonomous impersonal principle of natural order. When we
speak in terms of creation, we are saying, with the Old
Testament, that the meaning of our existence and that of our
physical environment, is best expressed in terms of the
unconditional personal commitment of a transcendent creator.
Finally, it should be noted that the issues raised in
the Primaeval History are not settled there. The reality of
human violence and the ambivalence of nature carry forward
into the Patriarchal History and, thence, to the present.
What the Primaeval History leaves us with is the promise
residing in the covenant with Noah. The covenant has
redemptive implications which concern not only humankind but
the whole of God's creation.
2.	 NATURE IN THE WORSHIP AND WISDOM OF ISRAEL
It is customary to treat these two strands of the Hebrew
tradition separately. However, while it is true that their
settings in life were different (a difference which must be
respected in any joint treatment), it is unlikely that there
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was any clear distinction between the users of the two
forms. The writer of Wisdom literature (be it the
proverbial wisdom of the popular culture or the dramas and
poetry of the educated elite) would have taken part in the
life and worship of the community: the Psalms were part of
his heritage. Similarly the composer of psalms worked in
the context of a culture informed by the Ancient Near
Eastern Wisdom traditions.
To say this is to reject the marginalisation of
Israel's Wisdom tradition which has been customary in Old
Testament studies. For example, Zimmerli comments that
"Wisdom thinks resolutely within framework of a theology of
creation" (Zimmerli 1964, 148). He makes this statement in
the course of arguing that the older wisdom literature is
not specifically Yahwistic; that it "has no relation to the
history between God and Israel" (Zimmerli 1964, 147). The
effect is to so emphasise the continuity between Israelite
wisdom and its Ancient Near Eastern parallels that it can be
regarded as an essentially alien tradition taken over by the
Israelites from Canaan or Egypt. Thus it is often asserted
that wisdom literature stands apart from the mainline
traditions of Israel since it substitutes rationalistic
cosmological	 speculation for salvation history	 (e.g.,
Scheffczyk 1970, 27).
In my view, the question of whether or not Israel's
wisdom literature is dependent upon or represents a parallel
development within the wider culture of the Ancient Near
East is of secondary importance. Whatever its provenance,
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it became an integral part of tsraelite culture. The
tendency to marginalise Wisdom stems from the dubious quest
for an authentic Yahwism: an Old Testament canon within the
canon. Roland Murphy rightly comments that the Old
Testament is able to embrace both traditions without any
sign of tension, and adds that,
One need not therefore justify wisdom and creation from
the standpoint of an alleged "Yahwism" with a
relatively narrow track of encounter in salvation
history. Rather the concept, as well as the
development of creation in wisdom theology, can be
accepted as a genuine element (and not merely an
importation) of the faith of the Israelites as they
encountered the Lord in the created world. (Murphy
1985, 5)
Against the charge that wisdom writing represents a
rationalistic alternative to the heilsqeschichtlich
orientation of authentic Yahwism it may further be noted
that this misrepresents ancient Israelite wisdom. Hermisson
notes that "ancient wisdom starts from the conviction that
the regularities within the human and the historical-social
realm are not in principle different from the ones within
the realm of nonhuman phenomena" (Hermisson 1984, 119).
Unlike the Hellenistic development of the concept of an
immanent and impersonal logos principle, the Hebrew concept
of wisdom makes the personal dimension primary. The result
is a wholistic world view in which knowledge of the nonhuman
illuminates the human and vice versa. Thus,
For the Hebrew, the order of nature is integrated into
the moral and religious order. Its regularity is due
to the will of a benevolent deity; but peaceful and
orderly relations between God and man are conditioned
upon man's submission to the divine regulation of human
conduct.	 A disturbance in the moral order has an
inevitable effect in the physical order; God employs
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the order of nature to chastise. (McKenzie 1953, 135)
A further reason for treating the Psalms and Wisdom
literature jointly in the present context is the significant
overlap between them. Thus some of the clearest creation
material in the Psalms shows significant wisdom influence23.
Similarly, some of the most important creation material in
the Old Testament wisdom literature, namely the divine
speeches in Job, takes the form of secondary insertions of
psalmic material.
(a) Nature ima ger y in the Psalms
Like the rest of the Old Testament, the Book of Psalms uses
creation and nature imagery in a variety of ways. Apart
from those psalms which concentrate more or less exclusively
on the praise of God the creator (which will be treated
separately) there are a number of creation centred passages
where the imagery is used in the service of other
theological themes, in particular, the creation of Israel
and the maintenance of the social order24.
Psalms 74:13-17 and 77:16-20 are good examples of the
use of creation imagery in speaking of the origins of
Israel. Both psalms are laments, the former being a
communal lament and the latter individual.
In Psalm 74 the psalmist, having bemoaned the
devastation of Jerusalem, recalls that, in spite of this,
God has shown himself to be sovereign. There then follows
the passage in question, in which creation imagery ("thou
hast established the luminaries and the sun.	 Thou hast
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fixed all the bounds of the earth") is intermingled with
allusions to the Chaoskampf myth ("Thou didst crush the
heads of Leviathan") and possible allusions to the Exodus
("Thou didst divide the sea by thy might"). On this basis,
the psalmist calls upon God to remember his covenant with
the oppressed, that is with the pious poor of Israel25
Similarly, in Psalm 77 the psalmist concludes his
lament by reminding himself of God's former wonders. 	 He
focusses on the creation of the people of God in the Exodus
but heightens the imagery by drawing on material that would
be appropriate to Chaoskampf mythology ("when the waters saw
thee, they were afraid; yea, the deep trembled").
Creation imagery also appears where the main focus is
on the maintenance of the social order, e.g., in the
Enthronement Psalms. 	 Again the psalmists' interests are
focussed on the present soclo-political situation rather
than on any cosmological speculation.
This is where the conscious connection of Hebrew
worship and wisdom is of value.	 When they are treated
separately the temptation is to argue that the use of
creation in this context is nothing more than imagery: a way
of expressing social and existential issues. 	 However, in
the light of the prevailing assumptions of Hebrew wisdom, it
is clear that the psalmists and those who used their psalms
in worship would have recognised a genuine correspondence
between the cosmic order and the social order. Thus their
references to creation were intended to illuminate and not
merely express. God's covenantal care for Israel had real
-276-
material (and ecological) implications. Similarly, God's
continuing care for his creation had implications for the
social and political order. But the validity of the latter
depended on the reality of the former. It follows that the
references to creation in these contexts may, after all, be
used as resources for developing a picture of the Hebrew
understanding of creation and nature. As we shall see
later, these references are entirely consonant with the
major creation theme of both the Psalms and wisdom
literature, namely that creation is not a past event but a
present reality: that God actively concerns himself with the
maintenance of his creation.
(b) The creation psalms
A number of psalms have been singled out by commentators as
creation psalms. These are psalms of praise which are
distinguished by their concentration on the divine creative
activity (past and present). Amongst the psalms usually
included in this category are Pss. 8, 19a, 104, 139, 148;
Amos 4:13, 5:8f., 9:5f.; parts of 2 Isaiah; Job 38ff
(Westermann 1967, 223). In common with the priestly
creation tradition examined above, they treat the created
order as a divine achievement or gift. It is never a mere
datum (Lewis 1961, 71).
(1) Psalm 8: The main theme of Psalm 8 is the status
of humankind within the created order. Like Genesis 1, it
is one of the major biblical sources of the doctrine of the
dominium terrae and is, therefore, a key text for Christian
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anthropology. On the face of it, it is less carefully
nuanced than its priestly counterpart and has been
interpreted as permitting the exercise of naked power in
relation to the nonhuman. However, Brueggemann points out
that the psalm is so structured as to place this statement
about the status of humankind strictly within the context of
praise. He adds that
Doxology gives dominion its context and legitimacy.
• . . Praise of God without human authority is
abdication . . . But to use human power without the
context of praise of God is to profane human regency
over creation and so usurp more than has been granted.
(Brueggemann 1984, 38)
Secondary to this emphasis on the priority of humankind
in creation are various statements about the extent of
creation. In keeping with the rest of the Old Testament we
find that "all things" are described as God's handiwork, and
this explicitly includes the moon and the stars26.
(ii) Psalm 19: Psalm 19a, which von Rad argues was the
product of Canaanitish influence, agrees with Psalm 8 on the
creaturely status of the heavens. It expands on this by
asserting that the heavens are, in fact, revelatory of God.
This is a corollary of the de-divinisation of the heavens
(and, indeed, of all creation) which took place as Hebrew
religion developed. As C. S. Lewis perceptively pointed
out, such de-divinisation is a necessary prerequisite of any
natural revelation (Lewis 1961, 70): only if a creature is
clearly understood not to be in any way continuous with God
is it possible to have that distance which is necessary for
the creature to become a pointer to God.
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(c) Psalm 104
This psalm stands out from the other creation psalms because
of its exclusive use of the theme of God's creative activity
as a basis for praise. However, this distinction has led to
the accusation that it is not original to Yahwistic belief
(von Rad 1984, 61).
Once again one must ask whether such a negative
judgment on a passage of Scripture may be allowed to
undermine its dogmatic value. That it is an alien
intrusion into the Old Testament can be seen from its clear
relation to the Old Testament Wisdom tradition. This
becomes explicit in verse 24 where the psalmist speaks of
the rationality of creation in language which is clearly
that of wisdom literature. But it is implicit in large
tracts of the psalm, e.g., verses 14-23 constitute a
catalogue of divine acts reminiscent of the catalogue genre
in wisdom literature27 : the nearest parallel in Scripture is
the divine challenge which forms the climax of the book of
Job (Job 38-41). A negative judgment on Psalm 104 implies a
similar judgment on the entire corpus of Wisdom literature
in the Old Testament. Furthermore, the psalm displays a
clear affinity with the priestly account of creation in
Genesis 1 (Kidner 1975, 368).
Since the themes of the psalm are broadly the same as
those of the priestly creation story it is not necessary to
go through it in detail. However, several differences of
emphasis must be noted in the interests of achieving a more
rounded view of the continuing aspects of God's creative
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activity.
The psalm is generally reckoned to consist of eight
stanzas. Of these, the first stanza (vv. 1-4) speaks of
God's creative activity in the heavens in relation to his
glory. It affirms the creaturely status of the heavens and
rules out any suggestion that the chaotic forces of nature
(the waters, the wind, and fire) might be anything more than
servants of the creator. Once again we may discern in this
something of the implicit demythologising of the Chaoskampf
which goes on throughout the Old Testament.
The second stanza (vv. 5-9) is widely regarded as an
allusion to the Noahic Flood and the subsequent re-creation
of the earth 28 . Verse 5 speaks of the establishing of the
earth: a concept which, elsewhere in the Old Testament,
comes close to the traditional Christian doctrine of
preservation. Then in verse 6 the Flood is summarised in a
few words. Verses 7 and 8 refer to the divine re-ordering
of creation which reaches it climax in verse 9 with the
recollection of the divine covenant with Noah (admittedly,
presented in less personal terms than those of the Primaeval
History). As a whole, the stanza underlines the part played
by the ordering (or bounding) of chaos in the Hebrew notion
of creation, and it reminds us that this was not a self
contained pre- historical act but, rather, a continuing
state which has once been rescinded as an act of judgment.
At the same time it recalls the divine promise never again
to subject creation as a whole to such a reversion to
disorder29
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Subsequent stanzas make repeated use of the Hebrew
imperfect tense, indicating that, for the psalmist, the
continuin g
 creative activity of God is a basis for praise.
He sees God as being immediately responsible for the
provision of the basic necessities of life, including the
appropriate habitats for different creatures, water, and
food.
There are two significant exceptions to this use of the
imperfect. In verses 5 and 19 the perfect tense appears
instead: signifying historical events which occurred once
and for all (but which constitute continuing foundational
data of creaturely existence). The first of these is the
aforementioned establishment of the earth. The second is a
reference to the fourth day of creation: "Thou hast made the
moon to mark the seasons; the sun knows its time for
setting."
Turning to the psalmist's references to humankind, he
speaks of the work that is provided by God. God supplies
the plants which humankind must cultivate for itself. Thus
we are called to share in the responsibility of providing
for ourselves. However, apart from this distinction, we are
seen as entirely one with the animal kingdom in our
dependence on God. This is perhaps the most striking
difference between the teaching of this psalm and that of
the Primaeval History. The emphasis on the special status
of humankind is reduced to the level of an implication of
this special responsibility.	 In so doing, the psalmist is
able to put greater emphasis on the present sustaining
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activity of God. The doxological context makes it
inappropriate for the psalmist to draw attention away from
the divine activity by stressing the dominium terrae. Thus
this omission does not undermine the complementary emphasis
of the Primaeval History on humankind's responsibility.
By implication, if God is the sustainer of life, he is
also the one who places a limit on life. This element of
the biblical teaching has not often found its way into
dogmatic treatments of providence (perhaps because of the
tendency to see death as necessarily evil). Of course the
psalmist immediately balances this truth with the assertion
that God is also the giver of life (to individual creatures
and not merely in the general sense of being the creator of
all). This recalls the blessings of the creation story and
also the limitations placed on the taking of animal life in
the aftermath of the Flood.
(d) Nature in the Job drama
The creation material -in the Book of Job embodies the
assumption of this section that treatment of the Psalms and
the Wisdom literature can be mutually illuminating. Here in
an undisputed piece of Old Testament wisdom are some of the
most extensive creation psalms in the Old Testament. With
the exception of the divine speeches, the most important
creation references in the work are put in the mouth of Job
himself: as answers to his friends. The passages in
question are 9:5-10 (from Job's reply to Bildad in the first
speech cycle), 12:7-10 (from his first reply to Zophar),
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26:7-14 (part of a reply to Bildad from the fragmentary
third cycle of speeches), and 28:23-27 (presented as part of
a concluding general reply).
(1) Job's statements about creation:
	 The first of
these (9:5-10) is a passage which is clearly akin to the
creation psalms looked at earlier.
	 However, far from
reassuring us that all creation is in the hand of God, thus
poem is deeply disturbing. In language reminiscent of the
myth of a primordial conflict Job affirms the sovereignty of
God. He is presented as the lord of the earthquake30 , "who
trampled the waves of the sea" (or "who trampled the back of
the sea dragon"). However, for Job, the power of God has
become a cause of alienation and God's creative activity is
simply incomprehensible.
The same is true of 12:7-10.
	 This passage stresses
that humankind and beasts are alike in the hands of God. He
has not left creation in a semi-autonomous state but is
actively involved in every event. For Job this is a source
of disquiet rather than comfort, implying, as it does, that
God is directly responsible for his suffering. The larger
point being made is that God deals with humankind and the
nonhuman in the same apparently amoral way. Most disturbing
of all is the appearance of the name Yahweh in this passage
(thus underlining the fact that Job holds the God of Israel
responsible for his predicament).
The poem quoted in Job 26:5-14 contains no less than a
dozen cosmological references from several competing
cosmological myths. Once again the primordial conflict is
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clearly in evidence: the Creator is the one who "stilled the
sea" (v. 12a), "smote Rahab" (v. 12b), and "pierced the
fleeing serpent" (v. 13b). There are references reminiscent
of the priestly hymn of creation: specifically, the
reference to the void (v. 7a) and the separation of light
from darkness (v. 10). But the former reference appears in
close proximity to an allusion to Canaanite mythology31
while the latter contains details found elsewhere in the Old
Testament only in Proverbs 8. The overall impression is of
a catalogue of divine creative acts drawn from a variety of
competing myths and creation stories with little or no
regard for coherence. Coherence is unnecessary since the
only concern of the poem is the unnapproachable awesomeness
of the creator. Once again Job is calling into question the
possibility of dealings with this being.
It has been suggested that chapter 28, rather than
being a continuation of the concluding speech of the
dialogue, is a redactional insertion (F. Anderson, 1976,
215). If the Book of Job may be regarded as a drama then
this chapter functions like the commentary provided by a
chorus between the acts of a play. Whatever its origin,
this passage uses creation imagery in a very different way
from both Job's speeches and the divine speeches. The
passage as a whole speaks of where wisdom is to be sought.
In the concluding verses we are, once again, presented with
God the creator and orderer of the world. The examples of
divine ordering in this passage all allude to the same
thing: this God is lord of the storm, a common Old Testament
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way of characterising Yahweh. But the conclusion flatly
contradicts Job's earlier assertions: this God is the fount
of wisdom who freely communicates it to humankind.
(ii) The divine speeches: With the divine speeches we
come to the climax of the Book of Job. The drama concludes
with a brilliant presentation of Yahweh as the Creator.
Indeed S. R. Driver went so far as to say of these chapters,
"The first speech of Jehovah transcends all other
descriptions of the wonders of creation or the greatness of
the Creator, which are to be found either in the Bible or
elsewhere" (cited by Rowley 1976, 240).
The character of this divine reply to Job has been much
discussed. For many commentators this deluge of counter-
questions on the theme of creation seems a grandiose non
sequitur: a divine refusal to answer Job's challenge. Some
even go so far as to see it as an extended exercise in
sarcasm (Rowley 1976, 241) designed to humiliate the
unfortunate Job.
However, as the preceding section shows, Yahweh's
questions pick up one of the themes of the drama. While
their content appears to develop Job's argument that God is
unapproachable, the very existence of the divine speeches
actually subverts that argument: the divine response shows
that Job has not been abandoned.
Against the charge that they were designed to
humiliate, Francis Anderson argues that they are too
playful, too relaxed to have this effect (F. Anderson 1976,
271). On the contrary, the questions serve an educational
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purpose. His experience of natural disaster has left Job
unable to discern the divine orderliness of the world. His
friends have offered him an anthropocentr-ic rationalisation
of natural disaster as just retribution for undisclosed
sins. Elihu has taunted him that God's hand is indeed not
visible in nature. Now God himself intervenes and
transforms Job's complaints about the divine otherness,
using them to lead Job into fresh insights.
It has been suggested that these chapters constitute a
divine legitimation of natural theology (F. Anderson 1976,
270). However, this is not natural theology as it is
commonly understood. Yahweh does not invite Job to seek him
in creation. Instead the personal encounter takes priority.
It is in the context of the divine response to his
complaints that Job is invited to enjoy creation with God.
This is no autonomous human quest for God, for God himself
is Job's guide.
Yahweh's first speech (38:1-40:2) draws pictures of
some twenty creatures both living and nonliving. There is
little sense of order in this catalogue, only a general
impression of movement from the abstract and cosmic to the
particular.	 Once again we find the free use of mutually
contradictory creation imagery drawn from several Ancient
Near Eastern myths 32 .	 A remarkable feature of these
thumbnail sketches is their objectivity. In contrast to
much proverbial Wisdom, there is no hint of anthropocentric
moralising (contra Baker 1975, 97). No attempt is made to
draw morals for the good life from these descriptions of
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creation. It is as if Yahweh were encouraging Job to enjoy
creation for the sake of its divine artistry and not for any
utilitarian purpose.
As far as positive content for a theology of nature is
concerned, this speech simply underlines what we have
already seen in Psalm 104. God governs the weather and
provides for wild animals without reference to humankind.
Indeed the text adds that Yahweh brings "rain on a land
where no man is . . . to satisfy the waste and desolate
land" (38:26f.). Such solicitude for the wilderness is
remarkable in view of the sinister connotations of
wilderness for the Hebrew mind.
Yahweh's second speech (40:6-41:34) consists of two
fantastical nature poems. The prologue to these poems picks
up another theme of the earlier speech cycles: Job's
insistence that justice must be left to God. Francis
Anderson suggests that the point of these poems is to
underline that Job can no more exercise jurisdiction in the
moral realm than he can control these monsters of the
natural world.
Yahweh's apparent satisfaction with Job's replies
(40:3-5, 42:1-6) gives the lie to the suggestion that he has
been seeking to break Job's will.	 At the end, Job is
subdued. He admits his ignorance but his response hardly
constitutes an act of confession, retraction, or submission.
Job had spoken without understanding but he stands by what
he said (42:3): the encounter with Yahweh has served to
reveal to him the full implications of his own position.
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3.	 THE PLACE OF NATURE IN PAULINE CHRISTIANITY
The intellectual	 context of Pauline Christianity is
undoubtedly that of Hellenistic Judaism. New Testament
traditions indicate that Paul himself was a diasrora Jew
with Roman citizenship who had trained in the rabbinic
schools. The churches within his sphere of influence
certainly contained Gentile members but his evangelistic
methods (as presented in Acts) were aimed particularly at
Hellenistic Jews and proselytes. Thus, in reading Paul's
letters with an eye to the theme of creation and the natural
order, we may take for granted that the original readers
were familiar with the general tenor of Old Testament
teaching and perhaps also with some of the inter-testamental
reflection and speculation on this theme.
The Pauline and deutero-Pauline letters of the New
Testament are our main source of information regarding the
creation teaching circulating in these churches. In
addition to Paul's own views, we find here a range of
traditional materials which receive apostolic approval or
modification. Since the letters are all occasional, we
cannot expect to find dispassionate objective cosmological
speculaton in them. Cosmology appears only because of its
relevance to other subjects. However, this should not be
allowed to detract from the importance of the cosmological
themes which do appear33.
The fact that Paul's cosmological teaching appears
because of its relevance to other issues prompts us to ask
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which issues in particular led to the use of such language.
A brief survey of the Pauline letters fails to reveal any
strong association between cosmology and a particular
doctrine34 . In this section we concentrate on two passages
which set out most clearly the Pauline position on creation,
and which have been widely used in recent years for their
ecological implications.
(a) Creation and renewal: Romans 8:18-25
This well-known passage appears in the context of a massive
exposition of Habakkuk 2:4b: "He who through faith is
righteous shall live" (Rom. 1:17).
	
By chapter 8, Paul has
begun to expound what is meant by "shall live.'
Specifically he is dealing with the new law of the Holy
Spirit and the Spirit's gift of hope which points us towards
our eschatological inheritance. This eschatological
dimension has led to the suggestion that Paul's attitude to
nature is informed by apocalyptic pessimism. According to
this view, Paul's answer
is not a means of redeeming the world of nature as well
as the soul of man, so that they can live in harmony to
create the Kingdom of God on earth, but a spiritual
liberation of those men and women who believe in Jesus,
who must then wait for a total remaking of the cosmos





of this passage will be very sensitive to Paul's use of this
key term.	 There	 is a wide range of possible
interpretations.	 'Creation' could mean the entire created
order, consisting of the angelic, human (possibly subdivided
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into believers and others), and nonhuman orders.
Alternatively, it could be used in a more restricted sense
to refer to any one or any combination of these sub-orders.
Any decision as to Paul's use of the word is complicated by
the fact several of the thirteen possible interpretations
have been championed by commentators (the only exceptions
are those interpretations which have included believing
humans to the exclusion of unbelievers).
Was he referring to the entire created order 35 ? This
interpretation is rendered unlikely by the involuntary
nature of the bondage to which creation is subjiected (v.
20). Any interpretation of 'creation' which includes the
angelic and human dimensions must be ruled out for the same
reason36 .	 We must conclude that ktisis is intended to
denote the subhuman created order.
(ii) Futility (mataiotes): This interpretation of
ktisis leads to the strange image of nature suffering. Even
more bizarre, nature itself is looking forward eagerly to an
eschaton which will, amongst other things, mark an end to
its bondage.
What does Paul mean when he speaks of the subjection of
nature to 'futility'? Mataiotes stands in contrast to telos
and means emptiness, futility, meaninglessness, lack of
purpose (Gibbs 1971a, 42).
	
It is the Septuagint's
translation of hebel or vanity (e.g., Ecc. 1:2). Here, it
appears to be synonymous with "bondage to decay" (v. 21).
With its reference to "groaning and travailing", the passage
clearly points us to Genesis 3 for an explanation of this
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term. Thus it seems likely that creation's inability to
achieve its telos, to fulfil the purpose of its existence
(Cranfield 1975, 413f.; Robinson 1979, 102) is a direct
result of the disorder envisaged in Gen. 3:17.
If this is the case, the one who subjected it in hope
must be God. However, the responsibility for this state
lies firmly with humankind: our place in the created order
is such that our disobedience brings with it ecological
consequences. Paul does not teach that nature is in itself
fallen, rather its telos is inextricably bound up with the
destiny of humankind (Lampe 1964, 457; Robinson 1979, 102;
Westcott 1890, 135). Our disobedience prevents the natural
order from achieving its goal: creation "is cheated of its
true fulfilment so long as man, the chief actor in the drama
of God's praise, fails to contribute his rational part"
(Cranfield 1974, 227).
(iii) Hope (el p is): In spite of this assessment of the
cosmic repercussions of evil, Paul emphasises that this
divine subjection does not exclude hope from creation. On
the contrary, the subhuman creation was subjected "in hope".
The present suffering of creation is a "groaning and
travailing": it represents the birth pangs which will
ultimately give way to joy and fulfilment. Paul sees
Christ's redemptive activity as effecting not just the
reconciliation of humanity with God but, through that, also
the consummation of the entire created order. The nonhuman
part of creation is not merely a backdrop to the human drama
of salvation history but is itself able to share in the
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"glorious liberty" which Paul envisages for the covenant
community. What we have here is a Christological and
pneumatological (and, hence trinitarian 37 ) transformation of
the Old Testament concept of the dominium terrae.
(b) Christ and creation: Colossians 1:15-20
That this important passage was originally part of a hymn in
use in the Pauline churches is not in doubt. However, its
precise provenance has been much debated. Is it Pauline or
non-Pauline? If the latter, did it originate from a Jewish
or a Hellenistic source and, in either case, was that source
Christian or non-Christian?
There is little disagreement over the first question.
The non-Pauline language, theology and style of the hymn
rule him out as its author (Cannon 1983, 23-28).
On the second question debate has been fierce.	 The
extreme positions are that the hymn was originally a Jewish
midrash on Proverbs 8 (W. D. Davies) or, that it originated
from Hellenism as a proto-gnostic hymn (Kasemann). Clearly
these views result in very different interpretations of the
passage. Käsemann's view lends itself to an interpretation
which makes the cosmological material strictly secondary, if
not completely irrelevant to the author's intention (Barrett
1962, 85).
While it is true that the passage contains language
reminiscent of Hellenistic philosophy, the philosophy in
question is stoicism rather than proto-gnosticism. Another
difficulty with this view is the presence of terminology
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from the wisdom speculation of Hellenistic Judaism (Dunn
1977, 53, 136f.). But perhaps the most telling argument
against a pagan Hellenistic provenance is the inherent
improbability of Paul or one of his disciples using
heretical material in this way.
A simple Jewish origin seems equally unlikely because
of the textual evidence of Hellenistic influence and the
known intellectual context of the Pauline churches. Thus
Cannon argues that "It is not a very helpful procedure to
assign certain ideas to Hellenistic provenance and others to
Jewish (Cannon 1983, 30).
Was the origin of the hymn Christian or non-Christian?
Käsemann insists that it has little or no distinctively
Christian content. However, its appearance in a canonical
text suggests that, whatever its origins, it had already
become a (Hellenistic Jewish) Christian hymn. As Cannon
points out,
By form, content, and use it professes to be a poetic
celebration of Christ developed out of the experience
of Christian worship. It contains a theology that
squares with the confession of the church in other
parts of the New Testament. It may not be the way the
writer usually expresses his Christology, but it is not
really incompatible with it. (Cannon 1983, 31)
A final introductory issue is that of the role of the
redactions made by the author of Colossians. Reumann argues
that these redactions and the subsequent Pauline commentary
on the hymn have the effect of playing down, if not
completely subverting, the cosmic implications of the
original. Thus,
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the underlying hymn does talk of Christ as Lord and
creator of "all things," and suggests the world to be
his body, so that, seemingly, all men are his and so is
the world of nature. But the Pauline author of the
finished epistle displays little interest in such
points, even though he quotes the entire hymn. (Reumann
1973, 53)
This suggestion must be borne in mind as we examine the
text since, if it is true, it must seriously undermine any
attempt to derive a cosmic Christology or a theology of
nature from this source. Indeed the theology of the letter
will have to be seen as a negation of that of the hymn.
Ci) Image (Eikon): The hymn begins by claiming of
Jesus Christ that, "He is the image of the invisible God,
the firstborn of all creation" (v.15). Both titles offer us
perspectives on the relationship between creation and
redemption.
Eikon signifies that Jesus Christ is the point of
contact between the Creator and his creation. He is the one
who reveals God to creation and, as such, is naturally
associated with the creator rather than the creation. Any
possible misinterpretation of this along Hellenistic lines
(as suggesting that he is in some respect inferior to the
creator in being, after all, only the visible image of God)
is ruled out by the synonymous parallelism with prototokos
(firstborn). The latter term, which expresses the concept
of pre-existence, is characteristically Jewish. Thus, as
Schweizer points out, "He is not merely the first but
passive object of God's activity, but simultaneously he is
the acting subject who extends God's activity to the
creatures that follow him" (Schweizer 1982, 67). Thus the
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hymn ascribes to Jesus Christ the role reserved in pre-
Christian Judaism for divine wisdom (e.g., Wisd. 9:4,9;
Prov. 8:22; Sir. 1:4, 24:9).
Implicit in this identification of Jesus Christ as the
image of God is a Christological reinterpretation of the
imago dei concept. Thus the restoration of the image of God
in humankind becomes part of the Christian vocation: we are
called to be conformed to Christ, the paradigmatic image of
God. At the same time the close connection made in the Old
Testament between the divine image and humankind's dominion
over the material creation means that the latter concept
must undergo a similar transformation.
(ii) Creation in, throu gh, and for Christ: Verses 16
and 17, in expounding the prototokos title, offer the
clearest Pauline (or deutero-Pauline) expression of this
Christological development of the doctrine of creation.
They present Christ as the agent of God's creative activity
when they say that all things (ta panta) were created
through him. Lohse comments that, The Christian confession
appropriates this view of Wisdom's role as the agent of
creation and transfers it to Christ in order to express the
universal validity of the Christ-event s' (Lohse 1971, 50).
Needless to say this reinterpretation in no way diminishes
the cosmic significance of what is being said here.
Furthermore, Christ is the frame of reference for
creation: all things were created in him, i.e., with
reference to or in relation to him. In other words, Christ
is the context of creation. This may be a literal statement
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about the location of creation. If so, the reference to the
church as Christ's body may be seen as a redaction
(eliminating an earlier reference to the cosmos as the body
of Christ). Lohse points out that at least one strand of
Hellenistic Judaism accepted such a pantheistic view (Lohse
1971, 54). However, a metaphorical interpretation would be
consistent with the view of divine wisdom held by more
orthodox branches of Hellenistic Judaism: a view which
probably provided the basis of John's conception of Christ
as logos or Word (a term whose Stoic connotations include,
"the scheme according to which things move, and the power
that makes them move)38.
The passage goes on to refer not only the origins of
the cosmos but also its goal to Christ. All things were
created for him, i.e., to be subject to and to glorify him.
Much has been made of the fact that verse 16 is similar to
prepositional formulae found in Stoicism39 . However, this
part of the verse reveals how deep the divergence really is.
The Stoic formulae use a succession of prepositions to point
to the final unity of all that exists. Instead of being
self-contained in this way, the cosmos envisaged in this
hymn is in movement towards its eschatological end, namely,
Jesus Christ. As Schweizer points out, "This means that the
world cannot be understood in the Stoic sense as the
continuously available presence of God; it can only be
understood with reference to God's activity, which extends
from the creation to the consummation" (Schweizer 1982, 71).
In expanding on the creative agency of Christ, verse 17
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adds that "in him all things hold together". The use of the
perfect tense here makes it clear that a reference to a
continuing activity is meant. Put another way, all things
continue and cohere in Christ. 	 He is the sole basis of
unity and purpose in the cosmos. Again the hymn has
substituted Jesus Christ for divine wisdom: he becomes the
personal basis of unity which allowed the Hebrews to discern
a real correspondence between the moral and natural orders.
He is the foundation upon which God has established the
earth40 . Indeed for Christian theology the very notion of
'cosmos' must be Christocentric (i.e., it must be defined
with reference to Christ as its basis). By thus making
Christ the basis of the order of nature this passage
appropriates to Christ the creative activity of ordering the
cosmos which we noted in both the Primaeval History and
Psalm 104. In other words his role in creation is by no
means limited to creatlo ex nihilo but includes the
continuing maintenance of the cosmic order. Thus Christ is
also presented as the divine agent of the preservation of
the cosmos.
(iii) The reconciliation of all thin gs: The hymn
concludes with a reference to the cosmic significance of
Christ's sacrifice(vv. 19, 20).
Because of the cosmic dimension already ascribed to him
it is appropriate to see him as reconciling to himself all
things (ta panta) and not merely the community of believers
or even the entire alienated human race. Again the
Colossian hymn parallels the Prologue of John, i.e., the
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maintenance of the Old Testament link between redemption and
creation (or new creation). But the way in which it makes
this connection raises the question of whether the nonhuman
creation is to be regarded as fallen and how Christ's
activity in redeeming fallen humankind can be said to have
cosmic effects. As we have seen from our study of Romans 8,
creation is better described as in a state of involuntary
subjection due to humankind's rebellion rather than itself
being regarded as fallen.
The effect of the redactions on the hymn is twofold:
they stress the universality of the Christ event and the
centrality of the cross in the work of reconciliation. As a
result we have to regard the crucifixion as the event which
sets the seal on the divine covenant which reconciles all
things to God.
Cc) The Pauline View of Creation: Concluding Comments
Both the context and content of the above passages indicate
that the Pauline tradition followed the Old Testament in
integrating creation and redemption. Contrary to the
readings of those who are steeped in the law-gospel and
nature-grace dichotomies, there is no evidence of a dualism
between creation and redemption. Nor does it appear that
creation was subordinated to redemption. Gibbs rightly
concludes that, "God's redemptive action presupposes the
creation, includes the creation, and is undertaken in the
face of the reality of evil, which cannot prevail because of
Jesus' lordship through his mediation in the works of
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creation and redemption" (Gibbs 1971a, 139).
For Pauline Christianity, redemption extended beyond
the community of believers to include the fulfilment of the
telos of all of creation. It was not understood as a re-
creation (contrary to the apocalyptic language of some
biblical passages). Applied cosmically, the term 'new
creation' would have referred to the transformation and
fulfilment of this creation (just as its application to
humankind indicated the believer in his continuity and
discontinuity with his old self).
5.	 CONCLUSIONS
As we have seen in preceding chapters there has been a
recurring tendency to treat the nonhuman creation as a
temporary expedient which will ultimately be supplanted by a
purely spiritual fulfilment. Such a tendency finds no basis
in the biblical texts we have examined. At most the
influence of apocalyptic gives rise to passages which
suggest the divine transformation of the world (e.g., Is.
65:17-25; Rev. 21, 22).
	
But nowhere is it suggested that
the biophysical universe will cease to be. On the contrary,
it too will share in the eschatological fulfilment
prefigured by God's redemptive activity in relation to
humankind (Rom. 8:21). This is further supported by the Old
Testament's insistence on the goodness of the nonhuman
creation (Gn. 1); God's fatherly care for even those aspects
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of nature which threaten humankind (Ps. 104); and, its
understanding of the nonhuman creation as the abiding
conntext for divine-human encounter(Job 38, 39).
However, granted that the Bible does not display such
extreme antipathy towards the nonhuman, environmentalists
still criticise it on the grounds of its ambivalence towards
nature and its anthropocentricity. Does our examination of
key biblical texts do anything to deflect these criticisms?
The Bible is sometimes accused of sharing in and even
of giving rise to the ambivalence which has been detected in
subsequent Christian attitudes to nature. Typical is
Santmire's accusation that the Johannine tradition is guilty
of injecting a degree of ambiguity into the Bible (Santmire
1985, 210-15). But our studies suggest that this accusation
is both too narrow and too sweeping.
It is too narrow in the sense that an element of
ambivalence is built into all the texts we have studied.
The Bible is neither unambiguously favourable or
unfavourable towards the nonhuman creation. It has become a
place of thorns; it can fill us with the horror vacul
experienced by Job; it is groaning and travailing. 	 Above
all the writers of both Testaments are well aware of human-
kind's capacity for misinterpreting nature. The religious
history of Israel appears as a prolonged struggle against a
variety of nature cults. While Paul (whom Santmire regards
as the most ecologically sound New Testament author) begins
his letter to the Romans with the most detailed warning
about the dangers of such misinterpretation.
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On the other hand, Santmire's accusation is too
sweeping since it does not enquire whether this biblical
ambivalence to nature is necessarily destructive. The other
side of the coin is that the Bible never questions the
goodness of creation as such. This is virtually the first
tenet of the canonical text and all the subsequent
reservations about nature are no more than qualifications of
it. Ultimately the negativities perceived in nature are
never regarded as inherent in it but rather the result of
its subjection to fallen humankind.
Corresponding to this proper ambivalence with regard to
nature the biblical traditions present us with proper and
improper ways of enjoying creation. The key to a proper
enjoyment of nature is the perception of it as divine gift.
Responsible stewardship would be a minimalist description of
the behaviour that should flow from this perception.
Conversely any perception of nature which fails to take
account of its character as a gift of God's love will give
rise to a range of improper ways of enjoying it.
A further consequence of the biblical perception of
nature as divine gift that one must recognise a degree of
anthropocentricity. This is clear from explicit statements
such as the dominium terrae but is also implicit in the
freedom with which creation imagery is pressed into the
service of other doctrines41 .	 Indeed, there is a sense in
which	 the	 Judaeo-Christian	 Scriptures	 are	 wholly
anthropocentr-ic. 	 However,	 this anthropocentricity	 is
severely qualified by the Hebrew understanding of lordship
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and,	 in the	 New Testament,	 by	 its Christological
reinterpretation.
Finally, it is clear from the passages exaniined that
this anthropocentricity is not such as would exclude a
proper consideration of the nonhuman. Yahweh is
consistently presented as the Creator of all things who
cares for every one of his creatures (even those which are
irrelevant or even threatening to human interests). In the
Old Testament the nonhuman clearly has standing before God
and the New Testament, while less explicit than the Old,
never departs from this assessment. Thus the biblical
traditions never condone the later Christian antipathy
towards nature 42 either in its idealistic form or its
utilitarian form.
NOTES
1. Theology is 'Christian' if and only if it is carried on
in the context of dialogue with the foundational
documents and major traditions of the Christian faith.
A degree of selectivity is unavoidable in any such
dialogue. However, the Judaeo-Christian scriptures
should remain the controlling factor. The systematic
selectivity of some theologians of nature suggests that
this is no longer the case.
2. The idea that the Genesis account of creation is
mythological,	 while largely out of favour with
theologians and biblical scholars, is still to be found
in scholarly works in related fields.	 One recent
example is Niditch 1985. Her approach, which relies
heavily on input from comparative religion and
psychoanalysis, operates with the presuppositnon that a
search for origins is implicitly a search for self.
3. Schmid 1984 rejects this commonly held view that
creation faith is found only later in the Bibile (or not
at all). On the contrary, it is, he argues,
fundamental to the ideology of kingship developed
contemporaneously with the earliest written sections of
the Old Testament.	 However, he maintains that the
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cosmic dimensions of creation faith are secondary to
the political dimension: that creation was, in the
first instance, a symbol for the divine constitution of
the nation of Israel.
4. There is no such agreement about the context or
function of its final redaction (Landes 1974, 280).
5. I have called it a hymn but, while the features
mentioned are suggestive of some sort of poetic text,
its form is quite unlike that of comparable Hebrew
liturgical poetry. Nor is Brueggemann's suggested
designation of litany any more appropriate since there
is no evidence of a congregational response in the
text.
6. This structure, while striking, is by no means unique
in Ancient Near Eastern literature. A similar 6+1
pattern was not uncommon amongst Ancient Near Eastern
authors. Only its appearance as the temporal framework
of a creation narrative remains unprecedented (Blocher
1984, 53).
7. This correspondence has been recognised since mediaeval
times when a distinction was made between the work of
separation (the first three days) and the work of
adornment (the second movement). And in our own era
explicit references to the correspondence date back at
least to Herder (Blocher 1984, 51).
8. Westermann 1984 offers a two stage explanation of the
transition from the original context to its present
canonical situation.	 First, it was detached from its
original cultic context and circulated as an
independent creation story. It was at this stage that
it acquired the function of an account of human and
world origins. The second stage is its insertion into
its present context.
9. The use of the reversal of creation imagery in relation
to the proclamation of divine judgment is an
unmistakable feature of Old Testament prophecy before,
during, and after the Exile. While, of itself, adding
little to a positive understanding of Old Testament
attitudes towards the nonhuman creation, this theme
does imply the existence from pre-exilic times of a
positive creation theology.
10. This suggestion dates back at least to Augustine and is
to be found in the writings of most orthodox
theologians. However, one caveat should be noted. It
is philologically unlikely that it refers to an initial
act of creation in verse 1 (Blocher 1984, 64).
11. After a careful discussion of the similarities,
Westermann concludes that .• fl is to be expected that
there will be points of contact, similarities, and
agreements in the stories of creation and of primaeval
events. The question of dependence therefore is of no
real significance" (Westermann 1984, 41).
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12. Comparisons are often made with Marduk's destruction
and recreation of a piece of cloth in Enuma Elish,
Tablet IV, lines 22-26. While the wording of the
commands is similar the immediate context of this
account is not creation but a demonstration of divine
power. Significantly, Marduk does not create the world
by a word of command.
13. Compare the Yahwistic account of the creation of man.
The only limit is the prohibition regarding the fruit
from the tree in the centre of the garden.
14. As we shall see when we turn to the Psalms and the
Wisdom tradition, the conception of continuing creation
was already an important part of Israelite traditions.
P's achievement was to recognise that this
historicising of creation enabled the reconciliation of
Israelite doxology with this tradition concerning world
cr1 gins.
15. In verses 4 (light), 10 (earth and seas), 12
(vegetation), 18 (sun, moon, and stars), 21 (birds and
sea creatures), 25 (land animals excluding man), and 31
(a summary verse in which creation as a whole is judged
to be very good).
16. Those who argue in this way ignore the commonsense
reason for this.
17. Westermann 1984 argues convincingly against such
efforts to read special theological significance into
P's use of bara'.
18. This argument has been disputed by a number of
commentators and theologians. They point out that the
climax of the story is not the creation of man but the
sabbath rest in which all creation worships God (e.g.,
Moltmann 1985, 276-87).
19. e.g., the creation of man is presented as a mere
afterthought in the Enuma Elish. A fuller treatment is
reserved for the Atrahasis Epic.
20. One of the chief opponents of attempts to develop a
biblical theology of nature, John Reumann, concentrates
upon the Yahwistic account to the complete exclusion of
Genesis 1 (Reurnann 1973, 31-42).
21. It is apparent from their appearance in Isaiah and
Ezekiel that the kerubim were not angels (Blocher 1984,
188). Blocher describes them as "a concentrated form
of the universe itself, summed up in its more glorious
figures, but insofar as it remains at the disposal of
the Lord and acts as the instrument of his power"
(Blocher 1984, 189). Thus, in the context of Genesis
3, the guardian of the entrance to Eden personifies the
resistance of the created order to Adam's efforts to
master it.
22. It may be analysed as follows:
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TRANSITIONAL INTRODUCTION
RETURN TO CHAOS: 1. Violence in creation (6:11-12)
2. Resolution to destroy (6:13-22)
3. Command to enter ark (7:1-10)
4. Beginning of Flood (7:11-16)
5. Rising waters (7:17-29)
GOD'S REMEMBRANCE OF NOAH
NEW CREATION:	 5. Receding waters (8:2-5)
4. Drying of earth (8:6-14)
3. Command to leave ark (8:15-19)
2. Resolution to preserve order
(8:20-22)
1. Covenant blessing, and peace
(9:1-7)
23. Thus a recent article on creation in the wisdom
literature used as its main texts material from the
Book of Psalms (Hermisson 1984). This was given
classical expression by von Rad 1984, 62.
24. Reumann 1973, 69-73 stresses these uses to the
exclusion of all else in his effort to show that
biblical faith uses creation imagery only in the
service of salvation history.
25. The extension of 'the oppressed' to refer to the non-
human creation may be a legitimate recontextualisation
(cf. its extension by the prophets to refer to resident
aliens) but it does not reflect the author's intention.
26. As with Genesis 1 we would expect a polemical element
here.
27. It is arguable that the similarity between this psalm
and the H ymn of Akhnaten lies more at this formal level
than at the level of content. Consequently it is going
too far to assert direct influence as von Rad does.
28. Anderson 1984d, 13 is representative of the majority
view. However, Hermisson argues that 'the waters' of
verse 6 cannot be the subject of the verbs in verse 8a
(Hermisson 1984, 125, 134). In favour of the majority
position it must be noted that Hermisson's reading is
intended to establish the permanence of God's original
ordering: a conclusion which brings the psalm into
sharp conflict with the Genesis Flood narrative.
29. This promise, which reflects the promise enshrined in
the Noahic covenant, does appear to contradict the
prophetic use of de-creation as a way of expressing the
divine judgment.
30. This is a recurrent theme of the Old Testament, which
often associates theophanies of Yahweh with
earthquakes, storms and fire (e.g., 1 Ki. 19).
31. The reference to Sapon (the north) in verse 7a, is an
allusion to the primaeval world-mountain of Canaanite
myth.
32. e.g., at one point creation is likened to an
architectural masterpiece while, at another, the
metaphor of birth is used of the sea. In the latter
case, we again see the tendency to demythologise
ancient myths. The sense of danger associated with the
sea is gone.	 It has been reduced from a primordial
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enemy to an unruly child.
33. It could be said that the author was interested only in
the current use of the cosmological material: that he
wrote without reflecting on the secondary cosmological
implications of what he said. It would follow that we
could discount those implications. Reumann uses this
approach to discredit the cosmological teaching of
Romans 8, arguing that Paul used an apocalyptic
fragment out of context to correct an over-emphatic
realised eschatology (Reumann 1973, 99).
Against this, it should be recalled that the
occasional nature of Paul's letters does not imply that
they are informal or spontaneous (contra Adolf
Deissmann). It is arguable that,
Although each of Paul's letters were related to
some concrete historical situation they should not
be regarded as informal, impromptu writings but
rather as substitutes for Paul's personal
apostolic presence and his authoritative word to
the churches for which he regarded himself
responsible. (Cannon 1983, 138)
34. Pauline references to creation and nature occur in the
following contexts: doxological (Rom. 11:33-36, Col.
1:15-20), creedal (1 Cor. 8:6), Christological (Rom. 5,
1 Cor. 15), soteriological (Rom. 8), in relation to
baptism (Eph. 2:10, Col. 3:10), and in relation to
ethical questions (1 Cor. 10:26, 2 Cor. 9:lff., 1 Tim.
4:3f.). This list is by no means exhaustive and there
is considerable overlap between the categories (e.g.,
Col. 1:15-20 is an expression of Christian worship
being used because of its Christological and
soteriological implications).
35. This interpretation dates back at least to Origen but
has recently been defended by Gibbs 1971.
36. This eliminates the views of Augustine (all mankind);
Schiatter (unbelievers); Pelagius, and Fuchs (the
angelic creation); Theodore (angels and the sub-human
creation); and Barth (humankind and the sub-human
creation, but with the emphasis on the former so that,
in practise, his interpretation tends to that of
Augustine).
37. Robert Jenson calls this chapter "The most remarkable
trinitarian passage in the New Testament .
amounting to an entire theological system" (Jenson
1982b, 44).
38. Note that the original reference to the body of Christ
in this hymn need not have been cosmological. O'Brien
1982 points out that elsewhere in the Pauline corpus,
soma is used to refer to local congregations. Thus the
redaction may have been an editorial gloss to prevent
confusion with the pantheistic possibility rather than
a correction.
39. e.g., "All things come from you, subsist in you, go
back to you" (M. Ant. 4.23.2 cited by Lohse 1971, 52).
40. And in this way we see another connection between Jesus
Christ and the Old Testament covenantal concept of
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creation.
41. This point is made very clearly by Reumann 1973 and
Stuhimueller 1970. However, as we have seen, Reumann
is incorrect when he concludes that this is the only
use of creation language.
42. However, it has to be admitted that once such antipathy
has gained the ascendancy there are passages of
Scripture which may be reinterpreted to support it.
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CHAPTER 6
THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM OF NATURE
1.	 THE DYNAMIC TRINITY
In the preceding chapters I have suggested that there is a
correlation between the Christian doctrines of creation and
the Trinity. The Christian doctrine of creation is
discourse about the establishment, maintenance, and con-
summation of the relationship between the triune God and his
world. Thus an inadequate doctrine of the Trinity will be
unable to sustain an adequate doctrine of creation.
My examination of the biblical traditions suggests that
there is a proper ambivalence towards the material creation
within Christianity. However, where it has been influenced
by an Augustinian doctrine of God, that ambivalence has
tended to give way to antipathy. The Reformed tradition, on
the other hand, has modified Augustinianism in the direction
both of a more positive attitude to nature and a more fully
trinitarian interpretation of the Trinity.
In this final chapter I shall examine more closely the
correlation between the doctrines of the Trinity and of
creation. Given an alternative doctrine of the Trinity, it
should be possible to develop an account of the
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relationships between God, humankind, and the nonhuman
creation which more closely reflects that of the Bible. As
I noted in Chapter 1, Eastern Orthodoxy appears to combine a
more positive view of the natural world with a distinctive
trinitarian theology. Thus a fruitful starting point might
well be the doctrine of the Trinity developed by the
Cappadocian Fathers in their struggle with Arianism.
(a) The Cappadocjan understanding of the Trinity
The Cappadocian Fathers' understanding of the God-world
relationship has been the subject of some dispute. It is
sometimes suggested that their insistence on the full deity
of Christ, while solving pressing theological issues, did
nothing to clarify this relationship (Young 1983, 112). In
this connection, James Mackey questions their rejection of
subordinationism (Mackey 1983, 142); and Kaiser presents
their approach as a quest for rationality at the expense of
alienation from the historical roots of the doctrine in the
divine self-revelation (Kaiser 1982, 73).
However, others have pointed out that this insistence
on the full deity of Christ has to be understood in the
context of a novel way of interpreting the nature of God.
It is simply misleading to argue, as Tillich does, that
their approach is coherent only in the context of Neo-
platonism and that in any other context it must degenerate
into tritheism (Tillich 1968, 76-79). On the contrary, it
constitutes a rejection of the cosmological approach of Neo-
platonism, Origen and Augustine1
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The full deity of Christ is central to the Cappadocian
understanding of God. Their affirmation that Christ takes
his origin from the very being of the Father implies there
is genuine differentiation within the Godhead. Thus the
being of God is to be understood in terms of relationships
rather than a divine substance (Jenson 1982b, 85).
Furthermore, it becomes possible to speak of different kinds
of relationship both internal and external to the Godhead:
to distinguish between, on the one hand, generation and
procession (the Spirit is not a second Son) and, on the
other, generation and creation (the Son is not a creature).
Their affirmation that Christ is homoousios with the
Father takes this relational understanding a stage further.
The incarnate Jesus Christ is not merely revelatory of God
but actually is God. The Cappadocian God is one "whose own
deity is not separable from a figure of our temporal
history" (Jenson 1982b, 87). Such a God must be intimately
involved not only in salvation history or human history but
in creation history as a whole.
(1) The three hypostases: The background of the
Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity was the difficulty
created by the tension between the content of the Christian
revelation and the dominant form of trinitarianism at the
beginning of the fourth century. This tension gave way to
crisis with the reaction to Arius and the Council of Nicaea.
The problem faced by the Cappadocians was that of the
rational	 articulation	 of	 orthodox	 trinitarianism	 as
enshrined in the Nicene Creed and the Church's worship.
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In essence they sought a coherent way of maintaining
simultaneously that God is both one and many, and that his
activity is not constrained by any necessity. Furthermore,
the Nicene Creed ruled out the easy options of modalism,
subordinationism, and adoptionism.
The starting point of their solution was an emphasis on
the divine economy. They maintained the full deity of Jesus
Christ and the Holy Spirit on the strength of the witness of
revelation and the Church's experience of the incarnate
Logos and the Holy Spirit as agents of salvation (Meyendorff
1975, 180). Thus, for the Cappadocians, one of the major
tasks of trinitarian discourse was to provide a coherent
account of the relation between God and his activity.
In keeping with this emphasis on the Persons, the
Cappadocians proceeded by re-examining the terminology in
use in the Christian doctrine of God. The outcome was a
transformation of the concept of substance (ousia, phusis)
and the redefinition of Person (hypostasis).
Their new understanding of substance amounted to an
outright rejection of the Hellenistic understanding of the
concept. The Greek language permitted three different ways
of posing the question of being. One could enquire as to
the fact of something's existence, the identity (or content)
of the existent, or its way of existing. In Hellenistic
philosophy substance was the answer to the second of these
questions: the identity of an existent. Furthermore it was
specifiable and logically prior to an entity's way of
existing.
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The Cappadocians could no longer understand substance
in this way. Far from being specifiable, divine substance
was entirely incomprehensible. This should not be seen as
an admission of irrationality or incoherence; nor was it a
deliberate mystification of the doctrine of God. On the
contrary, it was meant in an entirely positive sense: as the
epistemological correlative of their affirmation of the
infinitude of God. Only finite substances are specifiable2.
This insistence prevented the identification of the divine
substance with the Father, thus ruling out the Eunomian form
of subordinationism. At the same time as rejecting its
specifiability, they denied its logical priority over an
existent's way of being. Thus the divine substance had now
to be regarded as logically simultaneous with God's way of
being as Trinity.
The other important change in trinitarian terminology
was their redefinition of hypostasis. Originally this term
was identical with ousia and, as a result, its use for the
divine Persons easily gave rise to the suspicion of
tritheism. However, in addition to denoting the underlying
substrate, or substance, of an entity, h ypostasis could also
denote its individuality. It was this secondary meaning
which the Cappadocians emphasised by connecting the word
more closely with prosopon.
The implications of this redefinition were twofold. By
using hypostasis to refer to the divine Persons, the
Cappadocians were able to give them ontological content.
The Persons could no longer be regarded merely as roles or
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successive modes of being of the one God. On the contrary,
the Persons were seen to be constitutive of God (Zizioulas
1985, 39). At the same time, the connection with prosopon
permitted the connotation of relationship and freedom rather
than the bare individuality which the word originally
denoted. Thus the trinitarian terminology was enriched and
the possibility of a relational ontology was created.
The outcome of this work of reinterpretation was a
Trinity in which God is three h ypostases. There is no
longer any room for the view that God might take on three
successive roles, or that God (Father) might posit two
lesser deities. These hypostases are distinguished only by
their mutual relationships: "the Father is not Son, and yet
this is not due to either deficiency or subjection of
essence; but the very fact of being unbegotten or begotten,
or proceeding, has given the name of Father to the first, of
the Son to the second, and to the third . 	 . of the Holy
Ghost" (Gregory of Nazianzus, Theol. Or., 5.9).
Furthermore, as Gregory's statement suggests, these
mutual relationships are not ontological distinctions:
Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not understood as distinct
levels of being. It follows that the Persons are co-eternal
(Gregory of Nazianzus, Theol. Or., 5.4), and co-equal3.
(ii) Perichoresis and the divine ousia: If we are no
longer permitted to think of the Trinity as three Persons
united by a common underlying substance, how can we maintain
the unity of the Christian God? The Cappadocians sought
this unity in God's threefold existence as Father, Son, and
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Holy Spirit.	 Unity must be a function of the inter-
relationships between the Persons.
The basis of this unity is the Father, whom the
Cappadocians, following an earlier Patristic insight,
continued to regard as arche, as fons trinitatis. By
maintaining that the Father is the fount of the Trinity,
they imported causality into the Godhead. However, this was
not a natural causality (which would have implied a unity
based in a common substance and would have led to the
suppression of the trinitarian distinctions) but a personal
causality. Such a personal conception of causality implies
a personal unity which actually entails the personal
distinctions. Expressing it rather differently, the Father
is the cause of the Trinity, but Father is a relational
term: it is defined by reference to Son and Holy Spirit.
Therefore the causality of the Father cannot be understood
apart from the simultaneous existence of the other Persons.
The concept which most fully expresses this personal
unity of interrelationship is that of perichoresis. This
asserts the complete mutual interpenetration of the
hypostases. They are distinguishable onl y by their relation
to the others: they cannot be defined by their roles in the
divine economy (Gregory of Nyssa, Abi., 261f., 263).
	
In
other words, the h ypostases are ontologically inseparable4.
How does this understanding of the hypostases and their
unity affect the concept of the divine ousia? As Gregory of
Nazianzus pointed out (Theol. Or. 5.4), the co-eternity of
the hypostases implies that the divine substance has no
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existence apart from the Persons. He illustrates what he
means by the vivid analogy of three suns focussed into one
beam (Gregory of Nazianzus, Theol. Or. 5.14).
Gregory of Nyssa underlines this revision of the
concept of divine substance with his assertion that ousia is
not a name signifying divine nature (Abi., 259). On the
contrary, it signifies a divine operation (Abi., 261).
Jenson interprets this as meaning that 'God' is a predicate
rather than a subject (Jenson 1982b, 113). These assertions
appear to contradict the Cappa&cian use of the social
analogy for the Trinity (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Abi.;
Gregory of Nazianzus, Theol. Or. 5.15). This analogy is
intended to suggest ousia and hostasis are related in a
manner analogous to that of universal and particular. The
apparent contradiction is resolved by reading Gregory of
Nyssa's assertions as denying the existence of a (static)
unitary substrate beneath the h ypostases and redefining
ousia in terms of the dynamic personal unity of the
hypostases.
The outcome is that, for the Cappadocians, God could no
longer be considered a static divine substance.
	 On the
contrary, God is boundless life, activity, or event. Thus
we find the Cappadocians asserting the divine infinitude
against the consensus of Hellenistic philosophy (e.g.,
Gregory of Nyssa, Abi., 262-66).
An important implication of this understanding of God
is that the eastern understanding of the telos of creation
is very different from that which evolved under Augustinian
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influence. The telos of the creature is not the rational
contemplation of the divine essence. On the contrary, it is
active participation in the divine activity (Meyendorff
1975, 133). The creature is called to live and move within
the infinite richness of the divine activity: to be a shadow
forever chasing the light of God.
(iii) Comments and criticism: However, the eastern
approach is itself by no means immune from the criticisms
which have been directed at Augustinian theology in the
preceding chapters. The contrast between east and west is
not as clear cut as some apologists for Eastern Orthodoxy
would have us believe. Indeed Augustine himself is accepted
by most Orthodox scholars as one of the Fathers 5 (though
admittedly, one whose work has to be interpreted in the
light of the insights of the Cappadocians and subsequent
eastern Fathers).
Careful selection of Cappadocian (and later Orthodox)
texts reveals passages in which typically Augustinian
sentiments are expressed. For example, the same
utilitarianism with regard to the natural world may be
discerned in Gregory of Nazianzus' advocacy of an ascent
spirituality (Or. 45: 8,9). In particular, he treats the
material realm as merely allegorical of the spiritual and
appears to believe that physical existence is a strictly
temporary state of affairs.
More serious is the eastern accommodation to Neo-
platonism. While it is true that in their trinitarian
theology the Cappadocians rejected the Neoplatonic consensus
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of their contemporaries, it is equally true that they failed
to carry through the implications of this rejection for
other aspects of their theology (Jenson 1969, 122). Neo-
platonism still permeates their view of time (Callahan 1958,
49); it appears in Gregory of Nyssa's use of Neoplatonic
psychology6 (Cat. Or.); and, it is clear in Gregory of
Nazianzus' advocacy of the inner way (Or. 28). Thus Neo-
platonic philosophy remained a continuing threat to eastern
as to western theology.
The effect of this incomplete rejection of Neoplatonism
was a sharpening of the ousia--energeia distinction in the
work of subsequent eastern Fathers. This culminated in the
theological system of St Gregory Palamas. With the
sharpening of this distinction, the relationship between God
and the world had once again been rendered problematic
(Williams 1977).
In spite of these criticisms, the trinitarian theology
of the Cappadocians remains an important alternative to that
of Augustinianism. The question remains whether this
alternative, when its insights are applied systematically to
the doctrine of creation, is capable of providing the basis
for a positive theology of nature.
(b) The Cappadocian Trinit y Today
However, it is by no means straightforward to adapt the
Cappadocian analysis of the Trinity for use today. The
differences between the Hellenistic context of the
Cappadocians and our own post-Enlightenment context are so
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great as to create a major problem of theological
hermeneutics. One attempt at reinterpreting the Cappadocian
theology for the twentieth century is that of the American
theologian Robert Jenson. His interpretation has the
advantage that it remains firmly rooted within the western
theological tradition, drawing heavily on Karl Barth for its
inspiration. Of particular interest in the present context
is his awareness of the correlation between the doctrines of
the Trinity and of creation. Indeed, Jenson has himself
offered a brief outline of how a trinitarian doctrine of
creation might be developed (Jenson 1982a).
(1) Hypostasis as identity : Jenson follows the
Cappadocians in insisting upon the close connection of the
h ypostases with the divine economy. God reveals himself as
the transcendent will which called Israel out of Egypt and
creation out of nothing (God the Father). He reveals
himself as the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth (God
the Son). He reveals himself as that personal power which,
coming to the Church, enables us to participate in the
future of the Father and the Son (God the Holy Spirit).
However, he goes beyond the Cappadocian view that the
h ypostases are distinguished only by their relations to
affirm the western doctrine that the hypostases are
subsistent relations. This move forces him to consider the
charge of suppressing the personal distinctions which is
often brought against Augustinianism.
In discussing the nature of these relations, he points
out that they, like the hypostases, are grounded in the
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divine economy. Specifically, the Persons are distinguished
by Jesus' relation of filial obedience to the Creator of
Israel, and the mission of the Spirit in response to Father
and Son. In other words, the interpersonal relations
correspond to the temporal structures of salvation history
(Jenson 1982b, 106).	 Now this could have been said by a
modalist. However, Jenson insists that these particular
relations are constitutive of the divine life: as God works,
so he is.
Jenson summarises his development of the Cappadocian
concept of hypostasis by proposing to translate it as
identity. This concept, so familiar in modern thought,
offers three denotations relevant to trinitarian discourse.
First, it denotes a proper name, or identifying
description. Applied to the Persons, this implies that
there are three ways of uniquely identifying the one God.
Again, this could be said by a modalist. In order to avoid
the modalist interpretation, it is necessary to insist that
the Christian God is never identified by any one of these
names but only by all three in conjunction: the proper name
of God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
Secondly, identity denotes that which endures in an
entity. It is the element of continuity: that which enables
us to speak of several temporally distinct entities as one
and the same. The Hellenistic response to the problem of
change and endurance is well-known. 	 Indeed it pervades
western thought.	 Continuity is assured in this world of
change by affirming the existence of a timeless substratum
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of reality: substance. Cappadocian trinitarianism offers a
radical alternative. According to Jenson, they affirmed
endurance by maintaining that three temporally distinct
entities are, in fact, one and the same. Once again, this
must be carefully distinguished from the modalist
interpretation. Modalism asserts that God is successively
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so that God himself cannot
finally be identified with any one of these roles (or even
all three in conjunction).
Thirdly, identity denotes the act of positing oneself
in and through time. It is this third denotation which most
clearly explains Jenson's affirmation of h ypostasis as
subsistent relation.	 The particular relations in question
are acts of self-definition.	 Once again, this must be
distinguished from modalism. It does not mean that God
posits himself three times as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
This would suggest that the h ypostases are merely roles
taken on by a hidden God.	 On the contrary, God is that
which is posited by these three acts of self-definition.
(ii) The triune infinity : Jenson's reinterpretation of
h ypostasis requires a corresponding reinterpretation of the
concept of ousia.	 Again following the Cappadocians, he
rejects the traditional ambivalence of substance. Instead
of allowing that there is a sense in which god both is and
has substance, Jenson insists that substance is un---
equivocally a divine predicate.
But what precisely is this divine substance? According
to Jenson, it is equivalent to infinitude. We have already
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seen that this was an important feature of the Cappadocian
understanding of divine substance. Predicating infinitude
of God implies that there can be no exhaustive definition of
God: God is incomprehensible. It also implies that God is
in no way delimitable. God is not limited by time or space:
God is eternal (Jenson 1982b, 166) and omnipresent. Nor is
God limited by other causes or agents: God is omnipotent.
Jenson is not satisfied with such a negative
understanding of divine substance. He presents a positive
interpretation of infinitude as inexhaustibility. According
to this interpretation God is absolute creativity, unbounded
future possibility. God, thus understood, is actively
engaged in overcoming all creaturely resistance to change.
Like the God of the Cappadocians, Jenson's God is the very
antithesis of Hellenistic concepts of deity.
	 And a
corresponding metaphysics will
	 likewise be the very
antithesis of Hellenistic metaphysics.
However, if God were understood only in such terms he
would be indistinguishable from a creative demon. Without a
specific characterisation, encounter with this god could
evoke only an existential horror vacui. Jenson makes this
point as the basis for developing a trinitarian
characterisation of temporal infinitude.
That the life-giving Spirit, the one who confronts the
present with the power of the eschaton, is God implies that
the eschaton (temporal infinity) is the unbounded fulfilment
of all things. It is the ultimate and inexhaustible
interrelating of all events, including God. Alternatively,
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it is the complete relating of all events to the history of
Jesus (Jenson 1982b, 177). In other words, it points to the
eschatological participation of all events in the life of
God8.
That Jesus is God also serves to impose a particular
character upon temporal infinity. It implies that the
eschaton must be characterised by the love which has been
enacted in the history of Jesus. Finally, that the Father
is God indicates that the eschaton must be thought of in
personal terms.
(iii) Towards an ontology of communion: Jenson's
analysis of temporal infinity in terms of inexhaustibility
of interrelations, love, and personhood has important
implications for the development of a Christian ontology.
At the outset, it implies that enduring realities need not
be substances.	 This contrasts with the major Hellenistic
traditions which have informed western thought. For any
intellectual system with a cyclic view of time (or even a
simple linear view), being entails persistence of the past.
This is assured by equating being with substance.
Jenson's interpretation of the Cappadocians offers an
alternative way of understanding being. He asserts that
being entails structural openness to the future. Endurance
is not an inherent characteristic of being, understood in
this way. On the contrary, the endurance of any entity is
dependent upon the identity of the future. In other words,
it is determined by the character of the eschaton.
Jenson, for the purposes of creating the basis of a
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trinitarian ontology, defines future (or eschaton) as the
inexhaustible act of interpreting all prior events in the
light of the love of Jesus Christ. The future is divine
activity. Flowing from this is his definition of time as "a
reaching back in antici pation" (Jenson 1982b, 177).
Finally, it allows him to offer a definition of being as
interpretative relatedness across time (Jenson 1982b, 182).
(iv) Comments and criticisms: A central point of
Jenson's trinitarianism is that the triune God's sovereignty
with respect to temporality should not be regarded as one of
antithesis.	 God is not sovereign over time because he
himself is timeless: the very negation of life. On the
contrary, his sovereignty is one of fullness and fulfilment.
God is sovereign over temporal existence because he makes it
possible, frees it from mere persistence, and brings it to
its ultimate fulfilment.
	 Borrowing terms from Barth's
doctrine of providence: p raecurrit, concurrit, succurrit.
However, Jenson develops his account of the inner-
trinitarian relations in a highly symmetrical fashion. When
combined with his insistence on the temporal distinction of
the h ypostases in relation to the divine economy and the
fact that their constitutive relations are rooted in
salvation history, the effect is to suggest a time-symmetric
Trinity.	 Symmetry of relations suggests symmetry of
causation.	 If this is the case, then his Trinity is as
static as the timeless deity of Hellenism and Christian
Platonism.	 Divine temporality entails asymmetry of causal
relations.	 Thus, against Jenson, I would argue for the
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retention of the Cappadocian priority of the Father.	 The
Father is fons trinitatis.
Jenson fears that such a priority must inevitably lead
to the affirmation of the persistence of the past. The
orientation towards the past of Barth's theology is cited as
a case in point. However, while recognising that this is a
danger whenever the Holy Spirit is neglected in trinitarian
discourse, it is not obvious that the priority of the Father
must lead to the neglect of the Spirit. On the contrary, it
is arguable that the priority of the Father actually
prevents a doctrine of the Trinity from subordinating the
Spirit to the Son by prohibiting the filiociue clause. That
Jenson himself is not entirely free from this danger is
clear from the following summary of the innertrinitarian
relationships: God is the Father as the source of the Son's
and the Spirit's Godhead; God is the Son as the recipient of
the Father's Godhead; and God is the Spirit as the spirit of
the Son's possession of the Father's Godhead" (Jenson 1982b,
106).
A second point about which I am unhappy is Jenson's
identification of the Cappadocian concept of h y ostasis with
the modern concept of personal identity. This appears to be
a direct consequence of his acceptance of the Augustinian
argument that because the h ypostases are distinguished only
by their mutual relations, they are constituted by those
relations and, hence, are those relations. As we saw above,
personal identity may be regarded as a particular form of
relationship: one which is self-definitive. However, while
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identity is more stable than role, there is a clear
continuity between the two. Furthermore, coming as it does
from an intellectual context dominated by psychoanalysis, it
lacks ontological content: it is a purely psychological
term.	 Thus, without an explicit redefinition, it cannot
function as an adequate substitute for h ypostasis. As it
stands, its use for h ypostasis easily creates a modalistic
impression.
Thirdly, it has been pointed out that Jenson's theology
tends towards immanentism (Gunton 1988). This tendency is
visible in his view that the Cappadocians proclaimed a God
whose deity is inseparable from the historical Jesus (Jenson
1982b, 87). There -is a sense in which God is not separable
from the history he has created. However, the sense must be
stated with some care if it is not to suggest that God and
creation are bound together in a way that places
unacceptable limits on the freedom of both. Since Jenson
does not expand on his comment, one is left with the
impression that God and the creature have become enmeshed:
there -is insufficient 'space' for the establishment of a
genuine personal relationship9.
In order to avoid this inference, we might add to
Jenson's statement that the inseparability of God and his
creation is a voluntary and personal one. It is the
inseparability of the free self-commitment of the one to the
other.
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2.	 CREATION AND THE TRIUNE GOD
(a) The nature of creation
As we saw in chapter 5, two major features characterise the
biblical teaching on creation: God created from nothing and
did so by means of a divine speech act.
The first of these characteristics is, on its own,
ambiguous. Does it express the conviction that the triune
God is the exclusive cause of created being? Or does it
speak of an ontological nihil: the material cause from which
God manufactured creation? The latter interpretation has
been a recurrent theme in western theology. Amongst the
theologians studied in the preceding chapters it appears
most clearly in the work of Paul Tillich. More recently it
has found a place in Moltmann's doctrine of creation.
In his expression of this interpretation, Moltmann
draws on the Platonising Kabbalistic doctrine of zimzum.
The creation of Nothingness is a preparatory work of deity
brought about by "a withdrawal by God into himself"
(Moltmann 1985, 86). Thus, in Moltmann's view, creation is
the corollary of a primordial divine self-negation, The
divine creativity is to be understood in terms of negation,
emptying, humiliation.	 This is in keeping with his
presentation of Christ's redemptive work and recalls
Luther's tendency to understand love as self-hatred. It
patently does not cohere with the entirely positive note
struck by the biblical accounts of creation or with the
trinitar-ian vision articulated by the Cappadocians and
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interpreted by Jenson.
The second major characteristic of creation, its status
as a divine speech act, may be regarded as functioning as a
qualification eliminating the ambiguity of the ex nihilo.
In the beginning, God spoke. Creation is a positive act of
divine expression: it is rooted entirely in God. Creation
owes nothing to any alien nihil standing in opposition to
God. Furthermore, it is positively rooted in God: the
expression of creation does not flow from a divine self-
negation.
Negatively, creation as divine speech act rules out a
variety of speculative theories about the world's origins.
Specifically, it contradicts the ever popular metaphors of
diffusion and overflow 10 (Dorner 1882, 10). However, apart
from the difficulties of reconciling such pantheistic
metaphors with orthodox Christian doctrine, they render
creation impersonal. Creation is no longer a personal act
but an uncontrolled and arbitrary event. If creation is the
impersonal overflow of divine substance then God cannot be
in control of himself let alone be sovereign over that
overflow. If so, the world is essentially alienated deity
and redemption must be reinterpreted as the quest for
victory over this alienation which is creatureliness.
Pantheism and gnostic hatred of matter are two sides of the
same coin, and both are contradicted by the entirely
personal Christian characterisation of creation as a speech
act.
Positively, this presentation of creation as a speech
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act underlines Hebrew and Christian faith in the sovereignty
of God. Thus it also rules out any doctrine of creation
which would present it primarily in terms of divine self-
fulfilment (Dorner 1882, 10). Furthermore, a speech act is
essentially rational. Thus creation should not be thought
of as in any way capricious. Finally, it implies that
creation is divine expression: thus any Christian doctrine
of creation entails the prior development of an appropriate
understanding of God.
(b) Creation as triune act
(1) A Christian characterisation of creation: It follows
that a distinctively Christian doctrine of creation may not
be developed independently of a doctrine of the Trinity. If
creation is a personal, sovereign and rational act of the
God who has revealed himself in Christ Jesus, it is an act
of the triune God. However, western developments of
trinitarianism which divorce the triunity from the divine
economy have led to understandings of creation in which the
nonhuman is ignored and devalued.
The more dynamic trinitarianism outlined above may
enable the development of a more positive assessment of the
nonhuman. The form such a development might take will
depend on the proposed relationship between the divine
Persons and the divine Being. According to the
Cappadocians, the Persons are primary and divine Being is a
function of their inexhaustible life in relationship with
one another.. Thus creation, understood as a personal act,
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must be an act of the divine Persons rather than of the
Being. The Father creates, the Son creates, and the Spirit
creates: and this does not mean merely that the one God
creates in a way that may be understood under three purely
symbolic headings. There are three personal agents of the
act of creation.
On the other hand, the inseparability of the three
Persons precludes any understanding of creation which would
ascribe it exclusively to one of the Persons (contra
Moltmann 1981, 112). Thus, Gregory of Nyssa could say that,
We do not learn that the Father does something on his
own, in which the Son does not co-operate. Or again,
that the Son acts on his own without the Spirit.
Rather does every operation which extends from God to
creation and is designated according to our differing
conceptions of it have its origin in the Father,
proceed through the Son, and reach its completion by
the Holy Spirit.	 (Abi., 261f.)
Or again, dealing specifically with the notion of God's
providential activity,
the principle of the overseeing and beholding power is
a unity in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It issues
from the Father, as from a spring. It is actualised by
the Son; and its grace is perfected by the power of the
Holy Spirit.	 No activity is distinguished among the
Persons,	 as if it were brought to completion
individually by each of them or separately apart from
their joint supervision. Rather all is providence,
care and direction of everything, whether in the
sensible creation or of heavenly nature, one and not
three.	 (j., 263)
Clearly the Cappadocian understanding of the Trinity
also precluded a doctrine of creation which failed to
distinguish the different roles of the three Persons in the
one act of creation. Such failure would, of course, betray
an indifference towards the inner-trinitarian distinctions.
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In summary, we may say that the work of creation is a single
divine act which is the joint work of three agents whose
roles in the one work are distinguished in a manner
analogous to and deriving from the inner-trinitarian
distinctions of the Persons.
(ii) Conce ptual difficulties with triune activit y : The
notion of triune activity, like the doctrine of the Trinity,
raises a number of conceptual difficulties for the western
mind.
First, there is the problem of triune agency as such.
In what sense can one speak of three agents for a single
act? This problem has been effectively suppressed by
western doctrines of the Trinity which tend to be monistic.
However, it is implicit in criticisms of the social analogy
which represent it as inherently tritheistic. Our
understanding of agency and individuality is such that we
tend to see a multiplicity of agents as a multiplicity of
individuals: three divine agents implies three gods.
This difficulty is essentially the same as the problem
of double agency: how is it possible to speak coherently of
more than one agent as being responsible for a particular
act? Specifically, how can God and a human individual be
held responsible for a specific act without a profound
violation of human freedom?
The latter problem is closely connected with the modern
undrstanding of freedom. One effect of the change in the
historical consciousness of western society which
accompanied the Enlightenment' 1
 was a transformation in the
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concept of freedom (Gilkey 1976, 193). Traditionally
Christian theology understood human freedom in terms of
vocation: freedom lay in responding to God's will for you.
In western society this has given way to an understanding of
freedom as autonomy. Human beings have come to be seen as
creators of themselves and their world 12 . As a correlative
of this new view of freedom western Christian theology has
come to be dominated by both deism and pantheism (Tanner
1988, 164f.).
This Pelagian understanding of human freedom is simply
incommensurable with the concept of double agency. Thus
theologians must expound with some care the sense in which
they can speak of double agency in order to demonstrate that
such discourse is coherent in the context of Christian
theology 13 . Barth's defence of concurrence (CD 111/3, 90-
154) is an illuminating example of such an exposition. The
divine act of accompanying creation, both as a whole and in
its multitude of individual events, rules out every deistic
interpretation of transcendence. God is present in every
event, preserving its participants, making possible their
activity, and guiding that activity towards the eschaton14.
Concurrence implies the immanence of God in creation.
However,	 in	 doing	 so,	 it	 avoids	 any	 pantheistic
identification of divine and creaturely actions.
Similarly, the coherence of triune activity can only be
demonstrated by the careful exposition of the concept of
peri choresi s.
Another problem is that of the sense in which creation
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may be said to be a single act. After all, creation clearly
consists of an uncountable multitude of events and the
biblical witness makes it clear that creation was not
I nstantaneous.
One way of understanding this would be to invoke some
such concept as that of Gordon Kaufman's master act (Mason
1982, 391). He explains this by reference to the career of
a medical student. That career consists of many events
which, to an outsider might seem quite disconnected.
However, to the student herself all these events are
coordinated into a single act, e.g., the act of becoming a
brain surgeon.	 The point of his parable is twofold:
(a) like human purposes, providential activity is not
unambiguously visible in particular segments of history, and
(b) a final purpose and the methods chosen for achieving it
are known only to the purposer (unless he or she dhooses to
reveal them to another).
Since Kaufman rules out divine intervention, his view
of divine activity is entirely dependent on this analogy.
God's creative activity taken as a whole is a complex master
act of purposing and achieving those purposes. Thus the
myriads of events which make up created reality are
coordinated into a unity by this master act.
However, this approach may be interpreted as offering a
static Parmenidean understanding of the universe (Mason
1982, 416).	 An atemporal deity eternally wills one thing:
creation as a whole.	 The manifold character of that
creation is merely a result of the projection of the one
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onto time'5.
It also encourages a tendency to minimise any reference
to distinct acts of God. The emphasis is all on the master
act of coordinating the events of creation while the fact
that the component acts must themselves be, in some sense,
acts of God is overlooked. In other words, the concept of a
master act is flexible (or vague) enough to be used in
conjunction with a Tillichian (or, even, Whiteheadian) view
of God in which the deity does nothing in particular.
Nevertheless, Kaufman is right in pointing out that
created events are coordinated by their ordering to the
divine purpose (or purposes). A collection of completely
uncoordinated events would not be creation but chaos.
However, there are forms of coordination which do not cohere
with the Christian concept of God.
How events are coordinated is critical. The biblical
accounts of creation (with their stress on the "In the
beginning" and their narration of a creation history)
clearly point to their coordination with reference to a
particular point in time.
Commonsense suggests that this point is none other than
the beginning itself. All events are coordinated from the
beginning: their relationships to one another are defined by
their relationship to the primordial event. All world lines
intersect in a common origin. Given the initial conditions
of such a cosmos an omniscient observer could deduce the
trajectories of all world lines; could calculate the
subsequent history of the universe.	 This is the static
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deterministic cosmos of LaPlace and of the hyper-Calvinists.
However, such a commonsense approach to the unity of
creation is contradicted by the dynamic trinitarian concept
of God with which we have been working.
(iii) The creative s peech act as trinitarian: 	 The
creative speech act is presented as voluntary and personal
(Lossky 1957, 94f.). This characterisation of creation
immediately indicates a concept of God which is not simply
monotheistic (Jenson 1973, 132). If God were absolutely one
there would be no reason to conceiive of creation as
personal. Creation as a personal act means that, whatever
else it is, creation involves a decision to be related to
others, to what is created (Jenson 1969, 168; Young 1976,
151). It would be inconceivable for a divine monad to make
such a decision.	 The decision to be related entails the
possibility within the godhead for such relatedness. 	 Thus
the Christian doctrine of creation carries within itself the
seeds of the doctrine of the Trinity and vice versa.
Recognising that creation is properly an act of the
Trinity as a whole, Jenson has proposed the following scheme
of appropriations:
Insofar as "the world is created" 'is equivalent to "the
world has been commanded (to be)," creation is the work
of the Father. Insofar as "the world is created" is
equivalent to "the world now is (by God's command),"
creation is the work of the Son. Insofar as the world
is created" is equivalent to "the world is (commanded
now) to be for God's purpose," creation is the work of
the Spirit. But these are one work; that they happen is
one event. (Jenson 1982a, 41)
He has analysed the one act of creation into
origination, sustenance, and consummation and appropriated
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these	 activities	 to	 Father,	 Son,	 and	 Holy	 Spirit
respectively. There is a clear precedent for this in
Eastern Orthodoxy, as witness the following statement
derived from St Basil by Vladimir Lossky:
The work of creation is common to the whole Trinity,
but each of the three persons is the cause of created
being in a way which is different though in each case
united to the others. . . . 'In the creation,
consider first the primordial cause . . . of all that
has been made -- this is the Father; then the operating
cause . . . which is the Son; and the perfecting cause
• . . the Holy Spirit: so that it is by the will of the
Father that the heavenly spirits are, by the operation
of the Son that they come into existence, and by the
presence of the Spirit that they are made perfect.' It
is this common action of the Trinity, manifested thus
in the double economy of the effecting Word and of the
perfecting Spirit, that confers upon all creatures not
simply being, but also 'good being' . . . the faculty
of being according to the good, to perfection. (Lossky
1957, lOOf.)
In both cases the historical character of God's
creative activity is brought out by referring the different
aspects of that activity to the three 'dimensions' of
creaturely temporality. Thus origination refers to the
absolute past of created being; sustenance refers to the
actual course of created history; and consummation refers to
the absolute future of creation. The particular
appropriations made by both Jenson and St Basil are amply
justified by an analysis of the relationships within the
innertrinitarian life.
We have already seen that the creative speech act may
be characterised as a divine promise. Now, if, following
Jenson's lead, we inquire into the roles of the Persons of
the Trinity -in relation to this promise we come to the
following formulation:
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The Father is the source of the promise, the one who
makes the primordial commitment to the creature, the Creator
of heaven and earth. The Son is the mediator of the
promise, the one who, before time and in time, enables the
promise to be fulfilled, the one through whom all things
were created. The Holy Spirit is the fulfilment of the
promise, the one for whom the Son makes straight a path, the
Lord and giver of life.
But what is the relationship between this trinitarian
account of the creative speech act and the doctrine of
divine providence? God's personal and gracious care for his
creatures is clearly the activity which properly flows from
the promise. It is the activity by which the triune God
fulfils the primordial promise to creation.
Providence clearly presupposes creation: in Barth's
terminology it is the external basis of the covenant.
Conversely, creation understood in terms of the divine
promise, presupposes providence: providential activity is a
corollary of the divine self-commitment implicit in the act
of creation.
Recognition of the very close relationship between
creation and providence is often taken as the cue for the
dissolution of creation in providence. This is particularly
true of those theological systems which focus exclusively on
the present (e.g., Schleiermacher, Aulén). However, as
Weber has pointed out, such systems have the effect of
coercing God into the present. Or, more precisely, the God
with which they deal is not the living God who is sovereign
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over past, present, and future, but a mere concept.
Furthermore such a conception of God and his creative
activity entails an ontological coordination between God and
creation (Weber 1981, 504f.) which must issue in a form of
pantheism.
(c) The promise of the Father
The divine fiat, the primordial expression of the promise,
constitutes the background for any theological discussion of
created being, human as well as nonhuman.
A promise is a commitment of oneself to a course of
action intended to achieve some end on behalf of an other or
others. Casting creation in these terms, it is first and
foremost God's gracious giving of himself to his creation:
it is a divine self-commitment (Thunberg 1965, 86). Thus it
involves God's acceptance of responsibility for his
creation. As we have already pointed out, this provides a
basis for a doctrine of God's providential care for his
creation.
It entails the positing of structures to which God may
appropriately commit himself. Again, characterising
creation as promise rather than command suggests that these
structures are better thought of as open-ended: an
incomplete, contingent order which offers a framework for
cosmic evolution.	 Indeed, since there is no preceding
structure to be overcome,	 it suggests an entirely
contentless	 initial	 state:	 the mere possibility of
subsequent finite ordering.
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The Father's promise is a divine commitment to this
void: a commitment to the maintenance and fulfilment of its
structures, and to the evocation of ever more complex sub-
structures within it. This personal giving of himself to
creation entails a commitment to guide the evolution of its
structures so as to enable its appropriate response.
(d) Implications for the kin gdom of nature
What are the implications of this understanding of creation
for our understanding of the nonhuman?
If creation is a divine promise, then to be is to be
one to which or to whom God has promised himself.	 This
implies that every existent is, by virtue of its
creaturehood, an object of divine love. Further, it follows
from this that humankind and the nonhuman creation in which
we are embedded are interesting for their own sakes (Jungel
1983, 34). Thus, contrary to the intuitions of Augustinian
Christianity, the nonhuman creation is worthy of our respect
and interest.
If creaturely being entails divine self-commitment, it
follows that to be is to be related to the triune God. The
doctrine of the Trinity and of creation, taken together,
point to the necessity of a relational ontology. As is the
case of God's own being, creaturely being is rooted in
relationships and processes rather than in things or
individual events.
Some theologians and philosophers who would agree thus
far have been tempted to insist that personal relationships
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are the basis of all being. Thus some forms of process
thought have opted for a panpsychism in which something akin
to personhood is predicated of all existents. At the other
extreme, personalistic forms of idealism tend to make non-
human existents dependent on the human subject.
While these are extreme views, the personal
relationships within the Trinity do constitute the paradigm
for all creaturely relationships. This is clear in the way
in which God chooses to reveal himself to his creation. The
person of Jesus Christ is the final point of contact between
God and the world (Meyendorff 1983, 36). In the hypostatic
union, Creator and creature become one and indivisible
without any loss of their distinctive natures, without any
confusion. There is an absolute difference but no distance.
Such a relational ontology gives rise to two very
important affirmations about creation both human and non-
human. It guarantees the autonomous reality of creatures by
protecting the otherness of the creature. A personal
relationship as the basis of creaturely being precludes the
possibility of a pantheistic dissolution of God in creation
or the creature in God. Closely related to this (Thunberg
1965, 69) is the fact that it guarantees the freedom of the
creature and the contingency of creation as a whole
(Zizioulas 1985, 39). This implies that creation as a whole
is radically historical: history is not just a function of
human culture. Contingency also reminds us that the initial
creation was an act of absolute novelty (Young 1976, 149).
Creation is essentially dynamic.
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3.	 THE KINGDOM OF NATURE AND THE TRIUNE GOD
(a) Sustenance as triune activity
Given the above account of creation, we may regard the
divine sustenance as appropriately the work of the Son
(while rejecting any suggestion that it might be exclusive
to the second Person of the Trinity).
(i) The meaning of sustenance: The content of the
doctrine is the affirmation that the God who has once acted
to create a finite contingent order remains faithful to that
order and the individuals therein. 	 God maintains created
being in and through time: sustenance is the continuation of
creation. Negatively, it is the maintenance of creation
against the threat of dissolution into non-existence.
Positively, it is maintenance towards a specific end: there
is a dynamic, developmental (even, progressive) element
within the doctrine.
This latter aspect is sometimes emphasised by use of
the term creatio continua. The dangers presented by the
implicit dissolution of creation in providence have already
been highlighted.	 However, it also tempts us to regard
preservation as continuous origination 16 . Thus,
the duration of a thing which has remained almost
unchanged through years or centuries, or millions of
years, is . . . not a static being which exists in
itself, but a continuous series of successive acts of
preservation, by which from moment to moment it is
decided afresh that this thing shall retain this
particular form.
Thus all maintenance is a continuous re-creation.
(Heim 1935, 182)
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Implicit in this is a denial of creaturely persistence.
Temporal succession is mere illusion: an artefact of the
succession of acts of creation. By thus undermining the
status of time in the created order, the doctrine of re-
creation effectively denies the central content of the
doctrine of preservation or sustenance. It also undermines
the freedom of created being' 7 .	 Created activity is of
necessity temporal. If temporality is an illusion and the
reality is a series of divinely ordained static moments of
creation, there can be no genuine activity on the part of
the creature but only the illusion thereof. And without the
reality of creaturely activity it is futile to speak of
creaturely freedom.
In order to maintain the dynamic dimension of the
doctrine while avoiding the dangers impilicit in creatio
continua, I shall use the term sustenance (Berkouwer 1952,
50-82).	 It also avoids the negative connotations of
preservation and conservation' 8 . This organic metaphor
maintains the dynamic nature of conservation without
suggesting that the end in view is external to the object of
sustenance.	 It speaks of the nourishing and bringing to
maturity of creation. It also reminds us that God's
creative activity subsequent to the act of origination is a
creation on the basis of and in organic continuity with what
has already been created19.
(ii) Sustenance is trinitarian: A Christocentric
account of this doctrine would certainly be in accord with
the New Testament. However, we must bear in mind the opera
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ad extra principle and the limitations it places upon
appropriation. Sustenance, like any divine activity, is an
activity of the whole Trinity. It would be tempting to
continue the process of analysis further by subdividing
sustenance into past, present, and future aspects. However,
we are saved from the prospect of an infinite regress by the
lack of biblical or other precedents for the continuation of
the analysis beyond this point.
(b) The sustaining power of the Son
How are we to understand this activity of the Son in such a
way as to allow roles for the Father and the Spirit? One
way would be to reflect upon the relationship between
sustenance and the other aspects of God's creative activity.
Returning to my original definition, sustenance is the
maintenance of what has been originated by God with a view
to its ultimate consummation. Sustenance is the historical
activity of reconciling the original creation with the new
heavens and new earth of the eschaton. Precisely because it
is the reconciliation of origin and eschaton it has to be
understood in terms of those activities.
Viewed in this way, Christ is the one who shapes
creaturely existence (Hardy & Ford 1984, 119). He it is who
preserves what has been originated, maintaining it against
the threat of dissolution, the chaos of universal thermal
equilibrium. However, as has been suggested by my use of
the term sustenance, there is a positive aspect to this
creative work of Christ.	 His shaping of existence is no
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mere preservation of past structures. On the contrary, an
essential dimension of sustenance is the evocation of new
dimensions, new levels, of order and complexity.
Cc) Ori g ination and sustenance
Sustenance is the maintenance or continuation of original
creation. Therefore it must be understood in the light of
that act of origination. Creation is an act of loving
communication based upon a divine decision: "To be is to be
addressed" by the Father (Jenson 1973, 134). The doctrine
of	 divine sustenance teaches that this address did not
occur once and for all. It does not permit the deistic
notion of creaturely persistence as merely the immanent
unfolding of a past divine act. On the contrary the Father
continues to address his creation.
The content of that address is the history of Jesus.
The Son is the Word of God addressed to all creatures and
not merely humanity.	 Thus it is that, through Jesus the
Son, "all things hold together." This implies a striking
affirmation of the biophysical universe. God addresses his
creatures by entering into creation (Jungel, 1976, 2f.;
Steck 1980, 267). Creation itself and not some transcendent
realm of ideas is the divinely appointed locus for the
encounter between God and the creature.
Also implicit in this view of sustenance is a denial of
contemporary secular eschatologies based on the indefinite
extrapolation of our present understanding of the physical
universe. Current cosmological models suggest that, left to
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itself, the universe would eventually relax to a state of
statistical equilibrium. In this state, the physical
universe will have achieved maximum entropy and stability.
It will have degenerated to the "waste and void" of Gn. 1:2.
Ironically, this final state is, mathematically speaking,
simpler and more orderly than the present living disorder.
In denying this, the doctrine of divine sustenance
denies the universal applicability of the second law of
thermodynamics. This negative aspect of divine sustenance
might be summarised as resistance to that entropy and order
which signifies death.
(d) Sustenance and fulfilment
Many of the cosmological models which most clearly portray
the end of the universe as a state of universal thermal
equilibrium also satisfy a topological condition known as
Strong Cosmic Censorship; a condition which approximates to
Laplacean determinism. This suggests that the doctrine of
divine sustenance constitutes an affirmation of genuine
creaturely freedom and implies divine resistance to any
tendency for the universe to degenerate into a deterministic
state. It also justifies Pannenberg's insistence that
Christ's work in relation to creation should be seen as
reconciliation rather than determination (Pannenberg 1968,
395). Christ shapes creaturely existence but not as an
archetype. Thus creation is free to be a unique contingent
and historical	 reality;	 it is not a necessary or
deterministic imago Christi.
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What of the eschatological aspect: the cooperation
between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the activity of
sustaining created being? Without this, sustenance would
degenerate into preservation; the history of creation would
be become a mere maintenance of the status quo laid down in
the act of origination.	 It is the eschatological call of
the Holy Spirit that distinguishes creation from the static
harmony of the Hellenistic cosmos. 	 He is the perfecting
cause of creation; the agent of its consummation.
One aspect of sustenance is the movement towards this
consummation. The pneumatological aspect is to be found in
the liberation of the creature from bondage to history; from
the persistence of the past. "To be, says the gospel, is not
to persist; it is rather to be surprised, to be called out
of what I have and might persist in, to what I do not have"
(Jenson 1973, 138). This is basic to Jenson's anthropology,
but, in the present context, it may be extended to cover the
novelty which is observed to be a real part of creation
history. To the extent that sustenance is the maintenance
of a history that is progressing in this way, it is an
activity of the Holy Spirit. It follows that the Spirit's
activity of consummation is not merely trans-historical. On
the contrary, moments of partial consummation (steps towards
the eschaton) are to be found in creation history.
Looked at in this light, the incarnation is a
prefiguring of the telos of creation. The historical
localised embodiment of God in creation (Dorner 1882, 18)
points towards the eschatological universal embodiment of
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God (Moltmann 1985, 244). In other words, the hypostatic
union of God and creature in Jesus of Nazareth both
prefigures and evokes an eschatological hypostatic union
between the triune God and creation (Meyendorff 1983, 36).
God is thus the ground of novelty: continually evoking
new structures in a manner which 'diver ges' towards the
eschaton 20 . Ultimately such a God is not limited by the
limitations of his creation at any historical epoch. On the
contrary, the God who revealed himself in the histories of
Israel and of Jesus has revealed himself to be essentially
one who is able to create new possibilities in every
situation.
4.	 THE TELOS OF THE KINGDOM
(a) The Holy S p irit and the fulfilment of creation
We come now to the cosmic implications of Pentecost.
	 The
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the Church implies his
indwelling in creation.
	 But how are we to understand the
role of the Holy Spirit in creation?
According to the Nicene Creed, the most fundamental
title of the Holy Spirit, the role which determines all his
other roles, is zoopoioun: the Giver of life. For twentieth
century thought this title conveys an irreducible mystery
since life, in spite of the importance of the concept, has
never been adequately defined (Lovelock 1988, 16-18).
Although many Christians have understood this role of
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life giver in purely soteriological terms, the New Testament
itself is not so restrictive. For example, Paul clearly
relates life-giving spirit to the breath of life (1 Cor.
15:45). In so doing, he makes a clear connection between
spirit as the new existence in humankind and the Hebrew (and
Greek) conception of spirit as the universal source of life.
While, in Genesis 1, the gift of life is presented as the
adornment of the orders of creation. Both presentations
point to the responsiveness of creation towards the creator.
Thus the gift of life is intimately related to the telos of
creation.
The role of the Holy Spirit has been strongly affirmed
within the eastern Orthodox traditions (primarily as a way
of affirming the deity of the Holy Spirit). However,
western theology has tended to relegate the Spirit to the
role of divine assistant in the sanctification of individual
human beings21 . As a corrective to this tendency any
contemporary doctrine of creation must explicitly discuss
the role of the Holy Spirit.
Reference to the creative work of the Spirit has
already been made in the preceding sections because of the
opera ad extra principle. The Holy Spirit, like the Father
and the Son, is intimately involved in every aspect of God's
creative activity. However, the trinitarian scheme
presented above suggests that the aspect of creation most
appropriate to the Spirit is the eschatological horizon: the
consummation of creation.
The key to an understanding of the consummation of
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creation lies in the Creed's insistence that the Holy Spirit
is the one who gives life to creation. Consummation is the
vivification of creation. This ought to rule out any
suggestion that Christianity envisages a nonmaterial, trans-
historical eschaton. It is, of course, true that just such
a view has dominated much of the history of Christian
theology.	 A purely spiritual eschaton is the corollary of
an intellectualistic understanding of spirit. When spirit
is equated with mind, life is seen solely in terms of
(conscious) mental processes and the nonrational becomes the
nonliving as in Cartesian thought.
The writings of Telihard de Chardin offer us a vision
of the eschatological vivification of the cosmos. However,
from the perspective of a doctrine of the nonhuman creation,
it is a flawed vision. He makes the Augustinian assumption
that life and spirit are to be understood entirely in terms
of human consciousness. Thus he defines the end of the
world as
The wholesale internal introversion upon itself of the
noosphere, which has simultaneously reached the
uttermost limits of its complexity and its centrality.
the overthrow of equilibrium, detaching the mind,
fulfilled at last, from its material matrix, so that it
will henceforth rest with all its weight in God-Omega
(Teilhard de Chardin 1965, 315f.)
His language may be novel but his eschatology is
clearly continuous with the purely spiritual eschatologies
of so much western theology22.
What understanding of consummation do we arrive at if
we revert to a Hebrew view of life? In Hebrew thought, the
chief characteristic of life is activity: it is, thus, far
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broader than the intellectualistic approach. 	 For example,
the activity of running water is sufficient to warrant the
description 'living' (Gn. 26:19). The vivification of the
cosmos is also its activation: its transformation from
passivity and inertia to responsiveness.
This is not to be understood in terms of a simple
linear progression. Since its origin, the cosmos has
harboured elements of both passivity and activity. The Holy
Spirit is the ultimate (or final) source of all created
activity and life (understood as that which tends towards
the eschatological activity of the cosmos).
There is a clear connection between the doctrine of the
Holy Spirit as the giver of life and the doctrine of the Son
of God as the one who reconciles the cosmos to himself. We
have already seen how the Christological dimension of
creation may be developed in terms of resistance to entropy
(i.e., static equilibrium) and evocation of novelty (which
implies ever increasing complexity). The creative activity
of the Holy Spirit may be seen in precisely parallel terms.
Just as in traditional soteriology, the Son reconciles and
the Spirit redeems. The work of the Holy Spirit is the
necessary consequence of the Son's reconciliation of all
things to himself. With the Son, the Spirit is the agent of
novelty.	 Specifically, he is the beautifier of creation
(Edwards 1971, 108ff) and the agent of fulfilment.
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(b) The Sabbath of Creation
On the face of it, the above comments on the eschaton as the
vivification of the cosmos stand in clear contradiction to
that most fundamental biblical symbol of the eschaton: the
Sabbath rest.
Moltmann has done much to develop the doctrine of the
Sabbath in the context of an ecological doctrine of
creation. Specifically he presents the Sabbath as a time
which has been sanctified so that it might symbolise the
completion of creation. "It is a completion through rest.
Out of God's rest spring the blessing and sanctification of
the seventh day" (Moltmann 1985, 278). It symbolises God's
confrontation of his creation and its corollary, creation's
coexistence with God. Furthermore, if the divine rest is to
be taken seriously, the Sabbath of creation is also
indicative of God's immanence in creation (Moltmann 1985,
280). Thus the consummation of creation is to be understood
as "the completion given through the reposeful presence of
the Creator in what he has created" (Moltmann 1985, 287).
Moltmann claims that rest is the fulfilment of
activity, being is the completion of doing. However, in the
process he has succeeded in presenting rest as opposed to
activity. The general impression that one is left with is
that rest fulfils activity by being its negation (just as in
much classical thought eternity is the fulfilment of time by
virtue of being its negation).
(i) The Sabbath and fulfilment: In order to avoid this
impression it would perhaps be preferable to present rest as
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fulfilled activity rather than the fulfilment of activity.
Alternatively, rest is ultimate activity and is thus to be
distinguished from virtually all creaturely activity which
is penultimate and preparatory.
Activity and rest are not direct opposites.
	 The
Sabbath rest is an active rest typified by the Temple
worship.	 Other biblical metaphors for the eschaton also
bring out this emphasis on an active rest. Amongst these
the most notable is perhaps the vision of the Kingdom as a
place of feasting and enjoyment. The Sabbath rest is the
active enjoyment of God and his blessings.
In other words, the rest which characterises the
eschaton is not passivity but the active rest in which all
creation joins together in the praise of God. It is thus
the unbounded fulfilment of the partial jubilation already
audible in creation23 . This is the vision behind the final
stanza of the Philippian hymn (Phil. 2:9-11): and this again
reminds us of the essential Christological dimension which
is not lost even in the ultimate fulfilment of all things.
If the Holy Spirit is the one who empowers this
eschatological song of creation, the Son is its theme, and
the Father its original composer.
But the Sabbath rest is primarily a divine rest. The
ultimate fulfilment of all things is, in a sense, also the
divine self-fulfilment. This should not be taken as
implying any defect in God which the act of creation seeks
to overcome.	 Rather, it refers to the fulfilment of the
divine promise.	 The eschatological Sabbath is a time when
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God is able to give himself fully to creation 24 and creation
is able to respond fully. It represents the complete
participation of creation in the triune life of God
(Zizioulas 1985, 50).
Seen	 in this	 light the Spirit's eschatological
vivification of the cosmos is nothing less than a qualified
deification of the cosmos 25 .	 Eastern Orthodoxy has
traditionally presented the work of the Spirit in humankind
as theiosis.	 It seems appropriate to extend this to the
Spirit's work in relation to the nonhuman creation.
(ii) The p resent and the Sabbath: Much of twentieth
century experience would suggest that the present stands in
direct contradiction of this vision of the future. However,
the Christian vision of the future does not depend on
history visibly tending towards the eschaton as a curve
towards its asymptote.	 Eschatology does not imply a
doctrine of progress.
It is more appropriate to regard certain moments in
history as anticipations of the eschaton. The paradigm
would be the history of Jesus (Pannenberg 1968, 392).
However, there are such moments in the life of the Church,
of society, and of every individual believer.
(c) Implications for the nonhuman Creation
The simplest, most obvious and yet most important
implication of all this for the nonhuman creation is that it
too will be an integral part of the eschatological spiral of
blessing and praise. This conclusion contrasts sharply with
-352--
traditional Christian views of the eschaton as purely
spiritual and trans-historical. However, it is consonant
with the unashamedly materialistic eschatological imagery of
the Bible.
We may also recall that the Spirit is the giver of
life. All life is the gift of God. Every living creature
receives its existence as a divine gift. As we shall see,
this may be used to reinterpret the dominium terrae.
Can anything be said about the mode of giving? If it
is seen in the light of the divine self-giving, we may rule
out certain interventionist models. The gift of life is not
merely extrinsic: it is not the superposition of spirit upon
a dead mechanism. Dualism and interventionism remain
intellectual possibilities but they are not encouraged by
the Christian insistence that all life has the character of
divine gift.
Neither is life to be dismissed as a mere epiphenomenon
of material realities. This position is simply an inversion
of the Cartesian view.
Finally the Spirit's role as final cause or agent of
eschatological transformation suggests that teleology ought
to be rehabilitated as a way of speaking about created
realities.
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5.	 HUMANKIND AND THE KINGDOM OF NATURE
(a) God's Image in Creation
A Christian theology of nature must recognise the centrality
of humankind to both the biblical understanding of the
created order and the contemporary eco-crisis.
The biblical understanding of humankind is often
summarised by the doctrine of the imago dei. This metaphor
for humanity is important for theologies of nature because,
although it occurs rarely in the Bible 26 , its occurrences
correlate with some of the most important passages about the
nonhuman creation (e.g., Gen. 1-11; Rom. 8; Col. 1:15-20).
Traditionally, the imaqo dei has been defined by the
negation of the nonhuman. By seeking the divine image in
that which distinguishes the human from the nonhuman,
theologians have been able to maintain the Hellenistic
concept of the essential divinity of human rationality.
This approach is not open to a theology of nature because it
presupposes that humankind stands over against the nonhuman.
It actively encourages the alienation from nature which a
theology of nature must question.
The alternative is to attend to the God whose image we
are supposed to portray in creation. The imago del cannot
be satisfactorily understood apart from careful theological
attention to the triune God and his relationships with the
world of humans and nonhumans. In recent years this process
has led to important revisions of the concept of personhood
in the light of the inner-trinitarian relationships.
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However, more could be done with God's self-revelation in
creation.
The immanence of the Spirit and the incarnation of the
Son suggest that embodiment will be essential to the divine
image (Moltmann 1985, 244-75). Furthermore, we must recall
that God gives himself to what he has created. And in this
self-giving he imparts a genuine, if dependent, existence
and a genuine dignity to every creature. This latter point
suggests the need for a revision of the consequences of
understanding humankind as the divine image.
A positive approach to the imago dei leads to the
affirmation that humankind is sufficiently like God for
communication to be possible. Human beings are those
creatures to whom God can address himself. They are those
creatures to whom God comes (as a fellow creature) and in
whom he dwells.	 At the same time, human beings above all
creatures can respond in kind to the divine address.
Looked at in this way, the idea of the divine image
does not impose any ontological distinction between the
human and the the nonhuman. Men and women are animals with
a unique function. That function is one of representation:
they represent God to creation and creation to God.
The dominium terrae is to be understood in the light of
this representative function. Thus the gift of the world to
humankind is symbolic of the gift of being and life to all
creatures.
(1) The contradiction of the ima ge:	 The Bible
juxtaposes the affirmation that humankind is the image of
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God with a text in which primordial humankind is faced with
the temptation to become as gods. What is presented as a
gift and a vocation in Genesis I is seized by force in
Genesis 3.
The story of the Fall is the story of how the
representative creature violates the order of creation. It
speaks of the denial of creation's character as a divine
gift.	 With that denial, the dominium terrae takes on a
radically different character. 	 Its character as divine
vocation gives way to the assertion of human autonomy and
absolute lordship over the world. Genesis 4-11 portrays
human relationships with God (Babel), with one another
(Cain, Lamech), and with the environment in terms of
violence.
In this situation human relationships are typically I-
it relationships and dominion can only be understood in
terms of the power to manipulate in accordance with one's
will.	 A corollary of this is the inevitable alienation of
human beings from the objects of their manipulation.	 The
cost of having the world at one's disposal is that sense of
thrownness of which Heidegger spoke. Alienation and
domination: each gives birth to the other in a vicious
circle which circumscribes all aspects of our present
existence27.
(ii) The redemption of the ima ge: A prerequisite of a
proper relationship between humankind and creation is the
redemption of that image which has been so distorted by our
age-old efforts at self-deification. 	 Some of the
-356-
implications	 of	 Christ's	 redeeming	 work	 for	 this
relationship will be examined in the concluding sections.
(b) Concurrence and human agency
As we have already seen, the doctrine of concurrence affirms
that God gives creation space and time to be itself. He
respects its relative freedom while remaining intimately
involved in every creaturely event.
It follows that God respects the relative freedom of
his image in creation. The fact that every human act may
also be regarded as a divine act 28 leads to the problem of
double agency when	 interpreted	 in terms of post-
Enlightenment thought. However, as I suggested earlier,
this problem does not arise within the intellectual context
of orthodox Christian theology.
This doctrine has important implications for a
theological understanding of the relationship between human-
kind and nature.	 By respecting the freedom of humankind,
God has permitted us the freedom to act in God- like ways
towards the rest of his creation.
Once again, we have arrived at the doctrine of the
dominium terrae. Concurrence implies that we have the
freedom to exercise (divine) lordship over creation. We are
God's vice-gerents in the world.
However, that lordship is qualified in a number of
ways. First, as we have already noted, creation is a gift
of divine love. And God's gift to us symbolises his gift of
being to all creatures. As such, it is not simply at human-
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kind's disposal. On the contrary, its symbolic character
demands that the gift be treated with respect. Furthermore,
it also demands an appropriate response to the Giver.
Secondly, we are called to exercise dominion as the
ima ge of God.	 It follows that appropriate human dominion
will be modelled upon the divine sovereignty. This is
characterised by a love for the creature (who cannot or will
not reciprocate) which is manifested in self-sacrificial
humble service (Mk. 10:45). It is thus more appropriate to
see it in terms of stewardship and priesthood than of
absolute monarchy.
Our freedom to act in God-like ways also has
implications for human creativity.	 It is sometimes
suggested that only God is genuinely creative. Against
this, the implications of concurrence suggest that we are
also called to be creators, or sub-creators (Tolkien 1964,
70). This goes beyond literature and art. We have been
granted the freedom to create not only to produce creations
of the imagination but to influence the physical creation in
which we live.
The freedom to act in God-like ways is our warrant for
engaging in scientific research and technological innovation.
Taking this a step further, science is to be thought of as
more than "thinking God's thoughts after him." The freedom
I envisage implies that science involves the creative
interpretation of nature. Similarly the freedom to pursue
technological innovation involves the dangerous freedom and
responsibility to alter (and manage) our environment.
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(c) Stewardship and sustenance
The relationship between human dominion and divine
sovereignty suggests a correlation between the ways in which
dominion is expressed and the ways in which God exercises
his sovereignty in relation to the world. Thus stewardship
may be expounded in terms of sustenance and priesthood in
terms of consummation.
Just as sustenance was seen to have negative and
positive aspects so too does stewardship.
Negatively, stewardship of creation may be seen as
conservation. It involves respect for the integrity of the
nonhuman creation and recognition of our interdependence.
The vocation to conserve creation justifies the actions of
Christians who make common cause with environmentalists and
green activists. It requires us to maintain the present
diversity of creation against further damage and to repair
the damage already done by human activities.
Positively, stewardship implies the encouragement of
diversity and novelty in creation. This is its point of
departure from secular environmentalism. Contrary to many
voices in the Green movement, stewardship of creation
recognises a positive place for science and technology.
Nature is our responsibility: we are called to manage it.
How does responsible stewardship differ from the post-
Enlightenment technocentric approach to the environment
(O'Riordan 1981, 11)? As O'Riordan describes it, the latter
sees the environment primarily in utilitarian terms.
Conservation is understood as resource management.	 Its
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approach to environmental problems is to reaffirm its faith
in our capacity to produce technological solutions as and
when they become necessary. Thus it implies a doctrine of
(technological) progress. It contrasts sharply with the
dominant views of the environmental movement (which may be
described as ecocentric).
Christian stewardship's recognition of our freedom to
engage in scientific research and technological innovation,
and our responsibility to manage the environment lays it
open	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 repudiation	 by	 ecocentric
environmentalists.	 However,	 its motivation is quite
different from that of technocentrism. 	 It does not
encourage the sustainable exploitation envisaged by techno-
centric environmentalists. On the contrary, motivated by
love for God and concern for our fellow creatures, it seeks
to nurture the diversity of the world: through the
conservation of the present complex of ecosystems and
environments but also through the artistic and technological
transformation of our world. In this way human creativity
is permitted a small part in the movement of creation
towards its eschatological vivification.
If technocentrism is the Enlightenment response to the
environment, ecocentrism is the Romantic reaction against
that response. The roots of the modern environmental
movement are to be found in the English Romantics and
particularly the American Transcendentalists. While there
are many affinities between ecocentrism and the concept of
stewardship, there are also some important differences.
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There is a recurring tendency amongst ecocentric
environmentalists to divinise nature and to seek to appease
the resultant deity by sacrificing on its altar much of the
technological achievement of the human race. Stewardship
refuses to recognise such a god and refuses to turn its back
on technology.
In effect, stewardship summarises a third approach to
the environment which is quite distinct from the secular
options. This is a theocentric environmentalism which
neither exalts nature to status of deity nor debases it to
the level of human resource. It is not motivated by self-
interest (neither the technocentric management of resources
nor the ecocentric fear of violating divine nature). Rather
it recognises nature as our fellow creature entrusted to our
care by a loving God.
(d) Priesthood and consummation
If stewardship summarises humankind's ethical response to
God the Creator, priesthood summarises our doxological
response. As the stewards of creation we represent God to
creation; as the priests of creation we represent creation
to God. Our response to God is creation's response
translated into words.
The idea that one of our tasks as Christians is to
mediate the worship of creation to God is particularly clear
in the life and ministry of St Francis of Assisi, e.g., in
his Canticle of Brother Sun. In that hymn, Francis is not
praising God for the creatures or directing his praise to
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the creatures themselves.
	 Modern translations render his
use of the prepositions cun and p by 'through' used in the
sense of instrumentality, e.g., "All praise be yours, my
Lord, through all that you have made" (Habig 1973, 130).
The hymn recognises that God does, in fact, receive praise
through all creatures. Following the lead of several Old
Testament Psalms, he praises God by interpreting the praises
of creation.
Praising God through the interpretation of creation is
central to our vocation as the priests of creation. Our
praise is the self-offering of creation to the Creator.
This is particularly clear in much eastern orthodox liturgy.
However, it is also applicable to art and scientific
research.
How does this relate to the eschatological consummation
of creation? The Christian vision of the eschaton is
primarily one of boundless praise. The praises of God which
we now sing are the historical anticipation of that
unbounded song of creation.
NOTES
1. This approach presents God as being-itself (in
Tillich's terminology, it is the ontological approach
to theology). It results in the identification of
creation, procession and generation. Thus it tends to
subordinationism, reducing Christ to the ontological
link between God and the world.
2. In Hellenistic thought, the idea of an infinite
substance was self-contradictory. 	 To apeiron (the
unbounded) was, according to Anaximander, the void in
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which the world came to be, and, according to
Aristotle, God (Collingwood 1945, 33).
	
Its sole
characteristic was indeterminacy. Thus to speak of
divine substance was to imply its finitude: that it
must be constrained in some way.
The Christian doctrine of creat-io ex nihilo had
already ruled out any external constraint on the divine
activity. For the Cappadocians, an orthodox reading of
the Nicene Creed also ruled out any internal necessity
on God. This was most easily expressed by their
affirmation of the divine infinitude.
3. It would appear to follow from this equality of status
that a form of address for one of the Persons is
equally appropriate for the others. Thus when Jesus
exhorts us to address God as Father (i.e.,, to enter
into a personal relationship with the Father), a
similar relationship is possible with the other Persons
and a similar form of address (i.e, a fully personal
form) is appropriate in their cases too. Contrast this
with the Origenist insistence that prayer be addressed
to the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit.
4. It should be stressed that ontological inseparability
does not imply epistemological inseparability. The
doctrine of perichoresis does not rule out a
trinitarian analysis of the divine activity (Zizioulas
1985, 129). An analogy from contemporary philosophy
would be the actual entities of process metaphysics:
the entire process of prehension and concretion which
constitutes an actual entity is ontologically
fundamental, it may not be divided into constituent
parts, and yet it is legitimate to speak of it as
consisting of these elements.
5. A good example would be the regularity with which
Florovsky refers to Augustine in his account of the
Christian doctrine of creation (Florovsky 1949, 59;
1976, 43-78).
6. This use of Neoplatonic psychology is particularly
damaging to the Cappadocian rejection of Neoplatonism
since it appears in the context of the statement of a
psychological analogy for the Trinity.
7. In view of such evidence it is hard to accept the
argument that the Cappadocians' use of Neoplatonism was
no more than the use of the accepted terminology for
intellectual discourse at that period (Meredith 1982,
11 20).
8. This says nothing about how events participate in the
divine life. It certainly does not entail the adoption
of universalism.
9. It is arguable that this lack of 'space' between God
and the world is a consequence of the "relative failure
to give the persons of the Godhead particularity and
distinctness" (Gunton 1988, 17) apparent in my
preceding points about his trinitarianism.
10. Their popularity stems from the belief that only by
regarding it as part of the divine essence can we show
proper respect for nature (e.g., Spretnak 1986, 53).
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11. Gilkey sees this change in historical consciousness and
its corresponding change in the concept of freedom as
largely a product of the Enhigtnment. However, it is
possible to detect a tendency in this direction in late
mediaeval theology, e.g., in the work of Gabriel Biel
(Tanner 1988, 132-41).
12. A process which reached its logical conclusion in
existentialism and process metaphysics.
13. Tanner 1988 argues that so long as theologians
accommodate theology to modern methods of intellectual
inquiry they will be unable to overcome this pervasive
Pelagianism. She also seeks to demonstrate that
traditional Christian discourse about divine and human
activity is coherent within its own methodological
framework (Tanner 1988, 81-119).
14. The triadic structure of concurrence (IDraecurrit,
concurrit, succurrit) caused by our experience of
temporality suggests the possibility of trinitarian
formulation.
15. To be fair to Kaufman, his own interpretation of the
master act is that it "is not an act performed once and
for all at the beginning of the historical process,
like winding up a clock and then letting it run; it is,
rather, the continuous activity of a living agent, and
it necessarily involves God's responding in particular
and unique ways (in the light of his final objectives)
to each new historical situation as it arises out of
interaction with his creatures" (Kaufman 1978, 303).
16. Several distinguished philosophers and theologians of
the past three centuries have succumbed to this
temptation. Amongst these may be numbered Descartes,
Malebranche, Berkeley, Edwards, and Leibniz (Quinn
1983, 56).
17. Process thought avoids the loss of creaturely freedom
by transferring creativity from God to every actual
entity. However, it too denies the persistence of the
creature.
18. Preservation commonly connotes the maintenance of the
status quo or the restoration of a former state.
Conservation connotes maintenance with an end in view,
but this is invariably seen in anthroopocentric terms
(Passmore 1980, 73).
19. The Exodus experience is a biblical paradigm of this
creatlo nova. God does a new thing which was humanly
speaking quite unpredictable, indeed impossible and
which gives rise to a wealth of new possibilities for
creaturely being. And yet for all its novelty it
stands in organic continuity with the sweep of created
history (Jenson 1982b, 35).
20. 1 might have used 'convergence' but this could suggest
a determinate end-state towards which God is
manipulating all things.
21. This tendency is part of a broader neglect of
pneumatology engendered by an Augustinian doctrine of
the Trinity.
22. This is by no means an isolated reference. Approving
-364-
references to a purely spiritual eschaton could have
been multiplied many times over. See e.g., Mooney
1968, 196-98; Santmire 1985, 155-71, 254-57.
23. A possible physical metaphor would be that of
sympathetic vibration and resonance. God has called
creation into being; not an arbitrary chaos or a static
cosmos but a world with the potential to respond to the
divine call. Subsequently God has spoken his Word to
creation with a view to evoking the appropriate
response. The first stumbling responses are met with
renewed divine address encouraging a stronger response
and so on ad infinitum. The eschaton corresponds to
the to-us-incomprehensible state of completely un-
bounded divine address and creaturely response: an
infinite spiral of blessing and praise.
24. With appropriate qualifications this may be symbolised
as the divine embodiment in creation (e.g., Dorner
1882, 18; Moltmann 1985, 13-17).
25. It is participation not communion. According to
Zizioulas, the latter pertains only to the divine being
(Zizioulas 1985, 94).
26. There are only three direct references in the Old
Testament (Gn. 1:26-27, 5:1-3, 9:5-6) and less than a
dozen in the New Testament (mostly in the Pauline
writings).
27. Picking up the connotation of violence in bios,
Zizioulas summarises this by speaking of biological
man.
28. It is a divine act in the sense that God precedes and
accompanies it (making the human act possible), and
finally brings it to fulfilment.
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